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There is an epistemological conflict between religion and science. While the claims 
of science are justified using epistemic methods whose reliability has been 
corroborated by other people and by other methods, the claims of religion are not 
justified in the same way. Different methods are used. This thesis offers both a 
comprehensive description of the distinctive epistemic methods of religion and a 
philosophical appraisal of the claim that such methods are knowledge-conferring. 
The methods explored are various and care has been taken to sample a broad range 
of religious cultures. It is found that the same religious methods, when used to 
answer the same questions, generate different answers for different practitioners. 
Additionally, the results of religious methods fail to agree with the results of other 
epistemic methods when employed independently. This lack of independent 
agreement is the primary reason for the exclusion of religious methods from science. 
It is further argued that (a) this lack of agreement is evidence that religious methods 
are unreliable, and (b) the agreement generated by scientific methods is evidence for 
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‘What has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What agreement is there between the 
Academy and the Church?’ – Tertullian, De Praescriptione Haereticorum 
There is a conflict between religion and science. It is not a conflict between two 
communities using guns and missiles, but a conflict between two communities using 
distinct sets of epistemic methods. Religion and science approach the problem of 
human knowledge very differently. Each community, in making use of very different 
tools, arrives at very different answers to the same questions. Whereas the epistemic 
methods of science are reliable, the epistemic methods of religion have not yet been 
shown to be so. If it is true that we ought to use only reliable methods to justify our 
beliefs about the world, then we currently have no justification for taking up religious 
methods in this role. This thesis has three central aims. The first aim is to outline the 
nature of the conflict and to show that it is the result of differences in methodology. 
The second aim is to provide something like a taxonomy of religious epistemic 
methods. The last aim is twofold: to give a philosophical account of the reliability of 
scientific methods and to show that we do not have sufficient reason to believe that 
any religious methods are reliable. 
Traditionally, supporters of the thesis that there is a conflict between religion and 
science have characterized the disharmony as one standing between faith and 
reason. These terms are unfortunately ambiguous and so have the tendency to 
mislead. Sometimes, ‘faith’ is understood to mean belief in the deliverances of 
supernatural testimony, while reason is understood as the exercise of our natural 
cognitive faculties, such as perception, deduction and induction. Other times, the 
‘faith vs. reason’ thesis is taken as implying that there is a conflict between religious 
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dogmatism and scientific fallibilism. However the terms are usually defined, this 
general approach is correct to the degree that it characterizes the conflict as an 
epistemological one, but incorrect to the degree that it limits the scope of the dispute 
to what are apparently Abrahamic or Western religious phenomena. The conflict 
between religion and science is not limited to the Christian, or Abrahamic, notions 
of faith in divine revelation on the one hand and the secular methods of Western 
science on the other. The conflict is not historically limited to the scientific revolution 
of seventeenth century Europe. Indeed, the Tungus Shaman who seeks revelatory 
visions through the ingestion of psilocybin is no less a part of the conflict than the 
young Earth creationist who believes that the remains of Noah’s Ark are currently 
rotting on Mt. Ararat. Certainly, the young Earth creationist grounds her knowledge 
in an act of faith, but does the Shaman also make use of this notion of faith? It would 
be an odd thing to say that the Shaman also believes by faith that the spirit guides 
encountered during the psychedelic vision have prophesied a flood. This is not faith 
in any traditional sense of the word. While ‘faith’ may be a contestable term, it is not 
so elastic as to extend naturally to the deliberate ingestion of magic mushrooms by 
non-Christian Siberian shamans for the purposes of interacting with 
anthropomorphic spirit guides who can tell the future. No. This is quite unlike our 
ordinary notion of faith.  
While it may be true, historically speaking, that the conflict finds its clearest 
manifestation in the Western European case studies of, say, the Galileo affair or the 
condemnation of 1277, the epistemological conflict runs deeper than either of these 
episodes might suggest. The conflict between science and religion is not a conflict 
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that stands merely between reason and faith, but between, in the most general sense, 
the methods of science and the methods of religion.  
‘Now,’ the reader might be wondering, ‘what would motivate the thought that 
there is any conflict in the first place?’ Perhaps a good place to start is the observation 
that everyday religious folk often make empirical claims which appear specious to 
secular folk. These claims either flatly contradict what science and common sense tell 
us is the case, or they are extremely unlikely according to science and common sense. 
For an example of a claim that contradicts the results of science, evangelical young 
Earth creationists argue that the universe is about 6000 years old. As is well known, 
geologists and physicists disagree strongly with such a recent estimate of the 
universe’s age, and collectively argue instead that the universe must be well over 1o 
billion years old. For an example of a religious claim with merely a very low 
probability, it is an orthodox Islamic doctrine that the Mahdi will be sent to Earth to 
defeat all evil shortly before the Day of Judgment. This prophecy is not in any clear 
sense contradicted by our existing scientific knowledge, or by common sense, or by 
historical evidence. It is simply an improbable claim, having virtually no independent 
support or precedent unless one accepts the tenets of Islam and the associated 
background knowledge that comes with that acceptance. Secular folk have no reason 
to think that the Mahdi is coming any time soon. So far as they are concerned, religion 
and science just fail to see things straight. 
Now, there are numerous other examples of religious claims conflicting with 
scientific ones; too many to list. Altogether, they show that religion and science often 
get into a state of disagreement. Secular scientists and religious believers often fail to 
converge on the same answers to the same questions. This lack of agreement would 
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not be a problem if religion and science sought to answer different questions. But if 
we assume that religion and science are alternative ways of discovering truths about 
the natural world, and if we assume that there are not two contrary truths, one 
religious and one secular, but only one, then it seems we are left with three options: 
either science is unreliable, or religion is unreliable, or both are. At least one party 
has gone wrong somewhere, so which party is the culprit? 
It is hardly a secret that most philosophers assume that religion is the culprit. 
Science has a pretty good epistemic reputation and, moreover, the world's religions 
are not only in conflict with science, but also with each other. Different religious 
traditions make different claims about the way the world is, has been and will be. 
And while it is not in dispute that disagreement in science is commonplace, scientists 
nevertheless often agree on what it would take to settle their disagreement. A central 
task in science is to seek out those observations that would be relevant to settling 
such disputes. There is often a core of scientific agreement that is used as common 
ground from which to build bridges between disputants. There are mutually 
acknowledged methods of dispute resolution. In contrast, religious doctrines are as 
numerous and diverse as the religious cultures from which they spring. There is no 
widely accepted method for settling religious disputes. The empirical claims of all the 
world’s religions have almost no universally agreed content, and any common 
content between different religions can often be traced to a common cultural or 
historical source. To give an example, Jews, Muslims and Christians share a common 
mythology surrounding the Angel Gabriel, yet this is no surprise given Christianity’s 
origin as a Messianic sect of Judaism, and given that the Qur’an incorporates stories 
known from earlier Jewish and Christian sources. On the other hand, once religious 
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cultures have been isolated for hundreds, thousands or even tens of thousands of 
years, they are divergent in the extreme. One is hard pressed to find an analogue for 
the Australian Aborigine’s rainbow serpent in the pre-contact religious tradition of 
Easter Island. 
Despite the diversity of religious opinion and despite the poor fit between the 
deliverances of religion with the deliverances of science, some mainstream 
philosophers (and plenty of pastors and parishioners) continue to argue that religion 
is a respectable way of coming to know facts about the natural world. Religion is, they 
say, a source of justified, true belief. How can the arguments of these (usually 
Christian) philosophers go forward in the face of this ongoing conflict with science? 
Given that religious claims often conflict with scientific claims, is it not thereby 
shown that religion is an unreliable source of empirical knowledge? One would think 
so, at least if one believed that science used only and all reliable epistemic methods. 
Yet on the contrary, some philosophers, notably the so-called ‘reformed 
epistemologists’, turn the tables on the secular philosophers. ‘What’s so special,’ they 
ask, ‘about naturalistic science?’ After all, science relies in large part on 
intersubjective reports of human perception, and we rely on human perception, we 
are told, because beliefs derived from perception are simply basic. Perceptual beliefs 
are not warranted by any arguments, but by the perceptions themselves. We have no 
reason to accept the testimony of perception, but this is no blight on perception as a 
source of knowledge. Perception is still a warranted source of beliefs because it is, in 
some epistemically normative sense, an appropriate source. For instance, when I 
hear my cat purring, I naturally form a belief that my cat is purring, and this belief is 
justified by the perception itself. I do not deduce that my cat is purring. It is no 
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inference or argument. I simply hear the cat purring, a belief is formed, and hey 
presto! The belief is justified. Although my belief arises without the aid of any 
argument or deliberation, my belief is not without warrant. Perceptions are simply, 
in and of themselves, justifications for beliefs. They are appropriate knowledge 
sources. 
This picture of human knowledge as resting on basic sources has worrying 
implications for the status of science qua privileged epistemological enterprise. If the 
astronomer notes that a pulsar has a pulse width of 0.04 seconds, and this is 
measured precisely by some scientific instrument, ultimately this measurement 
depends for its validity on the astronomer’s perception of the instrument. ‘Now 
what,’ the reformed epistemologist asks, ‘can justify this appeal to perception?’ If the 
measurement can only be established by perception, then since perception is not a 
rational or inferential process, but a basic one, science does not have any rational 
grounding. For the sceptic, this would show that science is ultimately an irrational 
enterprise. Science is grounded in perception, and we have no independent reason to 
take perception to be reliable. We are lost in a dangerous abyss, with the threat of 
relativism looming. But then, the foundationalist comes to the rescue. ‘Not all 
justification is inferential,’ he proclaims. ‘Some justification is non-inferential, and 
beliefs formed by perception are just like this.’ Perception is a basic, non-inferential 
belief-forming process. Perception can warrant some of our beliefs, despite our 
lacking any inferential justification for the beliefs formed.  
If this picture of human knowledge is right, then a question naturally presents 
itself: is perception unique in having this special, warrant-conferring basicality? Or 
are there other non-inferential belief forming processes? If there are some, could not 
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these supply us with justified religious beliefs? Thus, the reformed epistemologist 
argues that religious belief may not be justified by any arguments either, but may 
arrive in the believer directly by way of religious experience. So, whereas perceptual 
experiences justify perceptual beliefs, religious experiences justify religious beliefs. 
And it follows that, ultimately, both religion and science are grounded in experiences 
for which we can provide no non-circular evidence of reliability.  
Therefore, it is argued, there exists an epistemic parity between religious and 
scientific ways of knowing. The warrant conferred by the one activity is no different 
in quality to the warrant conferred by the other. Moreover, there is no higher 
authority to which we might appeal to show the superiority of one way of knowing 
over the other. We are in some sense wedded to our basic belief-forming practices. 
We use them, because we find that they are effective, but ultimately our opinion 
about their effectiveness is determined by evidence drawn from these very practices. 
This leads to an interesting problem: if neither the secular person nor the religious 
person ultimately has any independent justification for being secular or for being 
religious, then for what rational reason should anyone embrace a secular approach 
over a religious one? What evidence could we appeal to if we wanted to justify our 
preference for our chosen set of methods apart from evidence derived from our 
chosen set of methods? It would seem we were out of options. Moreover, if both 
religion and science are valid ways of knowing, grounded ultimately in personal 
experience, then why does the scientist eschew religious methods? If religious and 
scientific methods are equally warranted, then couldn’t religious methods be of some 
use to science? And shouldn’t the scientist embrace all warranted methods of 
inquiry? Why all this “secular chauvinism”? 
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This line of argument for epistemic parity is, I believe, ultimately a failure. 
Contrary to what the reformed epistemologists say, there are non-circular 
justifications for the reliability of perception and other scientific methods that are 
not available for religious methods. One such justification runs that scientific 
methods are public, while religious methods are private. This public/private 
distinction may not appear to do much legwork towards showing that scientific 
methods are reliable while religious methods are not. Yet public methods are such 
that they generate agreement when applied to the same question by different agents 
in similar conditions. This success at generating intersubjective agreement is a 
marker of their reliability. In contrast, religious methods are private. When they are 
applied to the same question by different agents in similar conditions, they generate 
disagreement. This is a clue that religious methods are unreliable.  
Furthermore, the various methods of science converge on the same answers to 
the same questions, while the various methods of religion fail to converge in the same 
way. The fact that various (independent) methods agree on the same result is all but 
miraculous unless we assume that there is some fact of the matter which the methods 
provide epistemic access to. This argument has been called the corroboration 
argument for scientific realism (Chakravartty 2011, §2.2). The thread of the 
corroboration argument can be traced patchily through the writings of Aristotle, 
Aquinas, Locke, Carnap, Reichenbach, Wesley Salmon and, more recently and 
explicitly, Ian Hacking. The existence of independent agreement between different 
methods is powerful evidence in favour of the reliability of those methods. Moreover, 
such evidence cannot be summoned for religious methods.  
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This thesis will argue for these conclusions over the course of its seven chapters. 
I begin by considering whether religion and science truly share any explanatory 
overlap. After all, if religions failed to make any knowledge claims about the world 
that might conflict with scientific claims, then my argument would fall at the first 
hurdle. A religion that made no claims about the world could not possibly contradict 
the results of science. It is imperative, then, to first discover whether the apparent 
knowledge claims of religion are considered to be genuine knowledge claims. Do 
religions really seek to tell us something about how the world is? Religions must 
make knowledge claims that conflict with scientific knowledge claims for any conflict 
argument to get off the ground. I assume from the outset that scientific explanations 
are not mere performances or rituals, but genuine attempts to account for empirical 
phenomena.  
For any non-philosopher, it may seem strange to even conjecture that religions 
make no claims at all about matters of fact. But there are several philosophers, among 
them Wittgenstein, who argue that religious claims, while superficially resembling 
bona fide knowledge claims, are nothing of the sort. Religious language is part of a 
larger performative or symbolic activity that should not be mistaken as seeking to 
provide knowledge about the world. Religion is not “bad science”. Rather, religious 
activity satisfies a human need. It is an integral part of human behaviour. It is a 
cultural practice, fulfilling a human need for ritual; satisfying an urge, not for 
understanding, but for meaning. I find this account of religious language 
unconvincing, and I will argue that while religious ritual and practice are important 
aspects of religion, more often than not, rituals and practices are grounded in and 
inform claims about the way the world is.   
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Wittgenstein finds something of an ally in the biologist Stephen Jay Gould, who 
argues that scientific and religious explanations occupy distinct explanatory realms. 
Thus, although science and religion both seek to explain, they do not seek to explain 
the same things. The former seeks to explain the world around us by reference to 
natural law and causal mechanisms that have observational consequences, whereas 
the latter seeks to explain the purpose and value of human life. This thesis, dubbed 
NOMA (for ‘Non-Overlapping Magisteria’), has been picked up by theologians and 
scientists alike as a useful line of demarcation between science and religion. NOMA 
is found to be untenable on several points, the most important of which is that when 
religions make claims about matters of value, these are often inextricably grounded 
in what are thought to be facts about the nature of the world.     
After having argued that religion and science share a common aim, I investigate 
whether the conflict between the two is one that science self-imposes. Is 
methodological naturalism the cause of the disagreement between religion and 
science? It has been argued that since science doesn’t let the supernatural through 
the door, science could never avoid a conflict with religion. Science arbitrarily rejects 
the supernatural from the get-go. So, one might ask, how could there be anything but 
conflict if the supernatural explanations of religion are never given a chance to 
compete with science on a level playing field? The idea is that methodological 
naturalism arbitrarily erects a defensive wall around science which religion is 
forbidden to climb. Religious knowledge claims are unjustifiably eschewed in 
science. This allegation has most often been made by young Earth creationists, and 
proponents of Intelligent Design theory. These writers argue that science unfairly or 
prejudicially eschews the supernatural from its investigations by the adoption of 
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methodological naturalism. If this prejudicial restriction were lifted, then there 
would be concord between religion and science. The conflict would dissolve, and 
science and religion could cooperate and collaborate. If it’s true that science 
unreasonably prohibits religion, then religious folk would be right to feel aggrieved. 
Such a commitment to naturalism would seem to amount to an atheistic bias within 
science that would exclude certain religious theories by fiat. In reply to this objection, 
secular philosophers of science have spilled quite a lot of ink attempting to explain 
to creationists why methodological naturalism is justified. I consider two popular 
justifications, but I ultimately reject both of them on the grounds that the 
metaphysical commitments of both justifications may be as prejudicial as the 
creationists allege. I offer a reformulation of methodological naturalism in purely 
epistemological terms, and I argue that this epistemological naturalism does not 
prohibit scientists from talking about certain kinds of entities, but only from 
justifying theories in certain kinds of ways. Gods and ghosts, I argue, may be welcome 
in science, in principle, but religious methods—religious sources of evidence—are 
barred from entry. But what would justify excluding religious methods? Is this not 
merely one more atheistic bias? Not so. I argue that religious methods are rejected 
from science on the grounds that such methods are private and fail to generate 
agreement between independent investigators. If science accepts only public 
methods, then it is clear why religious methods are barred from entry. 
The subsequent chapter addresses the question of how the knowledge claims of 
religion are justified. This chapter describes the distinctive epistemic methods of 
religion, and attempts to sort them according to the manner in which knowledge is 
transferred from the supernatural entities to the believer. There are four phenomenal 
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methods of religion 1. Divination 2. Acquaintance, 3. Innate Belief and 4. Testimony. 
There are also two logical methods, 5. Inference and 6. Paradox. An attempt has been 
made to survey the methods of a diverse range of religious communities, showing the 
range of religious methods that are distinct from those used within science. Since the 
argument of this thesis is that the conflict between science and religion is a conflict 
of methods, it is essential that I identify exactly which methods I mean. I list only 
those religious methods that are distinctively non-scientific. I would also like to 
reiterate that this chapter is not limited to describing the epistemic methods of one 
sect of Protestantism, or of any other tradition of the major religious sects. As much 
as possible, I seek to describe the methods of a wide range of divergent and unrelated 
religious systems, from Sufism to Shamanism. I do this for two reasons.  
Firstly, it is important to note how much common methodological ground is 
found between diverse religious traditions. To give just a couple of examples, spirit 
possession states and dream interpretation are taken by a wide range of historical 
religious cultures to provide reliable information to believers. The fact that the 
methods are so often common to a diverse assortment of religions is an enigma, but 
an enigma that I, quite unfortunately, cannot seek to explain in this thesis. What can 
be seen, however, is that these common methods produce different beliefs. The 
dreams of shamans and the dreams of Muslims fail to agree. Since the very same 
method is used in each case, an argument can be made that the method is unreliable.   
Secondly, there has been, and continues to be, a tendency in the philosophy of 
religion to draw an arbitrary line between so-called “primitive” religious practices 
and the “sophisticated” religious practices of the communities to which academic 
theologians belong. This tendency to demarcate between the “great world religions” 
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and the rest is unique in contemporary academia for its utter lack of cultural 
perspective. Indeed, in a recent edited volume titled Evidence and Religious Belief, 
published by Oxford University Press, not a single chapter addresses the sorts of 
common methods by which evidence for religious beliefs is typically collected across 
a diverse range of cultures, and only one chapter out of a total of eleven discusses 
polytheism; the rest are concerned with theism. ‘In the history of religions,’ says the 
writer of this solitary chapter, ‘polytheism commands attention, but for philosophy 
of religion, it virtually doesn’t exist’ (Hasker 2011, 186). Given that the track-record 
of all religious methods is equally poor, I see no reason to further encourage this kind 
of Abrahamic parochialism.  
Since there is no essential set of methods common to all religions at all times, it 
is imperative to gather something like a representative list of popular methods. It is 
impossible, I fear, to collect in one place an exhaustive list, since not only are religious 
methods diverse at present, but it is plausible that there may have once been very 
popular religious methods that have since vanished in the depths of human 
prehistory. Moreover, there may very well be new methods to come in the future (the 
e-meter of the Scientologists comes to mind). Nevertheless, I have attempted to 
classify religious methods according to certain broad categories, so that one may be 
able to find a place for any new methods in one of these categories.   
Having argued that science does not accept religious methods, and having 
outlined what those methods are, I move to the argument that religious methods are 
not only private, but probably unreliable. To this end, I consider the long-standing 
problem of religious diversity, and some religious responses to the problem. The 
problem of religious diversity presents the following challenge to the defender of 
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religious methods: if religious methods are trustworthy and reliable, what can 
explain such widespread disagreement among different religions? To this challenge, 
there are three popular apologetic responses. The perennialist argues that all 
religions converge on a common, deep truth. The pluralist argues that religions 
describe a common reality by means of different conceptual and perceptual 
frameworks. And the exclusivist argues that at most one religion is on the money, 
and that there are good reasons to suppose that it is one’s own. None of these 
apologetic accounts of religious diversity are superior to the theory that religious 
diversity results from the use of methods that are unreliable. 
Religious diversity is a problem for religious believers since religious diversity 
shows that there is widespread religious disagreement. What is the proper response 
to all this religious disagreement? What does it matter if religion and science 
disagree? How should the scientist react when she learns that some evangelical 
Christians believe in a worldwide flood? The subsequent chapter explores these 
questions. The general problem to be dealt with is that the beliefs of our intellectual 
equals, whether secular or religious, appear to be relevant to what we ourselves 
should believe, and therefore, their ideas deserve to be taken seriously. Much work 
has recently been done to deal with the problems associated with disagreement in 
the growing field of social epistemology. I add my own bit of ink to this debate by 
mounting an argument to the effect that the evidential force of a disagreement is 
weakened when one party’s position is predominantly justified by methods that are 
not public.  
Continuing on, I address a problem that is seldom dealt with. While the problems 
of religious diversity and disagreement are well known, the opposite problem of 
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religious parallelism is comparatively poorly explored. The world’s religions are 
diverse both in their beliefs and their ritual practices, yet any comparison between 
isolated religions is bound to turn up at least some similarities. Yes, religious beliefs 
and practices are diverse, yet we nevertheless encounter persistent and puzzling 
examples of religious agreement. Heroic demigods, ghosts, ancestor spirits and 
hellish underworlds are common features of isolated religions from east to west, pole 
to pole. A strong argument can be made that this agreement is generated by reliable 
religious methods. If religious methods generate consistent outputs such as these, 
then we have reason to think that some religious methods may be reliable. I argue 
that religious parallelism is difficult to account for on the theory that religious 
methods are reliable. Instead, I survey some promising naturalistic explanations of 
religious parallelism, concluding that religious parallelism is best explained by (a) a 
common cognitive disposition to over-detect agency in the world and (b) analogical 
reasoning. No appeal to reliable supernatural epistemic methods is needed.   
In the final chapter, I present the case for the reliability of scientific methods and 
the unreliability of religious methods. The argument is very simple: The methods of 
science typically generate both intersubjective agreement and agreement between a 
variety of different methods. The best explanation for this agreement is that there 
exists some fact that the different methods have converged upon. In contrast, the 
best explanation for the disagreement generated by religious methods is that there is 
no part of reality that the methods reliably provide access to. Thus, after having 
shown that there is a methodological conflict between science and religion, I 
conclude that the conflict is to be settled on the side of science. And so, I conclude 
that in the epistemological conflict between religion and science, there is a clear 
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victor. The methods of science outcompete the methods of religion. The methods of 
religion are yet to prove their mettle. 
In a famous quotation, Tertullian once asked rhetorically: ‘What has Athens to do 
with Jerusalem? What agreement is there between the Academy and the Church?’ 
Tertullian saw Athens—the capital city of reason—as a threat to the security of divine 
knowledge. Athens and Jerusalem disagreed, and this disagreement was a symptom 
of epistemic illness: at least one party had got things wrong. I find myself in 
agreement with Tertullian. Either the Academy is mistaken, or the Church is 
mistaken, or they both are. And yet, while the fruits of Jerusalem have been sour for 
the Sikh, bitter for the Hindu, and inedible for the atheist, the fruits of Athens have 
been sweeter for everyone.  
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1. Do Religions Make Knowledge Claims? 
Christianity is not a doctrine, not, I mean, a theory about what has happened & 
will happen to the human soul, but a description of something that actually takes 
place in human life. — Wittgenstein, Culture and Value  
1.1 Realism and Antirealism 
There are many points of religious doctrine that look for all the world like knowledge 
claims: 
    “God exists,” 
    “The Mahdi will come to defeat evil,” 
    “There was an original human pair,” 
    “There is a cycle of rebirth,” 
    “The gods created the world,” 
    “There was a global flood” 
… and so on. 
These doctrines do not appear to be exhortations to action, or poetic niceties, or 
performative utterances. They appear to be declarative and truth-apt statements 
about certain ways the world might be. Religious doctrines, then, often appear to aim 
at truth. This is at least prima facie evidence that religious doctrines actually do aim 
at truth, and if we were to accept this, we would be accepting a position called 
religious realism. 
This realism is not limited to religious doctrines. Many religious practices, such 
as prayer and sacrifice, make little sense without the assumption that lurking behind 
the practice lies some belief about a particular way that the world operates. Why leave 
offerings to the ancestor spirits if there are no ancestor spirits to receive them? Why 
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pray to God, if God is unable to hear prayers? At the very least, some religious 
practices seem to be performed because some religious adherents have metaphysical 
beliefs that might be true or false. Unlike points of doctrine, religious practices 
themselves can be neither true nor false. However, they may still be understood 
realistically: If religious practices are believed to be effective, this requires an 
assumption of the reality of some particular metaphysical picture. I brush my teeth 
because I want to keep plaque at bay. But if I did not believe that tooth-brushing kept 
plaque at bay, I would not brush my teeth. My belief, therefore, goes some distance 
in explaining my action.  
Religious realism is the natural view of the nature of religious activity. The 
religious realist holds, in short, that truth is an aim of religion. There may be other 
aims of religion, but truth is among them. Some religions may achieve this goal where 
others fail. Indeed, it may be the case that none of the world’s religions have been 
successful in achieving this goal. However, even if religion habitually misses its 
target, it remains the case that unlike poetry, etiquette and imperative commands, 
religious doctrines are not intended simply to evoke feeling, or to change behaviour, 
or to serve some social function. Religious language is often propositional, the 
propositions are often explanatory and the propositions may be true or false. This is 
a very common sense view of religion.    
However, as is well known, philosophers are often less than content with common 
sense, and no less a figure than Ludwig Wittgenstein took issue with religious 
realism. Wittgenstein is an infamously opaque writer, and the work that he has left 
us relating to religious belief is especially scanty, often in note form and littered with 
incomplete sentences, rhetorical questions and open-ended speculation. Despite this 
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paucity of material, and despite the common-sensicality of the position he sought to 
overturn, Wittgenstein has had a remarkable impact on the philosophy of religion, 
perhaps simply for the perceived novelty of his arguments. Although, owing to his 
prose style, it is often unclear exactly what his arguments are, one thing can be 
known for sure: Wittgenstein’s thoughts about religion stand in total opposition to 
the religious realism just now outlined. 
Against the realist position outlined above, antirealism rejects the claim that 
religion and science share truth as an aim. For the Wittgensteinian antirealist, 
religious practice is a human activity that is antecedent to any metaphysical theory 
said to justify the practice (Taliaferro 2013, §3). The aim of religion is not to explain 
puzzling empirical phenomena, but to live a particular kind of life. In the living of 
such a life, the religious person may attest to the truth of this or that doctrine, but 
this attestation is an expression of commitment, an oath, to a particular form of life. 
This commitment is not held because the evidence recommends it, and would be held 
even if the evidence suggested it was false. Indeed, evidence is wholly irrelevant to 
religious belief, since religious belief does not aim to explain anything. 
If Wittgensteinian antirealism is true, and religion does not share any of the aims 
of science, then there could not be a conflict between science and religion. If religious 
doctrines are not descriptive or “realistic”, then science and religion would not be in 
direct competition. Since my thesis is that both science and religion aim at truth and 
seek to attain it by employing distinct epistemic methods, it is imperative to show 
that religion and science really do aim at the same end.  
20 
 
1.2. Wittgensteinian Antirealism 
I believe that the best place to start to understand Wittgenstein’s philosophy of 
religion is the following proposition from the collection of notes, not directly related 
to the philosophy of religion, now known as On Certainty:  
318: there is no sharp boundary between methodological propositions and 
propositions within a method.  
For Wittgenstein, a methodological proposition in one context becomes a 
proposition to be appraised by some method in the next. We cannot, as it were, cleave 
off all of the methodological propositions as a distinct subset of our language. If we 
consider the claim that some thermometer is reliable, in one context this is a 
methodological proposition, assumed for the sake of testing others, yet it is a claim 
that can be assessed in its own right, once we adopt quite different methodological 
assumptions. What is assumed in one context can be scrutinized in another. What is 
background knowledge here becomes a tentative hypothesis there. This is an 
unproblematic claim. So far, so good. 
But Wittgenstein pushes further, and charges that some propositions are more 
fundamentally methodological, less hypothetical, than others. That Mars has an 
average distance from the sun of 227 million kilometres is more like a hypothesis 
than the claim that there are physical objects. The latter is more fundamentally 
methodological than the former. Without the latter, I could not even make sense of 
the former. As another example, take the Moorean claim that I have two hands. Such 
a claim is not often seriously treated as a proposition within a method. More often 
than not, this claim, and others like it, make up part of the unproblematic 
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background by which we decide whether other claims are true or false, plausible or 
implausible, sense or nonsense.  
If this picture of the structure of rationality is correct, then what are the 
implications for religion? Wittgenstein sees the situation like this: to say that one 
believes in the resurrection of Christ, for example, is partly to describe a proposition 
to which one assents (a proposition within a method) yet it is also to describe how 
other propositions are to be understood (a methodological proposition). 
Importantly, Wittgenstein argues that religious beliefs often sit at the more strictly 
methodological level of our belief system. Such beliefs will decide what propositions 
count as “making sense” elsewhere in the epistemic system, or, as Wittgenstein would 
say, in the religious language game. To believe in the resurrection of Christ is, 
therefore, not only, or not even necessarily, to accept a particular proposition as true, 
but to have a commitment to a particular methodology that decides what 
propositions will count as true elsewhere in the language game.  
To illustrate, consider the popular idiom: 
(A) ‘Everything happens for a reason’  
On Wittgenstein’s view, someone who accepts (A) does not really take it to be a 
hypothesis that might be true or false depending on how the evidence pans out: either 
everything happens for a reason or it doesn’t. Instead, (A) is more plausibly cast as a 
rule of interpretation. We might reconstruct (A) as the methodological principle (A*): 
(A*): ‘For all events, infer at least one purpose’ 
If (A) is better thought of as the methodological principle (A*), then arguing against 
(A) by asserting its negation utterly misses the point. Instead, Wittgenstein thinks 
that if I disagree with someone who accepts (A), I cannot say much more than that 
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the methodological principle (A*) is not a part of my own method. I see the world one 
way, and you see the world differently. You infer purposes. I do not. On this 
Wittgensteinian reading, (A) describes a framework for a particular style of language 
game. Religious language games have their own in-house rules and their own 
principles that decide what counts as making sense within their boundaries.  
Note that on this interpretation, religious discourse becomes importantly non-
evidential. One might ask someone who accepts (A): ‘But how do you know that 
everything happens for a reason?’ And to this question the believer in (A) can provide 
no evidence. Or rather, everything could be brought forth as evidence. That is to say, 
the believer of (A) could carry on pointing at every event that has happened for a 
reason, but this proof would be suitable only for those who are already playing the 
same language game. G.K. Chesterton had a similar thought in his very readable 
book, Orthodoxy: 
If one asked an ordinary intelligent man, on the spur of the moment, “Why do you 
prefer civilisation to savagery?” he would look wildly round at object after object, 
and would only be able to answer vaguely, “Why, there is that bookcase ... and the 
coals in the coal-scuttle ... and pianos ... and policemen.” The whole case for 
civilization is that the case for it is complex. It has done so many things. But that 
very multiplicity of proof which ought to make reply overwhelming makes reply 
impossible. (1915, 150—1) 
While Chesterton’s point is to emphasise the practical impossibility of defending our 
most deeply held beliefs, for Wittgenstein, these beliefs are in principle 
indefensible—the ubiquity of evidence is the consequence of the fact that the belief is 
so deeply held. Once one accepts the fundamental reality of God, one sees his work 
everywhere. Once one has accepted some religious principle, it becomes a framework 
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for all further thought. The proposition is, in Wittgenstein’s terms, a hinge belief: a 
belief on which all others turn. 
So conceived, religious doctrines are not beliefs held on the basis of empirical 
evidence, and neither are they revised in the light of it. They are not explanations in 
the hypothetical sense that they can be empirically demonstrated to be true or false. 
Religious belief is better parsed as religious commitment; a way of framing all 
subsequent experience. Whether some religious commitment is true or false is not 
sensibly decided outside of the system from which it arises. Certainly, if we apply a 
scientific epistemic system to religious propositions, then many of them will appear 
to be major blunders. But as Wittgenstein notes: ‘whether a thing is a blunder or 
not—it is a blunder in a particular system. Just as something is a blunder in a 
particular game and not in another’ (2009, 170). The rugby player does not blunder 
when he holds the ball in his hands, despite this being a foul in a game of football. 
Religious blunders and scientific blunders are quite different things that depend on 
different sets of rules. The language game of religion is not the language game of 
science, and it is folly to assess the one by the rules of the other.  
Religious commitments, therefore, partly determine our picture of the world, 
including deciding what is true and false. Such beliefs decide which linguistic moves 
are part of the game and which are not. As Wittgenstein notes: ‘I did not get my 
picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I 
am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I 
distinguish between true and false’ (1969, §94).  
Wittgenstein considers the following case, which I think is worth quoting at 
length, in his Lectures on Religion: 
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Suppose you had two people, and one of them, when he had to decide which 
course to take, thought of retribution, and the other did not. One person might, 
for instance, be inclined to take everything that happened to him as a reward or 
punishment, and another person doesn’t think of this at all. 
If he is ill, he may think: “What have I done to deserve this?” This is one way 
of thinking of retribution. Another way is, he thinks in a general way whenever he 
is ashamed of himself: “This will be punished.” 
Take two people, one of whom talks of his behaviour and of what happens to 
him in terms of retribution, the other one does not. These people think entirely 
differently. Yet, so far, you can’t say they believe different things. 
Suppose someone is ill and he says: “This is a punishment,” and I say: “If I’m 
ill, I don’t think of punishment at all.” If you say: “Do you believe the opposite?” 
—you can call it believing the opposite, but it is entirely different from what we 
would normally call believing the opposite. 
I think differently, in a different way. I say different things to myself. I have 
different pictures. (2009, 169) 
Thus, different world pictures are not the sorts of things that could be mistaken, for 
they lay out the criteria by which we decide whether anything is mistaken. This 
thought leads Wittgenstein to the conclusion that it is mistaken to consider religious 
beliefs, whether held by peoples of primitive cultures or modern civilisations, as even 
possibly being grounded in error, since to be in error is to be mistaken according to 
some set of epistemic rules. But the very rules in question are those foundational 
principles which we want to claim are in error. In a rather surprising passage, 
Augustine of Hippo can be seen anticipating this Wittgensteinian thesis: ‘For 
whenever anyone affirms that the eternal ought to be valued above the things of time 
… no one judges that it ought to be so, but merely recognizes that it is so,’ and he also 
adds ‘we make these judgments according to those rules of truth within us which we 
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see in common, but no one ever passes judgment on the rules themselves’ (1999, 67). 
Religious doctrines are not bare empirical hypotheses about the way the world is, but 
non-explanatory frameworks that serve to ground the very notion of what would even 
count as a successful explanation. ‘No opinion serves as the foundation for a religious 
symbol,’ says Wittgenstein ‘and only an opinion can involve an error’ (1993, 123).  
The sceptic may reply to this: it is one thing to say world pictures differ, but quite 
another to say that none could be mistaken. Perhaps the theist simply has the wrong 
world view! Wittgenstein again thinks this misses the point. Are we to step outside 
of the language game to check which world picture is true and which is false from 
some neutral viewpoint? There is no such viewpoint, he says. Such attempts at 
viewpoint-neutrality fail, since all attempts lead to the adoption of another language 
game with its own peculiar rules. We are, as it were, trapped by language. The only 
way to understand how some language game works is to play the game.  
Clearly, Wittgenstein is no realist with regards to religious doctrines, but what 
about religious practices? Are religious practices and rituals realistic in the sense that 
they are thought to be effective? Predictably, Wittgenstein also thinks it is mistaken 
to regard religious practices as aiming at some goal, the achievement of which would 
require that some particular metaphysical thesis hold. He gives the following 
analogies: 
Burning in effigy. Kissing the picture of one's beloved. That is obviously not based 
on the belief that it will have some specific effect on the object which the picture 
represents. It aims at satisfaction and achieves it. Or rather: it aims at nothing at 
all; we just behave this way and then we feel satisfied. (1993, 123) 
His argument, then, is that there are compelling analogies in other aspects of our 
social life, in which ritualistic behaviour of a kind not dissimilar to that found in 
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religious life is clearly not aimed at any goal, the achievement of which requires that 
a certain metaphysical view be correct. Neither burning effigies nor kissing 
photographs appears to be aimed at anything other than the satisfaction of 
completing the ritual act. Ritual acts such as these are aimless. Furthermore, if we 
want to explain why some person burned an effigy, we need not assume that the 
person must believe that the represented party will be harmed. And if we want to 
explain the kissing of a photograph, we need not assume that the kisser must believe 
that somehow, by magic, the represented party will come to feel adored. To do so 
would be to seriously mischaracterize the intentional states of the agent. 
For Wittgenstein, it is uncharitable to interpret the collective activities of religious 
people as chronic blundering based on flawed or faulty metaphysical beliefs. He says: 
‘the characteristic feature of ritualistic action is not at all a view, an opinion, whether 
true or false,’ yet he adds ‘although an opinion—a belief—can itself be ritualistic or 
part of a rite’ (1993, 129). This is a difficult point to make sense of, but we might 
understand it by way of the following example: to accept the bread and wine of the 
Eucharist, one must perform a particular ritual, part of which is the acceptance of 
the proposition that the wine is the blood of Christ and that the bread is his body. 
Seemingly, this is a belief that is accepted as a part of the ritual, but once again, we 
are wrong-headed to approach it as though it were a theory or hypothesis of 
transubstantiation that explains why the ritual takes place. The belief itself could not 
be defended outside of the language game of religion. It is a part of the ritual of the 
Eucharist to regard the wine and the bread as the blood and the body of Christ. The 
belief is a part of the ritual, not an explanation of it.  
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Wittgenstein’s arguments can be quite compelling. But it is worth asking: does 
Wittgenstein take his thesis to hold universally, for all religious practices? It is 
exceedingly difficult to account for all religious activity as aimless. Indeed, we can at 
least imagine a case in which a religious practice aims at truth. What if, for example, 
a practicing Catholic were to carry a St. Christopher’s medal in her car just because 
she believes the truth-apt claim that this will prevent accidents? This practicing 
Catholic also believes that scientists could discover that this were true, but that their 
atheistic biases have so far prevented them from investigating the matter. This 
believer is motivated to bring the medal into the car just because she believes it really 
has some effect. If she were taken to Lima, however, and were to witness the 
abundance of cars crashing while bearing St. Christopher’s medals, she would reject 
her belief. Presumably, this good Catholic is not made non-religious by the fact that 
she believes that cars can be protected from crashes by certain amulets. What would 
Wittgenstein say about such behaviour? 
Wittgenstein might reply that this would not count as religious behaviour, since 
the woman in question does not have the right kind of religious world picture. But 
what is the right kind of religious world picture? Seemingly, it must be a world 
picture that does not incorporate the same sort of grammar as the scientist; a world 
picture in which empirical evidence is able to influence belief. But if that is so, then 
Wittgenstein has defined his way to victory against the religious realist. He will have 
defined ‘religion’ so narrowly that many paradigm examples of religious belief will 
not count as religious. 
To be clear, Wittgenstein is certainly right that some religious believers take part 
in practices that they do not assume are effective. Perhaps the Eucharist is like this 
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for many practicing Catholics. But some religious people do believe that some of their 
religious practices are effective, and to characterize their religious practices as 
aimless is clearly a misdescription. Adherents of the Christian Science Church choose 
prayer over conventional medicine when it comes to treating a range of illnesses. This 
has led to many otherwise preventable deaths of the children of Christian Science 
Church members. Is there really a better available explanation for their actions than 
the theory that the parents believed that prayer would be effective? Surely the parents 
did not ‘behave this way and then … feel satisfied’. No. The parents made a mistake. 
To describe their behavior—allowing their children to die—as ritualistic, or symbolic, 
or what have you, is about as uncharitable as you are going to get. Why, then, did the 
parents act this way? It seems that the parents just made an awful and regrettable 
mistake. They held certain beliefs about effective health care, and those beliefs were 
wrong.  
David and Ginger Twitchell were members of the Christian Science Church who, 
in 1986, refused to seek medical help for their two-year-old son, Robyn’s, obstructed 
bowel. Instead of taking him to the hospital, they prayed for him day and night. He 
died. The parents were found guilty of manslaughter. After the trial, David Twitchell 
expressed his deep regret and remorse. His failure, he said, was in not having prayed 
with sufficient faith. ‘If we were closer to God,’ lamented Twitchell, ‘we could have 
stopped this from happening. In that way, I blame myself’ (Twitchell quoted in 
Gottschalk 1988, 602). Had he prayed with the conviction that God required, his son 
would still be alive today. I see no reason not to take Twitchell at his word. His 
prayers were supposed to be effective, but something went wrong. 
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To say that aimlessness is the nature of all religious practices is therefore either 
to exclude many religious practices that are considered effective, or it is to 
mischaracterize the intentional states of the agents performing religious practices. If 
Wittgenstein is simply reducing the data set to count only aimless rituals as religious, 
then he is certainly right that such rituals are not performed because of a faulty 
metaphysics. To this, my reply would be that I am also interested in those rituals 
(such as the intercessory prayers of the Christian Scientists) that do have aims. But 
Wittgenstein appears to argue that even those religious rituals that appear to have 
aims do not. To this, my only reply is that such a hypothesis is an empirical and 
psychological one; not to be settled on logical grounds or by mere speculation. 
Whether religious adherents believe a religious ritual is effective is decided only by 
observing their behaviour and collecting first person reports. I would emphasise that 
Twitchell’s own words speak against Wittgenstein on this point. As the 
anthropologist Ioan Lewis said: ‘Let those who believe in spirits and possession speak 
for themselves’ (1971, 29). Quite so. 
Having given an overview of Wittgenstein’s approach to the philosophy of religion 
and having shown that Wittgenstein has not established that religious practices are 
not taken to be effective, I now turn to his claim that religious doctrines are not 
realistic, that they are not akin to scientific explanations and that they should not be 
judged by the same standards. What are Wittgenstein’s arguments that lead him to 
accept the kind of antirealism that he accepts?  
Wittgenstein appears to reach antirealist conclusions by way of two quite distinct 
arguments. I have tried to keep these two arguments separate, as their conclusions 
are very different. Indeed, their conclusions are contradictory. In light of this, 
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Wittgenstein scholars may wish to consider which of the arguments he would 
ultimately endorse. I am not particularly interested in that question, since I am no 
Wittgenstein scholar. The question I want to answer is whether either argument is 
any good.  
The first of the two arguments I dub the language game argument. The second I 
dub the hinge belief argument. The language game argument concludes that there is 
a logical and intentional divide between religious and scientific discourse. The hinge 
belief argument can be construed as having one of the following consequences. Either 
religious commitment is non-propositional (in which case, religion is an activity, or 
a form of “knowledge how”) or, if religious commitment is propositional, the 
propositions in question cannot be thought of as a kind of knowledge in the sense of 
being justified or justifiable. I will first look at the language game argument, before 
discussing the hinge belief argument in the two following sections. 
1.3 Different Meanings of “Truth” 
The language game argument runs that it is folly to assess religious doctrines 
according to scientific standards, since religion and science are two different sorts of 
language game that consist in different “grammars”. “Grammar” is a Wittgensteinian 
term of art, which refers to the network of rules that determine what will count as 
making sense and what will not in any language game (Biletzki and Matar 2014, 
§3.6). So, the respective grammars of religion and science decide what will count as 
true and false only in their own domains. Religion and science accept contrary 
methodological principles and because of this, there is a fundamental 
incommensurability between religion and science. In particular, the concept of truth 
found in religion simply isn’t the same thing as the concept of truth one finds in 
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science. While one might say that the scientific concept of truth is something like a 
correspondence relation—a relation between statements and the way the world 
actually is—the religious concept of truth is quite different.  
According to Wittgenstein’s follower, D.Z. Phillips, religious truth is the kind of 
truth one might deploy in the following sentence: ‘I have come to see the truth of the 
saying, that it is better to give than to receive’ (1970, 12). Phillips adds that when 
Jesus proclaimed that he was ‘the way, the truth, and the light’, he surely did not 
mean that he was a relation between sentences and the world. He meant that he was 
vitally important, or valuable, or to be emulated, or something along those lines. 
Religious truth is a distinctly value-laden concept, quite unlike the concept used in 
the sciences. Similarly, the Buddhist’s Four Noble Truths are not truths in the sense 
that one accepts them after consideration of all the supporting evidence. The Four 
Noble Truths are foundational principles that one either commits oneself to or does 
not. One hears the Four Noble Truths and one thinks ‘this is speaking to me’. Truth, 
then, is not the same relation in religion and science. Therefore, it follows that (a) 
there is a logical divide between scientific and religious language games: the rules of 
one do not apply to the other, and (b) there is an intentional divide between scientific 
and religious attitudes. That is to say, religious belief is not akin to scientific belief, 
since the former is a belief about what matters and the other is a belief simply about 
what is. Thus, to fault the believer in religious doctrines for being factually incorrect 
is confused, since one does not believe religious doctrines on the grounds that they 
are factually correct. 
Well, are religion and science really logically distinct? Phillips’ argument, I think, 
commits an equivocation fallacy. He argues that the fundamental ambiguity of truth 
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makes it impossible to discuss what is true in religion without employing the 
appropriate concept of religious truth. Yet this is simply not the case. The word 
‘truth’ might well be used differently in different contexts, but this does not imply 
that truth is a relation that is constituted differently in religious and scientific 
contexts. Truth does not differ depending on which language game we’re playing, 
although the meaning of the word ‘truth’ might differ in different contexts. There is 
an old story about Abraham Lincoln attributed to Lloyd Reinhardt (a story which I 
have inherited from Alan Musgrave). Lincoln poses the question:  
‘If tails as well as legs were called “legs” how many legs would a donkey have?’ 
‘Five, Mr Lincoln,’ comes the reply.  
But such a reply would be mistaken. Donkeys have four legs no matter how we talk 
about them (Musgrave 1999, 30). And no matter how ‘truth’ is ordinarily defined 
within religion, what is true remains the same.  
Why do I bring up donkeys’ legs? My reason for alluding to the example of Lincoln 
is to draw attention to the fact that if the religious meaning of ‘truth’ and the scientific 
meaning of ‘truth’ are not the same, then ‘truth’ is just a homonym. Therefore, there 
is no reason to think that science and religion are language games that must forever 
be logically distinct. We can take concepts from one language game and apply them 
in another in an effort at understanding. We might say, herein, that we will abolish 
the word ‘truth’. Instead, the religious concept of truth is now dubbed ‘R-truth’ and 
the scientific concept of truth is now dubbed ‘S-truth’. And once we tidy up our terms 
like this, the perceived incommensurability vanishes. The hardline skeptical scientist 
would say ‘there are no S-true propositions in religion,’ by which he means that there 
are no theories that correspond to the way the world really is, and the hardline 
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religious believer would say ‘there is no R-truth in science,’ by which she means that 
science cannot show us what our fundamental purpose is, or what is ultimately 
valuable. This is no insurmountable logical distinction; it is wordplay. The question 
of interest, now, is just whether any religious propositions aim to be S-true. Well, as 
far as I can tell, the claim that there was a global flood is taken by many evangelical 
Christians to be S-true, not R-true, and the fact that the young Earth creationist Ken 
Ham of Answers in Genesis recently spent over $100 million on the construction of 
a Noah’s Ark replica museum full of evidence for a young earth is the pudding where 
the proof can be found.   
To say that there is a fundamental logical distinction here—that one cannot apply 
the concepts from one language game in another in an attempt at understanding—is 
little more than a Wittgensteinian bias. To understand religion, Wittgenstein thinks, 
one must understand what is significant from within a religious viewpoint. One 
cannot have an understanding of religion without having a religious understanding. 
This is a terrible fallacy that is lamentably widespread: one cannot truly understand 
oppression without having been oppressed. One cannot truly understand a cultural 
or political system if one stands outside of it. It is as though one were to say that to 
truly understand insanity, it is of no use to study psychology; one must be stark 
raving mad. 
The claim that there is a logical divide between science and religion is false. But 
what about the claim that there is an intentional divide between scientific and 
religious beliefs? What about the claim that religious beliefs, unlike scientific beliefs, 
are not held because they are thought to be factually true? To this argument one can 
only repeat that such a claim is a psychological one that requires some kind of 
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psychological evidence. It is not the sort of claim that one can intuit a priori. Either 
religious belief is not held to be factually true, or this is not so. Given the 
preponderance of seemingly evidence-based justifications for religious belief, and 
given the number of believers who claim to reject their faith in the light of 
disconfirming evidence, including such events as the death of a loved one, we have at 
least some prima facie reason to prefer the latter hypothesis. As already mentioned, 
young Earth creationists defend their views by constructing multi-million-dollar 
Creation Museums, filled to the brim with supposed evidence for the events found in 
scripture. It would be odd to say that the museums are not really intended to provide 
evidence that the events recorded in scripture are factually accurate; even more odd 
to say that young Earth creationists were not really religious after all.  
So much for the language game argument. 
1.4 Religious Commitment as Propositional but Unjustifiable. 
The hinge belief argument is rather different from the language game argument. 
While the language game argument seeks to establish a logical and intentional 
distinction between religious and scientific epistemic systems, the hinge belief 
argument runs that religious commitment is either unjustifiable or non-
propositional. In either case, religions do not make knowledge claims. For if religious 
commitment is unjustifiable, then it is not knowledge, and if religious commitment 
is non-propositional, then it is no claim at all. Which of these two conclusions 
Wittgenstein might have endorsed depends on the interpretation of the key term 
‘hinge belief’.  
Let us first turn to the claim that religious commitment is propositional, but 
unjustifiable. On this view, religious commitment is composed of fundamental, 
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methodological propositions, and so it is not open to justification in the same way 
that the rest of our beliefs might be. The argument runs that religious commitment 
sits at the very bottom of our epistemic system. It cannot be “levered up”, as it were, 
by any other belief in order to be rationally appraised. In the same way, to test 
whether I have two hands, I hold them in front of my face. But the belief that I have 
two hands is so basic that one struggles to imagine what can be brought from lower 
down in the epistemic structure to ground the belief as reasonable. ‘For why 
shouldn't I test my eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two hands?’ asks 
Wittgenstein (1969, §125). Hinges, then, are not knowledge claims, since they are 
unjustifiable. When understood as propositions, hinge beliefs are generally 
unreflective beliefs that must have the following two properties: 
Circularity: The belief cannot be defended without begging the question. 
Evidential Immunity: The rationality of the belief cannot be affected by 
changes in evidence. 
If religious commitment is the acceptance of hinge beliefs, then religious 
commitment does not consist in making any knowledge claims. One does not take up 
a religious commitment in order to explain puzzling phenomena. Religious 
commitment is ultimately groundless and unjustified. That being said, religious 
commitment is the means by which other explanations are appraised. It is a lens 
through which we are able to see the world in a certain way. It defines the very 
boundaries of critical scrutiny. For the religious person, religious commitment 
defines the reasonableness of all other claims.  
If all of this is right so far, then to call religious commitment into reasonable 
doubt is impossible, since to doubt a hinge is to doubt everything. It is to doubt the 
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very methodological principles that make reasonable doubt possible. To excise a 
hinge from one’s network of beliefs is to dismantle part of the machine of justified 
belief. It is to recklessly take a sledgehammer to the mechanism. To doubt a hinge is 
possible, but to reasonably doubt a hinge is impossible. 
Note, that it is possible to change from one set of hinge beliefs to another. It is 
simply not possible to reasonably do so. No rational considerations could compel us 
to accept some set of hinges as superior to any other. Unlike hinges on doors, which 
may become rusty or stiff and need replacing, the hinges on which our beliefs turn 
do not admit to any evaluative appraisal and are not replaced on the grounds that 
they are defective, ineffective or wrong. Perhaps we have prudential reasons to 
change our hinge beliefs, or maybe we are just not feeling ourselves. We may have a 
conversion experience, or we may be coerced into accepting some new world picture. 
Fashions, of course, come and go. Whatever the reason, once we switch our hinge 
beliefs, we simply start to see the world differently than we did before.  
Is religious commitment like this? It is clear that some religious beliefs are 
logically more fundamental than others. Thus, for example, the shahādah (the 
statement that Allah is the only god and that Muhammad is his messenger) is 
fundamental in Sunni Islam; whereas the belief that one must ritually wash before 
prayer is derivative. Only by committing oneself to accepting the former belief is 
there any reason to accept the latter. The question is, however, are such logically 
fundamental religious claims actually hinges? Do they exhibit circularity and 
evidential immunity? There is clearly a difference between hinge beliefs and beliefs 
that merely enjoy a logically fundamental status.  
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So, can religious commitment be defended without begging the question? On first 
thought, it seems plausible that any defense of a deeply-held religious belief must beg 
the question. If one were to ask the Muslim why he accepts that Muhammad is the 
messenger of Allah, he may point to the Qur’an, in which Muhammad is described as 
a messenger of Allah. Yet it is immediately obvious that the authority of the Qur’an 
depends on the truth of the proposition that Muhammad is Allah’s messenger. This 
justification is circular. The Christian may also offer a circular defense, with the Bible 
sometimes described as a ‘self-authenticating text’ (Dawes 2016, 103). These are both 
clearly examples of circular justifications of religious commitment. But for our 
purposes, we require stronger evidence that that.  After all, logically speaking, any 
belief can be given a circular justification. What is needed is evidence that any 
defense of religious commitment must invoke religious commitment. It is the 
necessity of a circular justification that would show us that we are dealing with a 
hinge.  
Some examples of putative hinges come to mind, as Crispin Wright writes:  
It is utterly unclear how evidence might be amassed that there is an external 
world, that there are other minds, or that the world has a substantial history at 
all, which is not evidence specifically for particular features of the material world, 
or for the states of consciousness of particular people or for particular events in 
world history. (2003, 59) 
Religious commitment must be unavoidably circular in the same way as these 
paradigm examples of hinges are. Yet religious commitment is not always like this. 
Consider the popular Islamic argument that evidence for the divine origins of the 
Qur’an can be found in the miracle of its prose style. As is stated in the Qur’an:  
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And if you are in doubt concerning that which we have sent down [i.e. the Qur’an] 
to Our slave [i.e. Muhammad], then produce a surah of the like thereof and call 
your witnesses beside Allah, if ye are truthful. And if ye do it not—and ye can never 
do it—then guard yourselves against the fire prepared for disbelievers, whose fuel 
is of men and stones. (2:23—24) 
Indeed, the Qur’an is here offering a unique challenge for the unbeliever. The 
argument is that the Qur’an is written in such magnificent prose that Muhammad, 
an illiterate and poorly educated man, could not have devised it himself. It must have 
been a divine revelation. If anyone else were to produce a surah comparable in beauty 
and poetic form to one contained in the Qur’an, then the Qur’an would be shown not 
to be divinely inspired. Suppose that I, as an atheist, read the Qur’an and I concur 
that unless a similar literary feat could be performed, then it is unlikely that the 
Qur’an could have originated with Muhammed without divine revelation. I do a bit 
of research into the history of the Qur’an and discover that Muhammad was indeed 
the person who dictated it. I try my hardest to produce a comparable surah and I 
search extensively to find an example. I find none. It follows that I should, at least 
tentatively, believe that the Qur’an is a divine revelation and that Muhammad is the 
messenger of Allah. In short, I should come to accept the content of the shahādah, 
and I would have been led to do so by a rational method. So, there is at least one 
example of religious commitment justified by a non-circular argument, and so 
religious commitment is not universally justified circularly. 
Does religious commitment exhibit evidential immunity? On first sight, there 
seem to be good reasons to think so. One of the pervasive features of religious 
commitment is its lack of what Popper terms empirical content (1959). Religious 
commitment, it is often said, is infamously unfalsifiable. Religions make few 
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predictions that could possibly show them to be false. Take some bare theistic 
postulate such as that there exists an omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent 
person. This postulate is compatible with any possible observation. The claim is 
simply unfalsifiable. There is no obvious piece of evidence that might lead us to 
rationally reject the theory. Certainly, many instances of religious commitment are 
like this. There is no way evidence can speak against the commitment, since many of 
the core claims concern invisible and undetectable agents, as well as events that occur 
in inaccessible, supernatural realms. The metaphysical elements of religious 
doctrines are often empirically evasive, and so the theories containing them have zero 
empirical content. Therefore, we have reason to suspect that religious commitment 
is evidentially immune. But is all religious commitment evidentially immune? I do 
not think so, and I provide some examples in the following chapter dealing with the 
testability of supernatural claims within science. For now, I bring the reader’s 
attention to the problem of evil, which, if it were successful, would be just the kind of 
evidence capable of rationally undermining a theistic commitment.  
It is important not to confuse evidential immunity with an unwillingness to 
change one’s belief in the light of new evidence. Religious commitment is not a hinge 
belief merely because the evidence against it is never taken seriously or consistently 
disregarded. This would be to confuse the attitude of the believer towards her belief 
with the logico-epistemological consequences of what is believed. A religious claim is 
a hinge only if there is no relevant, non-circular evidence that could affect the 
probability of the claim. It is important to be clear on this point, for as is well known 
religious believers often tenaciously cling to their religious commitments even in the 
face of compelling evidence to the contrary. Yet that does not show the commitments 
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to be hinges. It only shows those religious believers to be stubborn. Indeed, evidence 
not taken seriously is evidence nonetheless. For a hinge belief, there is no question 
of evidence.  
What can we conclude? In some respects, religious commitment is hinge-like, but 
religious commitment does not always exhibit the necessary circularity or evidential 
immunity to count as a bona fide hinge belief. Religious commitment can be 
appraised on grounds that do not beg the question, and the credence one has in one’s 
religious commitments may change as the evidence changes. Thus, religious 
commitment, if propositional, is not unjustifiable. 
1.5 Religious Commitment as Non-Propositional 
So we arrive at our last Wittgensteinian option. Perhaps religions do not make 
knowledge claims simply because religious commitment does not consist in mental 
assent to any claims at all. Perhaps religious commitment is non-propositional. Up 
to this point, we have been understanding hinge beliefs to be fundamental, 
methodological propositions. But perhaps, as Daniéle Moyal-Sharrock argues, hinge 
beliefs merely ‘look like statements about reality, but are not’ (2007, 42). But if 
religious commitment is a hinge belief in this non-propositional sense, if religious 
commitment is not commitment to a set of claims, then what else could it be? The 
answer given by the proponents of this view is that it is a commitment to a way of 
behaving. Hinge beliefs are unreflective, non-propositional and normally expressed 
only in our practices. They are not sophisticated thoughts, but something closer to 
basic animal urges. ‘Does a cat know that a mouse exists?’ Wittgenstein asks (1993, 
478). We are inclined, I suppose, to answer ‘no’. Wittgenstein’s disciple Norman 
Malcolm elaborates on this example: 
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A cat watches a mouse hole. It would be natural to say that the cat knows, or 
believes, that a mouse may come out of the hole. But what does this come to? Are 
we attributing to the cat the propositional thought, ‘a mouse may appear’? No. We 
are only placing this behaviour in the larger pattern of cat-seeking-mouse 
behaviour. An infant reaches for its milk bottle. Does it ‘believe’ that what is in the 
bottle is milk? One could say this. But what would it mean? Just that there is this 
behaviour of reaching for the bottle from which it has been fed in the past; plus, 
perhaps, the fact that it will reject the bottle if what it tastes is chalk water. This is 
just doing. (1995, 71) 
To hammer home the point, I am adept at making use of the world around me. I sit 
on chairs and I converse with my friends. But to say that I believe that chairs exist or 
that there are other minds is not quite right. Rather, I act as though I accepted the 
above propositions. I act in this way. I do not act another way. Indeed, if I were asked 
whether I believe that chairs exist, I would be puzzled and probably ask the 
questioner to repeat themselves. The belief is embodied in my practice, but it is not 
a thought. It is not a proposition to which I assent. The question of justification, then, 
or even of understanding, need not arise. This is simply what I do. This is my form of 
life, to use Wittgenstein’s phrase. I do not know that there are other minds; I know 
how to get along with people.  
Can this picture of hinges as non-propositional account for religious 
commitment? Perhaps Straits Chinese children merely learn how to leave offerings 
for the ancestor spirits, and how to avoid angering those spirits. It seems plausible 
that they might learn the practice of religion (religion as a form of life) without ever 
taking as problematic the proposition expressed by the sentence, ‘the ancestor spirits 
exist’. Belief in the ancestor spirits is embodied in their practice. ‘Ancestor spirits 
exist’ is not a belief offered up as any kind of knowledge claim. When we attribute 
this belief to the Straits Chinese, we are not describing anybody’s mental state; we 
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are describing, in a kind of shorthand, the practices that shape the believer’s form of 
life. Does a cat believe that a mouse exists? No, but cats stalk mice. Do the Straits 
Chinese believe that ancestor spirits exist? No, but the streets are filled with offerings.  
I see two problems for this non-propositional approach. The first problem is that 
if hinges are dispositions to behave as though some proposition were true, then all 
hinges can be fairly interpreted as dispositions to mental assent to propositions. 
Since this is the standard definition of belief qua propositional attitude, we are back 
where we began: hinge beliefs are propositional. Once we treat hinges this way, as 
propositions, they become knowledge claims that can be independently appraised. 
The proposition that the ancestor spirits exist can be brought under critical 
examination, and so too can the practice of ancestor spirit worship more generally. 
Perhaps it is true that, in practice, the vast majority of religious believers never take 
the hinges of their religion as independently problematic propositions. This does not 
change the fact that the propositions are independently problematic. I use the word 
‘problematic’ here in two senses: the propositions are in principle open to criticism 
(there is nothing logically awry about criticizing them), and the propositions are in 
practice often criticized. The fact that a proposition is not often brought to the fore 
of our criticism gives us no reason to think that the proposition cannot be criticised, 
or that it has not been criticised. 
It is argued, however, that it is the very nature of hinges to be acted on as generally 
unproblematic. If some hinge were genuinely problematic, it would no longer qualify 
as a hinge. Hinges are then, by definition, neither generally criticizable nor well-
criticized. Hinges just are those ways of behaving that hold fast for us. Nothing 
speaks against them. As Moyal-Sharrock puts it, the certainty of a hinge can be traced 
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to ‘its seamless coherence, to its not standing out as unacceptable as a foreign body. 
To its not standing out at all. Its invisibility, its inarticulateness are a measure of its 
unquestionability. It is accepted as … going without saying’ (2007, 112). The 
unproblematic nature of hinges can be witnessed in our treatment of them: ‘a 
question does not normally present itself as to whether I or the chair I am sitting in 
exist. It does normally present itself about unicorns, or about whether there are 
chairs in the next room’ (2013, 263).  
But fundamental religious claims, no matter how strongly and unquestionably 
held, are regularly exposed to criticism. They are generally regarded as problematic, 
in the sense of being open to criticism and regularly criticised. In times of great 
suffering and hardship, believers will question whether an omnibenevolent god 
really exists. Cook and Wimberly (1983, 226) note that a third of parents interviewed 
struggled with a loss of religious faith in the wake of a child’s cancer diagnosis, and 
Coleman et al. (2007) note the negative effect that the death of a spouse may have on 
theistic belief. In the light of new scientific discoveries that challenge the orthodoxy 
of scripture, believers will question whether scripture is really an infallible 
deliverance from a divine being. In discovering that their holy guru has been 
behaving in an immoral or base manner, followers will doubt his claims to godliness 
(Costabile 2014). In meeting adherents of different religions, one’s belief is shown 
not simply to go without saying. Religion is brought to the fore of our mind routinely 
as problematic and as able to be criticised. To paint what I am trying to say in terms 
of Moyal-Sharrock’s earlier analogy, gods are more like unicorns than chairs.  
To conclude, if hinge beliefs are dispositions to behave as though some 
proposition were true, then we may recast non-propositional behaviours as 
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propositional attitudes. Once we do this, it is possible to critically appraise the 
proposition believed by appeal to evidence and background knowledge. This 
criticism is not only possible, but actually happens routinely in the lives of believers. 
Thus, religions put forward propositions which can be critically appraised, and which 
are often criticised. Religions do make knowledge claims.    
I now leave this discussion of Wittgensteinian antirealism. It is a position that, 
although once popular, has slowly shed supporters. I hope I have convinced the 
reader that this decline in popularity is deserved. Despite the novelty of the views 
presented, they fail to withstand criticism. I now turn to a view that is currently more 
popular in the public imagination, yet not so unlike the Wittgensteinian views just 
now rejected. 
1.6 NOMA  
Ultimately, Wittgensteinian antirealism aims to show that religion and science are 
not, and could not be, in explanatory competition. The language game argument, in 
particular, argued that truth is a concept that is constituted differently in religious 
and scientific contexts. It was argued that the religious concept of truth is a value-
laden concept, whereas the scientific concept is not. For this reason, religion and 
science forever talk past each other. A similar argument can be made, which is not 
equivocal about the concept of truth. It is possible to accept that truth is univocal and 
that religions do make knowledge claims, while accepting that these claims are 
restricted to knowledge in a non-scientific domain. Religion and science, then, are 
attempts to provide answers to different kinds of questions. Each kind of question 
pertains to a separate zone of human knowledge, a distinct explanatory magisterium, 
or teaching authority. 
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Stephen Jay Gould is perhaps the most prominent defender of this view, which 
he dubs the Non-Overlapping Magisteria Thesis (NOMA, for short). As Gould 
outlines it, there is no essential conflict between science and religion, since each field 
tries to answer different questions. Indeed, he says:   
The lack of conflict between science and religion arises from a lack of overlap 
between their respective domains of professional expertise—science in the 
empirical constitution of the universe, and religion in the search for proper ethical 
values and the spiritual meaning of our lives. The attainment of wisdom in a full 
life requires extensive attention to both domains. (2001, 739) 
And Francisco Ayala, in agreement with Gould, adds to the picture:   
Science and religious beliefs … cannot be in contradiction because science and 
religion concern different matters. Science concerns the processes that account 
for the natural world: how the planets move, the composition of matter and the 
atmosphere, the origin and function of organisms. Religion concerns the meaning 
and purpose of the world and of human life. (2007, ix) 
A similar thesis has also been quietly endorsed by Kenneth Miller, a cell biologist, 
philosopher and practicing Roman Catholic, who argues that the problem of ultimate 
purpose is quite rightly left to the realm of faith (Miller 2005, 369).  
The idea is not a new one. Galileo famously quoted Cardinal Baronius in his letter 
to the Grand Duchess Christina of Tuscany: ‘the Bible tells us how to go to heaven, 
not how the heavens go’. Science is concerned with such things as empirical facts, 
predictive models and natural law; while religion is concerned with such things as 
value, purpose and spiritual fulfilment. These separate zones of enquiry do not 
overlap. And so, science and religion can coexist. 
Of course, specialists in each field may sometimes overstep the bounds of their 
expertise. A priest may claim that a tsunami is caused by a nation’s failure to repent, 
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or a scientist may claim that the meaning of life is to maintain an income within an 
upper middle class bracket. But these specialists, in justifying their claims with the 
tools available to them within their respective fields, would have invaded foreign 
explanatory territory. Such conflicts are due to misunderstandings about the proper 
domains of science and religion. Thus, NOMA is best understood as a claim about 
what it is appropriate for each subject’s practitioners to make knowledge claims 
about, given the tools and methods available to them.   
One might accept NOMA if one already thought that the methods of science were 
appropriate for solving one class of problems and that the methods of religion 
appropriate for solving another, that the respective methods of science and religion 
differ, and that each method is particularly suited to achieving its own aims in its own 
designated explanatory magisterium. Scientific and religious methods would then be 
effective in their respective domains. It would only be natural to grant the descriptive 
domain to science and the evaluative domain to religion, since it is only in these 
domains that the methods are effective.  
If that is the argument, then we must first be sure of what the respective aims and 
methods of science and religion are. Arguably, science has a well-studied, if often 
disputed, method of inquiry, thought to be an effective means to solving problems of 
fact and prediction. Yet it is unclear what the aims and methods of religion are. We 
have all at least heard of the scientific method, but what is the religious method? Does 
it actually aim to solve problems of meaning and value? And if so, is it effective? Until 
these questions have some rudimentary answer, it is quite unclear why we should be 
so confident to allocate religion its own distinct explanatory magisterium. It is 
further unclear why it should happen to be the magisterium of value. Moreover, why 
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should religion, as opposed to any other field, such as philosophy, jurisprudence, or 
anthropology get dibs on the magisterium of value? Perhaps all these fields should 
be supplying us with theories of what is meaningful and valuable. Perhaps none 
should be. It is premature to say. And so, why should we assume that theologians 
have better tools than anyone else to answer such questions? As Richard Dawkins 
jibes: ‘Why the chaplain? Why not the gardener, or the chef?’ (2006, 56). 
What is the aim of religion? One should, I think, take a firmly skeptical line to the 
claim that religion has one single, essential aim. The vast array of world religions 
appear to have wildly varying aims. Mikael Stenmark provides a diverse list of the 
alleged pragmatic and epistemic aims of religion, including: moral truth, empirical 
truth, salvation, eternal life, existential intelligibility, usefulness, community 
building, moral excellence and divine communion to name just a few (1997, 496).  If 
all of these are aims of religion, then given that empirical truth is among them, 
NOMA has fallen at the first hurdle. If both science and religion share the aim of 
empirical truth, then the magisteria do overlap. But do religions have to concern 
themselves with matters of fact? Perhaps this shared aim is the result of a mistake on 
the part of some believers, who fail to understand that religion isn’t capable of 
answering such questions. 
It is abundantly clear that certain religious texts do make claims about matters of 
fact, and that such factual claims are core beliefs, to which believers are expected to 
assent if they are to count as a member of the religion at all. Belief in some matters 
of fact, then, is an essential part of at least some religions. It seems unlikely that we 
would find a religion that made no claims at all about the external world. What would 
such a religion look like? Could such a practice even be called, with all due respect to 
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the common usage of the word, a “religion”? Religions are cultural institutions, 
membership of which routinely requires assent to a common core of beliefs among 
adherents. Such beliefs at the core are deemed sacred and irreproachable. There is 
no reason to stipulate that these sacred doctrines are limited to propositions about 
value and meaning. Numerous religious doctrines concern matters of historical, 
biological and archaeological fact. The belief that Jesus cleared the temple court at 
Jerusalem, overturning the tables of the money-changers and scattering their coins, 
is for many Christians a belief about a matter of historical fact. It would be odd to 
say that these Christians, in taking the story literally, and not as a mere parable, are 
no longer engaged in a religious activity, but have instead become amateur 
historians. As Massimo Pigliucci notes: ‘If one is a young Earth creationist, one isn’t 
violating NOMA by chance by rejecting evolutionary theory; that rejection is at the 
very core of the creationist’s belief’ (2010, 126). This opinion is shared by theists, as 
Alvin Plantinga notes: ‘Some of the teachings most central to Scripture and to the 
Christian faith tell us of concrete historical events; they therefore tell us of the history 
and properties of things within the cosmos’ (2001, 117). 
This particular argument against NOMA runs that it is the very essence of some 
religions to provide explanations about the world around us. Thus, given that this 
feature is essential to some religions, NOMA must be false. The core religious 
doctrines by which we discern one religion from another are often doctrines 
concerning phenomena in the material world. Thus, religion is unavoidably engaged 
in describing and accounting for phenomena in the external world. Therefore, both 




There is another argument against NOMA that does not depend on an appeal to 
the essential features of religion. One might argue instead that religious folk, for the 
most part, actually do happen to believe many historical, or geological, or biological 
claims on religious grounds. Religious folk believe that there was an original human 
pair because they have applied religious epistemic methods to the question of human 
origins. To label their belief non-religious, then, is to artificially limit the scope of 
beliefs that might be obtained by religious methods. Naturally, Gould would reply 
that these believers just happen to have some beliefs which they think are religious, 
but which are, in fact, not religious at all. But this reply does not quite engage with 
the argument as I see it.  
The argument is that NOMA puts forward an arbitrary, stipulative definition. It 
does not carve religion, as a natural kind, at its joints. If almost every member of 
every religion accepts some point of doctrine (on religious grounds) that concerns a 
matter of fact, not value, then NOMA, in putting such doctrines out of the realm of 
true religion, redefines ‘religion’ in a way far outside of ordinary usage, and in a way 
that does not do justice to the nature of object of inquiry: religion as a particular kind 
of cultural institution. In other words, if Martian sociologists came to investigate the 
phenomenon of human religion, it is doubtful that they would come to the conclusion 
that human beings divide themselves into religious groups, the defining element of 
which is common assent to certain sets of beliefs which everywhere and always 
concern matters of value, and never matters of fact.  
Putative explanations of empirical phenomena are given within religions and the 
explanations are justified by appeal to the results of religious methods. It is not the 
case that religious folklore serves only a moral purpose. Noah’s ark is not always an 
50 
 
allegory; sometimes it’s just a very big boat. Yet according to NOMA, the priest who 
teaches his flock that this boat came to rest on the mountains of Ararat is no longer 
a priest, but has metamorphosed into an amateur archeologist. No true priest 
sermonizes on big boats, according to Gould. (And no true Scotsman puts sugar on 
his porridge.) Of course, we could choose to talk like this if we wished to, but it is 
unclear why we should wish to, unless we were trying to cover up an undesirable 
truth that was otherwise in plain sight. 
There is one last reason to reject NOMA that I would like to leave here. When 
religions do make pronouncements about matters of value, such pronouncements 
are often derived from doctrines concerning matters of fact. Consider, as the most 
obvious example, divine command theory. According to the divine command 
theorist, we ought not to transgress that which is forbidden by God. This ethical claim 
is grounded in a doctrine about the way the world is: it contains a God who explicitly 
forbids, say, murder. Similarly, consider the Buddhist ethic of altruism, which is 
inseparably grounded in the metaphysical theory of no-self. Since the self is an 
illusion, there is no unique person capable of owning any particular instance of pain. 
Therefore, all instances of pain are equally undesirable. It is moral to act to prevent 
pain wherever it is found or anticipated. Now, whatever you think of the Christian’s 
divine command theory or the Buddhist’s argument for selflessness, both derive from 
claims about the nature of the world. Religious value claims depend on factual claims. 
Both the Christian and the Buddhist, in clear contradiction of NOMA, must appeal 




Religions do make knowledge claims, and many religious practices are taken to be 
effective. The most popular theses to the contrary, Wittgensteinian antirealism (in 
all its forms) and NOMA, are flawed accounts of the nature of religious belief and 
practice. Both approaches, I fear, are primarily aimed at insulating religious belief 
from the disconfirmations of scientific evidence. Both approaches artificially delimit 
religious discourse, such that it is established as a sphere of understanding apart 
from science, evaluated according to different standards, kept hidden, or worse, kept 
sacred. The positions explored in this section have been shown to be on very unsteady 
psychological footings. Furthermore, if taken as stipulative definitions of ‘religion’, 
both Wittgensteinian antirealism and NOMA make many traditional religious beliefs 
and practices essentially non-religious.  
I have not aimed to show that all religious practices are assumed to be effective, 
or even that all religious belief is truth-apt or empirically predictive. My aim has been 
only to show that some intrinsically religious beliefs and practices are, and that, 
therefore, Wittgensteinian antirealism and NOMA are false. Given that religions 
sometimes make knowledge claims, just like science does, we can infer that religion 
and science have the opportunity to stand in explanatory competition. Young Earth 
creationism is perhaps the best known contemporary example of a religious 
knowledge claim that stands in direct competition with many aspects of modern 
evolutionary theory. As is well known, the threat posed by creationism to 
contemporary science is now a political one, as there exist organized campaigns to 
interfere with the teaching of evolution in public schools. This interference is 
especially prevalent in the United States. The discord between creationism and 
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evolution is a symptom of the epistemological conflict between religion and science—
a conflict which has now reached beyond Athens and Jerusalem, all the way to Dover, 
Pennsylvania. The young Earth creationist and the proponent of modern 
evolutionary theory disagree, and a reconciliation does not seem forthcoming. These 
disagreements are manifestations of the deep epistemological conflict at play. 
But is the creationism debate really a symptom of an epistemological conflict? 
One might have reason to be skeptical. After all, that science stands in a state of 
disagreement with supernatural creationist theories is hardly a surprising fact. 
Science, it is said, accepts a methodological naturalism, according to which the 
denizens of the supernatural realm are rejected out of hand. Talk of gods, spirits, 
angels and demons is eschewed in science as a matter of principle. If that’s right, then 
it follows that the disagreement between scientists and creationists is no accident; it 
is institutionalized. Why should we expect religion and science to agree about 
substantive empirical matters when scientists have determined from the outset that 
the central objects of religious thought will be rejected come what may? If religious 
claims are methodologically eschewed in science, then of course disagreement will 
be the natural result. But such disagreement will not be epistemologically salient, it 
seems, since it results only from the scientist’s adoption of a certain principle while 
doing science. When the scientist hangs up his lab coat at the end of the day, he is 
also entitled to put to the side his naturalistic principles. He can return home 
believing in gods, goblins and ghosts. If methodological naturalism were like this, 
assumed only for the sake of doing science, then we should expect disagreement 
between science and religion. However, such a disagreement would fail to pack much 
epistemic punch, since the claims of science would be restricted to a limited domain 
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of naturalistic explanations. The claims of science could all be prefaced with the 
phrase ‘on the assumption that there’s nothing supernatural going on,’ and such a 
precaution might ensure that there is agreement between religion and science. 
To anticipate these concerns, I now turn to the question of whether 
methodological naturalism prohibits explanations that appeal to supernatural 




2. Are Supernatural Explanations Prohibited in 
Science? 
They have endeavored to build a system of natural philosophy on the first 
chapter of Genesis, the book of Job, and other parts of Scripture; seeking thus 
the dead among the living.  — Francis Bacon, Novum Organum 
2.1 Introduction 
The conflict between science and religion has seen certain obvious flashpoints, the 
most famous of which is the battle over the scientific respectability of creationism. In 
this particular battle, there is perhaps no greater point of contention than the matter 
of whether or not scientists should accept methodological naturalism. Intelligent 
design proponent Michael Behe writes, for example:  
It is often said that science must avoid any conclusions which smack of the 
supernatural. But this seems to me to be both bad logic and bad science. Science 
is not a game in which arbitrary rules are used to decide what explanations are to 
be permitted. Rather, it is an effort to make true statements about physical reality. 
(Behe 2001, 255)  
Behe’s allies in battle, Alvin Plantinga and Phillip Johnson, have also argued in a 
variety of places1 that methodological naturalism is an arbitrary demarcation 
criterion that places an unreasonable prohibition on supernatural creation theories 
in science. If creationism is rejected a priori as an explanation for human origins, 
then of course something like naturalistic Darwinism will be accepted, they say. But 
for what reason, they ask, should we accept methodological naturalism in the first 
                                                     
1  Several of these articles have been collected in Robert Pennock’s (2001) Intelligent 
Design Creationism and Its Critics. 
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place? A variety of philosophers have sought to address the creationists’ collective 
grievance. They have sought to explain why science accepts the naturalistic 
constraints that it does. I argue that most of these explanations have misconceived 
methodological naturalism. There is a general tendency in the literature to locate the 
naturalism of science in the metaphysical commitments of its explanations. I argue 
that this is misplaced. Methodological naturalism prohibits scientists, not from 
making appeals to certain kinds of entities, but from making appeals to methods of 
justification that do not yield intersubjective agreement. In particular, those methods 
whose reliability depends on appeals to some kind of supernatural agency. 
The most popular interpretation of methodological naturalism, simply put, is that 
it is a principle of science according to which claims about supernatural entities are 
barred from entry. I define supernatural entities, in line with definitions given by 
Owen Flanagan (2006) and Evan Fales (2013), as causally efficacious disembodied 
minds or immaterial agents such as ghosts, gods, demons, and hobgoblins. Entities 
such as these should not, according to this interpretation of methodological 
naturalism, take up any explanatory role in any respectable scientific theory. To do 
so would be to break some rule, or some rule of thumb, of respectable science. So 
then, how is this anti-supernatural principle defended? After all, if there are demons 
and hobgoblins hiding in the laboratory, one would think that the scientist, nobly 
pursuing truth, would be the first to want to know.  
At present, two conflicting defenses of methodological naturalism are usually put 
on offer, leading to two very different concepts of what methodological naturalism is. 
The first has been called, by Maarten Boudry, the intrinsic defense of methodological 
naturalism. The second is called the pragmatic defense. The former charges that 
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science simply can’t deal in supernatural explanations. The latter charges that 
science does deal in, and has done away with, supernatural explanations. Neither of 
these approaches, as I aim to show, is quite right, however, since methodological 
naturalism does not consist in the rejection of supernatural explanations, but in the 
rejection of supernatural methods of justification.  
I will present the intrinsic and pragmatic defenses of methodological naturalism, 
before rejecting both of them. In their place, I’ll be putting forward a picture of 
methodological naturalism as a principle of science according to which supernatural 
sources of evidence, such as faith in a divine revelation, are eschewed. Since I believe 
that this particular concept of methodological naturalism was first clearly enunciated 
as a demarcation criterion between natural philosophy and theology in the Middle 
Ages, I’ll be drawing on some historical examples of medieval natural philosophy to 
support my case. In short, my case is just that methodological naturalism does not 
obligate science to reject supernatural entities, but to reject supernatural methods of 
acquiring evidence, such as those methods surveyed in the previous chapter. 
2.2 Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism 
The most popular defense of methodological naturalism is the intrinsic defense. This 
runs that science, by its very nature, cannot appraise supernatural theories. On this 
view, methodological naturalism is a ground rule, without which science ceases to be. 
It is a demarcation criterion, separating true science from pseudoscience and non-
science. To give an example that puts the principle to work, when Newton famously 
suggested that God might have to tweak planetary orbits from time to time, the 
argument goes, he was no longer actually doing science. He was doing something 
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else, like theology or storytelling. This intrinsic view has been defended by several 
philosophers of science such as Michael Ruse, Robert Pennock, and Eugenie Scott.  
Michael Ruse (2001, 377) has argued that supernatural explanations are “science-
stoppers”. They are dead-end explanations; nothing more than tourniquets for 
doubt. We may feel as though we have explained the problem of, say, the origin of life 
by appealing to a miracle from God, but in reality, we have merely given ourselves an 
excuse to stop looking for better, naturalistic explanations that generate further 
testable predictions. The idea is that supernatural explanations are not really 
explanations at all, since they offer no predictions over and above the fact to be 
explained. They are simply, to use Darwin’s phrase, restating the fact in dignified 
language.  
Robert Pennock (2001, 89) argues that supernatural explanations are 
unfalsifiable since any observation can be said to be compatible with the existence of 
supernatural agents unconstrained by natural law. No possible observation, he says, 
is incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent god whose will is inscrutable. He 
writes that such a being ‘may be called upon to explain any event in any situation, 
and this is one reason for the methodological prohibition against such appeals in 
science’ (2001, 93). Pennock further argues that this prohibition applies not only to 
theories containing omnipotent and inscrutable supernatural entities, but also to 
such lesser beings as demons and angels, as well as to gods with well-defined desires 
and capacities (2011, 189—90). So, since falsifiability is a hallmark of the scientific, 
and since supernatural explanations are not falsifiable, Pennock argues that 
supernatural explanations are not scientific. To use Popper’s terminology, such 
explanations have zero empirical content. 
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Eugenie Scott, former executive director of the National Center for Science 
Education, is also a defender of the intrinsic defense. She argues that ‘one cannot use 
natural processes to hold constant the actions of supernatural forces; hence it is 
impossible to test ... supernatural explanations’ (2001, 39). Furthermore, belief in 
supernatural beings is a matter of faith, not science. Science doesn’t have the right 
tools to investigate the supernatural. So, if you want answers to those kinds of 
questions, you’ve got to find your local priest, mystic or necromancer.  
The above writers agree that supernatural theories must be rejected because such 
theories are not amenable to scientific investigation. Specifically, there are certain 
logico-epistemological features of supernatural explanations that put them beyond 
the purview of science. And to emphasize, according to the intrinsic view, scientists 
have not judged supernatural explanations to be false or unlikely or bad 
explanations. Scientists just can’t judge supernatural explanations. ‘Science is a 
limited way of knowing,’ says Scott; limited insofar as it is unable to reject the 
possibility of the supernatural (Scott 1996, 519).  
The claim that supernatural theories are unfalsifiable science-stoppers has been 
convincingly dealt with by Boudry et al. (2010), and I direct the reader to that paper 
for a detailed rebuttal. I will only briefly go over the obvious problems with these 
claims. Firstly, one can invent all manner of supernatural theories that produce 
falsifiable, independently testable predictions. Elliott Sober asks us to consider the 
hypothesis that an omnipotent supernatural being wanted everything to be purple, 
and had this as a major priority (2007, 4). Purple ID is a supernatural theory that 
generates independently testable and falsifiable predictions. Beside me, as I write, 
there is a piece of greenstone sitting on a chest of draws. Therefore, purple ID is false. 
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To be sure, most theistic explanations are nothing like purple ID, but some will be 
more so than others. The claim that God created the world in six days and less than 
10,000 years ago generates, in conjunction with our background knowledge, a 
greater number of testable predictions than the bare claim that God created the 
world. In any case, Sober’s example shows that supernatural theories are not 
necessarily unfalsifiable, or necessarily science stoppers, and so such theories 
cannot be excluded from science for those reasons. 
Kelly Smith (2001, 707) has argued that the testability of any theistic explanation 
depends on the degree of reasonableness of the will of the posited god. 
‘Reasonableness’ here refers just to the degree to which God’s will resembles others 
with which we are familiar. The more mysterious and inscrutable his will, the less 
predictable his behavior, and so, the less testable any theory incorporating such a 
God. Smith’s argument applies well to Eugenie Scott’s claim that one cannot hold 
other variables constant to test for an omnipotent God. It seems that we can hold 
other variables constant so long as the posited omnipotent God is a reasonable and 
reliable one, who only interferes in the workings of creation under very particular 
circumstances. If this reliable God, for example, did nothing other than unfailingly 
cure cancer patients each and every time a patient was prayed for, such a God would 
not, it seems, be so difficult to control for.  
So, these arguments seem to bleed support from intrinsic methodological 
naturalism, since supernatural claims can be made falsifiable, can be made 
predictively potent and can be investigated under constrained conditions.  
There is another reason to reject intrinsic methodological naturalism that 
Theodore Schick (2000) has argued previously. Science is ultimately silent on the 
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metaphysical commitments of new theories. No rule of science should prohibit, a 
priori, particular kinds of objects from inclusion into the body of scientific knowledge 
for the rather obvious reason that this may prematurely close off fertile avenues of 
investigation. Whether some theoretical entity is of any explanatory use should not 
be decided before viewing the evidence. Of course, there are plenty of other spooky 
concepts and entities in modern science, such as wave-particle duality, point 
particles and quantum entanglement, which would all be excluded from science if 
metaphysical constraints on spookiness were taken seriously. In other words, it is 
very difficult to understand why we should eschew causally efficacious disembodied 
minds a priori, but not objects that take up no space!  
The important point, I think, is that the methodology of science may be able to 
tell us whether this claim is better than that claim, but not what we should claim in 
the first place. 
2.3 Pragmatic Methodological Naturalism 
Let us turn now to the pragmatic defense. The pragmatic defense of methodological 
naturalism charges that science does have something to say about the supernatural, 
and that so far, the verdict has been pretty negative. Scientists, then, are reasonable 
when they reject the supernatural, since the track record of supernatural 
explanations is so ghastly. Maarten Boudry and colleagues at the University of Ghent 
(2010) have argued that the preference for naturalistic explanations in science is a 
sensible rule of thumb that has been arrived at after the consistent failure of so many 
supernatural explanations in the history of science. Pragmatic methodological 
naturalism has also been defended elsewhere by Greg Dawes (2011). 
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According to Boudry et al, methodological naturalism is ‘an empirically grounded 
commitment to naturalistic causes and explanations, which in principle is revocable 
by extraordinary empirical evidence’ (2010, 229). The decision to eschew the 
supernatural ‘did not drop from thin air,’ they say, ‘but is just the best methodological 
guideline that emerged from the history of science, in particular the pattern of 
consistent success of naturalistic explanations’ (2010, 229—30). And Greg Dawes 
similarly argues that the preference for naturalistic explanations ‘should be regarded 
as nothing more than a provisional commitment, justified by reference to the history 
of these disciplines’ (2011, 7). This leaves us to wonder: by reference to what in their 
histories exactly? The implication is that the history of science has witnessed a 
dwindling of the sphere of supernatural explanations, as they are slowly discarded 
and replaced by superior naturalistic ones. As Boudry elsewhere writes ‘as a result of 
centuries of scientific investigation, earlier animistic, anthropomorphic, and 
teleological views have gradually been superseded by more parsimonious, 
impersonal explanations’ (2015, §3.3). 
On the pragmatic defense, methodological naturalism is not an a priori dogma. It 
is no demarcation criterion. After all, we could give up on this naturalism caper at 
any time given compelling enough evidence. Maybe next week on an overcast 
morning, the clouds will part and celestial trumpets will shake the Earth and L. Ron 
Hubbard will descend bodily from the heavens, and if that happens, we needn’t 
scratch our heads wondering what natural law accounts for this very extraordinary 
event. We can simply abandon our naturalistic bias. 
Since the claim is that supernatural explanations have consistently failed, it 
follows that science can judge the supernatural. The idea is that throughout history, 
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scientists have learnt that supernatural explanations are predictive failures. And 
indeed, just as the pragmatic defense alleges, scientific investigations into 
intercessory prayer, telepathy, special creation, intelligent design and other alleged 
supernatural phenomena have occurred.2 Furthermore, just as the pragmatic 
defense argues, such research has usually failed to confirm any of these phenomena. 
This seems to be pretty compelling evidence for pragmatic methodological 
naturalism. The pragmatic defense coheres better with the observation that 
supernatural claims have been tested, and appear to have been largely discredited.  
However, the claim that science has, over the centuries, eventually adopted 
methodological naturalism in reaction to the failure of supernatural theories is a 
claim with virtually no historical support and much evidence against. Naturalistic 
theories did not gradually supersede supernatural ones in the history of science. 
From its very inception, science, or natural philosophy, was a discipline that 
necessarily subscribed to naturalism in some sense.  
David Lindberg (1992) and Edward Grant (1996) have traced the naturalism of 
modern science to a rebirth of classical, pagan learning as early as the middle half of 
the twelfth century. And medieval philosophers such as Duns Scotus, Adelard of 
Bath, William of Ockham, Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, Nicole Oresme, 
Boethius of Dacia and John Buridan all explicitly repudiate the supernatural in 
natural philosophy. Yet these medieval philosophers had not tested a number of 
supernatural explanations and found them wanting. The subject matter of their 
                                                     
2  An overview of the scientific research of the alleged supernatural effects of prayer can 
be found in Dein and Littlewood (2008). For an overview of telepathy studies between 
the mid-nineteenth and late twentieth centuries, see Alvarado (1998).  
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research program just was the regular workings of the natural world. In particular, 
the medieval idea that natural philosophy was limited to the study of the ‘common 
course of nature’ (communis cursus naturae) by appeal to reason and sense 
experience was not an idea born as a reaction to the uninspiring track-record of 
supernatural explanations. Moreover, and here’s the important bit, medieval 
philosophers were able to hold both natural and supernatural knowledge side by side. 
But when the two ways of knowing stood in conflict, supernatural knowledge was 
usually given priority. In the fourteenth century, for example, John Buridan wrote 
that ‘we must hold on the basis of faith that the heavens are supernaturally created 
... but it must also be said that the heavens are not naturally able to be generated or 
destroyed’ (Buridan in Biard 2001, 79). That is, by faith we may know that the 
heavens had a supernatural cause, but by all observational evidence, their 
movements have remained uniform throughout history. This latter claim is therefore 
grounded in a track record of observations, such as those alluded to in Aristotle’s De 
Caelo, in which he notes that all existing astronomical records, including the records 
of Babylonians and Egyptians, indicate that no change whatsoever has taken place in 
any part of the outermost heaven (Lloyd 1968, 136). This distinction between natural 
and supernatural knowledge should give us pause for thought about the nature of 
methodological naturalism. It should, in particular, give us reason to doubt the 
supersessionist historical narrative given to us by Boudry. Medieval natural 
philosophers clearly accepted methodological naturalism, yet argued that we must 
hold that the heavens are supernaturally created. The creation theory only fails on 




As noted already, the pragmatic defense does not claim that the supernatural is 
totally prohibited from science, but only that scientists act sensibly when they avoid 
supernatural explanations. On this point, I admit that I share some common ground 
with Boudry and Dawes. We agree that so far, all proposed supernatural explanations 
that have been seriously considered by scientists have proven to be failures. 
Nevertheless, it is a misleading construal of the nature of methodological naturalism 
to say that it is entirely accounted for by the failure of previous supernatural 
explanations. This is not only historically inaccurate, but it also locates naturalism in 
the wrong context. Methodological naturalism is not a constraint on the subject 
matter of science, but, as the name would indicate, a constraint on the method of 
science. It is, I urge, an epistemological principle. To reiterate, I agree that entities 
that have repeatedly proven to be predictive failures should, ceteris paribus, be 
eschewed, but this eschewal does not account for the naturalism of science. Science 
does have intrinsic anti-supernatural commitments. 
To recap, the pragmatic defense is correct that supernatural explanations are 
testable, have been tested and have often failed in the scientific arena. Yet on the 
other hand, the pragmatic defense gets wrong the historical claim that 
methodological naturalism was eventually adopted as a rule of thumb. The intrinsic 
defense also gets something right, insofar as science is a discipline with an explicit, a 
priori, anti-supernatural bias. But, the intrinsic defense doesn’t square with the 
observation that science apparently can test and has tested supernatural 
explanations. Thus, science is not a ‘limited way of knowing’ in the sense that Scott 
alleges. Given these shortcomings, neither view can be the right way to understand 
methodological naturalism. I believe there is another way. 
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2.4 The Intrinsic and Pragmatic Defenses Defend the Wrong Thing 
Methodological naturalism is not a thesis about what may or may not be conjectured 
by scientists, but about how scientists may or may not justify their theories. Scientific 
justifications eschew appeals to supernatural methods of knowing, such as faith, 
revelation or spirit mediumship. Such justifications make an appeal to the authority 
of the testimony of some disembodied mind said to be providing testimonial 
evidence. Methodological naturalism is a restriction on ways of knowing, not on the 
metaphysical commitments of theories. For the scientist, only natural cognitive 
faculties may be used to collect evidence that may justify theories.  
To be clear, it is important to draw the well-worn distinction between the context 
of discovery and the context of justification. The context of discovery is the context 
in which new theories are developed. The context of justification is the context in 
which theories, once developed, are appraised. There is no naturalistic 
methodological constraint in the context of discovery, and there are numerous 
examples in the history of science of theories dreamt up from the wildest of 
inspirations. Perhaps Kekulé’s half-waking vision of a fiery ouroboros, which 
inspired his theory of the molecular structure of benzene, is among the wildest. That 
a theory had an odd inspiration, however, is no blight on that theory. It is only with 
respect to our appraisals of new theories that science accepts a methodological 
naturalism. Kekulé’s theory is only as good as the evidence that can be summoned 
for it by a natural method.   
Given this understanding of methodological naturalism, Buridan’s claim that we 
must hold that the universe was created on faith can be better understood. Although 
the medieval philosopher held as a matter of faith that the heavens were created by 
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God, the natural tools of reason and sense experience indicated that the heavens were 
eternal and incorruptible. This clear distinction between natural and supernatural 
ways of knowing is a ubiquitous one in medieval natural philosophy. The important 
point, however, is that the medieval natural philosopher institutionalized this 
separation of natural and supernatural knowledge in natural philosophy. 
Methodological naturalism was cemented in the Middle Ages as an injunction on 
appeals to faith in natural philosophy. The two most commonly appealed to 
naturalistic principles of medieval natural philosophy were the principle of the 
common course of nature and another principle that I call the principle of 
empiricism.  
The principle of the common course of nature stated that natural philosophers 
should proceed as though nature always operated with the kind of regularity 
commonly observed in day to day life. Such a principle happened to exclude 
unpredictable miracles from the realm of science, but its epistemological effect was 
greater than just that. Joel Biard (2001) has argued, following Edward Grant (1978) 
and J. M. M. H. Thijssen (1987), that the principle of the common course of nature 
is a medieval principle of induction, that allows that our never faltering experiences 
of such things as hot fires may justify knowledge claims of general theories, such as 
that all fire is hot (Biard 2001, 91). Without such a principle, sense experience could 
not be taken to justify knowledge claims of universal theories. To establish the 
characteristic nature of fires, we conjoin our experience of all observed fires with an 
ampliative principle of the common course of nature. Knowledge of a scientific theory 
is then justified on the grounds that the theory’s predictions have been ‘observed to 
be true in many instances and to be false in none’ (Buridan in Grant 1978, 109). It is, 
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then, an epistemic, not metaphysical, principle. There are metaphysical implications 
of the principle of the common course of nature e.g. claims about unpredictable or 
irregular miracles are generally rejected. As Adelard of Bath wrote in his Quaestiones 
Naturales, miracles should be posited only when reason has been absolutely 
exhausted (Adelard 1920, 96). Nevertheless, theories making appeal to predictable, 
or controllable, supernatural entities need not be excluded by such a principle. Such 
a principle does not constitute a blanket prohibition on causally efficacious 
supernatural entities in science. 
The principle of empiricism was another foundational principle of medieval 
natural philosophy. One can characterize this principle negatively as the view that 
knowledge claims or evidence allegedly derived from some divine authority, such as 
faith or scripture, may not be appealed to in the appraisal of theories. This 
secularization of knowledge is almost certainly due to the rediscovery of Aristotle’s 
empirical method in the twelfth century. The translation of the Aristotelian corpus 
between circa 1125 and 1200 brought forth a wave of optimism concerning natural 
human cognitive faculties. No divine illumination was needed for man to have 
certitude. Our natural cognitive faculties were sufficient for the acquisition of 
knowledge.  
For a positive account of the principle of empiricism, Duns Scotus made the 
following list of the ways in which we may naturally acquire knowledge: a proposition 
may be self-evident, or we may know if from induction of particular cases, or by 
introspection, or we may know it directly from experience (Pasnau 2015). Such 
natural methods of knowing were kept strictly isolated from supernatural methods 
in the medieval university. One could apply the method of faith in the theology 
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faculty, but in the faculty of arts, reason and sense experience were the only 
legitimate tools. This distinction between knowing by faith and knowing by reason 
becomes so well established that it later becomes common for natural philosophers 
of the period to preface their scientific theories with the phrases loquendo naturaliter 
and loquendo supernaturaliter, that is, speaking naturally and speaking 
supernaturally. Buridan uses this distinction, as does his predecessor Siger of 
Brabant and his successor Nicole Oresme. Regarding the origin of the universe, these 
philosophers write that speaking naturally, it is known that the universe can be 
neither created nor destroyed, yet speaking supernaturally, it is known that it has 
been created by God. Natural reason alone tells us that the world is not capable of 
being created or destroyed, but faith tells us that there is a God who is capable of 
doing what is naturally impossible.  
This distinction between knowing by faith and knowing by reason was cited in the 
Condemnation of 1277, which attempted to outlaw certain Aristotelian teachings 
from the University of Paris. In the preamble to the condemnation, Bishop Tempier 
writes that the dangerous doctrine shared by all these troublesome natural 
philosophers is that they ‘state things to be true according to philosophy, but not 
according to the Catholic faith, as if there are two contrary truths’ (Tempier in Dodd 
1998, 133). But few (if any) of the philosophers of the day accepted the Averroist 
doctrine of double-truth to which Bishop Tempier is referring. Few genuinely 
believed that there were two truths that could be known by different methods. There 
was only one truth, and indeed, when pushed to make a decision about the eternity 
of the world, medieval philosophers on the whole agreed that the Earth must have 
had a beginning. The idea was that although the light of our natural faculties 
69 
 
established that the world was eternal, we nevertheless should accept by faith that it 
had a beginning when it was created by God. Ultimately, faith trumped reason. It just 
so happens that in natural philosophy, appeals to faith could not be made. Faith—
qua appeal to supernatural authority—was off-limits. Tempier includes this anti-
supernatural principle among his condemnations. Specifically, he condemns those 
natural philosophers who claim ‘that man should not be content with authority to 
have certitude about any question’ (Klima 2006, 181).  
This abrupt shift towards a natural method was not the result of the chronic 
failure of supernatural hypotheses, but was a definitive methodological feature of 
medieval natural philosophy. Medieval natural philosophers accepted that 
supernatural explanations were true, but also accepted that they could not be shown 
to be true in the realm of science. Crucially, medieval philosophers rejected 
supernatural testimony and adopted a natural concept of justification. Thus science 
was born. Therefore, when the pragmatic defense argues that methodological 
naturalism consists in nothing more than a scientific rejection of failed supernatural 
explanations, this is simply not true. It does. Science, as a matter of principle, 
eschews justificatory appeals to such things as divine revelation and faith. This 
naturalistic method of justification has been an intrinsic part of science since its 
establishment in the Middle Ages as a demarcation criterion between science and 
theology. The intrinsic defense, as presented by Pennock, Ruse and Scott, simply 
locates naturalism in the wrong context. Science is not necessarily naturalistic with 
regard to its explanations, but with regard to its method of justification.  
Now, it remains the case that supernatural explanations are generally rejected as 
inadequate, but this is no kind of metaphysical bias. Many supernatural explanations 
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have been rejected after having been shown to be either redundant or false. Elliot 
Sober gives the example of the claim of Intelligent Design proponents that there is a 
supernatural cause for the vertebrate eye. Such a claim makes few predictions over 
and above the phenomena requiring an explanation. As Sober puts it, such a theory 
‘entails that vertebrates have eyes, but that does not permit it to be tested against 
alternative explanations of why vertebrates have eyes’ (2007, 8). The ascription of a 
supernatural cause is clearly redundant. What is needed is some predictive power 
beyond entailing of the observation alone. Such predictions can be generated if 
Intelligent Design creationism is put forward in conjunction with auxiliary 
hypotheses about the nature of the designer. But whenever such auxiliary hypotheses 
have been brought forward, the resulting theory has been shown to be false. The 
problem is made worse by the fact that desirable auxiliary hypotheses are not 
typically drawn from a hat, or invented out of thin air. Typically, it is desirable that 
auxiliary hypotheses are adopted which have already garnered some degree of 
independent support (Sober 2007, 6). In the case of the designer’s nature, no such 
independently supported hypotheses are available (or, if they are available, they have 
been supported by religious, and therefore illicit, epistemic methods).  
Thus, methodological naturalism is an epistemological principle of science. It is 
the principle that appeals to the epistemic methods of religion (and especially 
appeals to the authority of divine or supernatural testimony) are eschewed. This 
eschewal can be clearly seen in the work of medieval natural philosophers as science 
is becoming institutionalized, and it is only with this concept of methodological 
naturalism in hand that we can make sense of the medieval distinction between 
natural and supernatural knowledge. Locating the naturalism of science in the 
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metaphysical commitments of scientific theories is a mistake—a mistake that adds 
fuel to the collective grievance of creationists, who feel that their theories are rejected 
out of hand. Indeed, it is not their theories that are rejected, it is their method. This 
recharacterization of methodological naturalism is sorely needed. 
2.5 Problems for this Conception of Methodological Naturalism  
To this point, I have argued that methodological naturalism is an epistemological 
principle of science: a principle that eschews the use of putatively supernatural 
methods to justify theories. I have said, in a nutshell, that methodological naturalism 
does not tell us what we may conjecture. But an objection might be made that this 
epistemological principle amounts to the denial of a certain metaphysical picture of 
the world, specifically one in which there are disembodied minds who come into 
causal contact with human beings. Therefore, the principle does limit what we may 
conjecture. As Matthew Ratcliffe puts the objection:  
A refusal to entertain the possibility that God speaks to people during religious 
experiences as an aspect of scientific deliberation does not amount to neutrality. 
In fact, it ultimately entails an ontological rather than merely methodological 
position, a position that implicitly rules out the possibility of certain coherent, 
theistic ontological claims. (Ratcliffe 2003, 323—4) 
It seems that if there were disembodied minds floating about and revealing 
knowledge to human beings willy nilly, then this would be a fact about the world 
which scientists would wish to know. It is a conjecture about the causal structure of 
the world which, by my thesis, ought to be open to scientific investigation. So why 
are scientists justified in eschewing the claim that there exist disembodied minds that 




Certainly, I do not wish to argue that the hypothesis that there may exist 
knowledge-imparting disembodied minds should be eschewed in science. Indeed, 
this is the very thesis I have been rallying against. Instead, I claim only that in order 
to justify any hypothesis, including the one just mentioned, science may make no use 
of evidence drawn by supernatural methods. How am I able to make this distinction 
without falling into a metaphysical trap? Like so: methodological naturalism, 
construed as an epistemological thesis, is a commitment to public methods, and this 
commitment is no kind of metaphysical prejudice. Publicity is an epistemological 
characteristic of scientific methods. 
Since supernatural methods are private, they fail to generate scientific evidence. 
Only evidence collected by public methods counts as scientific evidence. After all, 
science is a communal activity that ought to be maximally inclusive; open to all 
rational and capable human beings. This inclusivity requires that the methods used 
be public. But just what counts as a public method? One of the more promising 
accounts comes from Alvin Goldman, who defines a method of evidence collection M 
as public iff (A) two or more investigators can severally apply M to the same 
questions, and (B) if different investigators were to apply M to the same questions, 
M would always (or usually) generate the same answers (induce the same beliefs) in 
those investigators (1997, 534). Thus, the tendency to generate intersubjective 
agreement is the hallmark of scientific methods. Private methods simply are not like 
this. Such methods generate intersubjective disagreement and conflict, not 
consensus. To be clear, there does exist some intersubjective agreement within 
particular religious communities with regards to the deliverances of some methods, 
but this intersubjective agreement is not in any way surprising. That is to say, this 
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intersubjective agreement does not tend to come about independent of a locally 
shared historical or cultural source. Methods that invoke the authoritative testimony 
of some immaterial spirit (faith in divine revelation, prophetic dreams, spirit 
possession etc.) have been used by many historically isolated religious cultures, and 
yet these methods do not generate the kind of surprising cross-cultural agreement 
that is required to admit such methods as scientific ones.  
Contrast the persistent disagreement generated by supernatural methods with 
the agreement that is generated by the use of our natural cognitive faculties. Even 
historically isolated, preliterate, tribal societies have bodies of practical knowledge 
(concerning such activities as agriculture, fishing, and navigation) that share in 
common a surprising amount of theoretical detail. There is surprising cross-cultural 
agreement in the key principles of these “proto-sciences”, despite these cultures 
having long been isolated from each other. What makes this kind of agreement 
surprising? The agreement is surprising because the hypotheses underwriting this 
practical knowledge have not come from a common cultural source. Instead, this 
knowledge has been drawn from (and tested against) experience by each community 
separately. Our natural cognitive faculties and a process of trial and error generate 
surprising intersubjective agreement. In the sorts of cases mentioned above, 
historically and culturally isolated investigators, using the same methods of evidence 
collection, are led to the same conclusions. The methods they used, then, are 
demonstrably public.  
But surely, one might think, that just is not so. Surely there are extensive 
differences in the theoretical beliefs of these historically isolated communities, even 
with regards to these bodies of apparently successful practical knowledge. Thus, the 
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criterion of publicity given here may be susceptible to the charge that no methods are 
capable of inducing the same beliefs in different investigators. After all, and as is well 
known, for any given piece of evidence there exists an infinite number of theories 
that are logically compatible with that piece of evidence. If that’s so, then Goldman’s 
criterion of publicity may be too strong, since investigators are, it seems, not only 
very often led to disagreement in practice, but probably inevitably led to disagree 
because of the problem of underdetermination of theory by evidence. As Gualtiero 
Piccinini (2003, 604) has noted, however, the practical impact of this 
underdetermination is mitigated once we are clear on what Goldman means by the 
phrase ‘induce the same beliefs’. If we understand ‘belief’ in the broadest sense, to 
include all our most general scientific theories and abstruse metaphysical beliefs, 
then this criterion of publicity would indeed judge no method to be public. Instead, 
‘beliefs’ should be taken to mean beliefs about what the results are. It is this narrower 
kind of agreement that many methods do, in practice, happen to generate. While this 
answer fails to solve the logical problem of underdetermination (no surprises there), 
it nevertheless answers the sceptic who charges that in practice this intersubjective 
agreement cannot be found.  
It ought to be emphasized that not all the methods used within religion are 
private. Deductive arguments for God’s existence, for example, generate the kind of 
agreement described above (they generate agreement about what the results or what 
the conclusions are). Nevertheless, supernatural methods are, it seems, private. 
Therefore, allowing supernatural methods to count as scientific methods would 
generate widespread intersubjective disagreement that was in principle 
irreconcilable. Keep in mind the variety of religious traditions with their distinct 
75 
 
supernatural authorities. Not only could the Bible be brought to bear on scientific 
questions, but the Qur’an and the Granth Sahib and Dianetics also. Scientific inquiry 
would be irreconcilably divided along religious lines if any investigator could bring 
forward private evidence in the appraisal of theories. Without a common set of 
justificatory tools, scientists would be led to a dangerous stalemate, a stalemate that 
Piccinini has appropriately termed epistemic divergence. There is no escaping this 
divergence without agreeing on a public set of epistemic tools: a set that tends to 
generate agreement. My thesis is, then, that the anti-supernatural commitments of 
the scientist are subsumed under the more general preference for public evidence. 
Indeed, this scientific preference for justificatory methods that tend to generate 
agreement appears to have preoccupied Aquinas. He considers the argument, for 
example, that sacred doctrine is a lowly scientia, since not all men find its 
deliverances compelling or self-evident. The following argument is found in the 
Summa Theologiae:  
It seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other sciences; for the nobility of 
a science depends on the certitude it establishes. But other sciences, the principles 
of which cannot be doubted, seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine; for its 
principles—namely, articles of faith—can be doubted. (1.1.5) 
Sacred doctrine does not command the assent of all people. Aquinas therefore also 
considers whether sacred doctrine should be considered a way of knowing at all:  
It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every science proceeds from 
self-evident principles. But sacred doctrine proceeds from articles of faith which 
are not self-evident, since their truth is not admitted by all: “For all men have not 
faith”. (1.1.2)  
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He ultimately rejects these arguments, concluding that faith remains a bona fide way 
of knowing; just not a way of knowing that should be considered as justificatory 
within natural philosophy (1.1.6.ad.2). It is telling, however, that Aquinas considered 
the lack of intersubjective agreement surrounding faith to be a problem with regards 
to its status as a scientia at all. 
The notion that publicity is a virtue of scientific methods can be traced to 
Aristotle. In the Metaphysics, he writes:  
… the same thing never appears sweet to some and the contrary of sweet to others, 
unless in one case the sense organ which discriminates the aforesaid flavours has 
been perverted and injured. And if this is so the one party must be taken as the 
measure, and the other must not. (Met. 1063a 1—5) 
Aristotle is closely followed by Aquinas, who also argues that the first principles of 
rational demonstration are those which are ‘common things that no one is ignorant 
of’ (1.2.ad.1). These common principles account for Aquinas’ commitment to the 
autonomy of rational investigation (De Ceglie 2016). Like Aristotle, Aquinas takes up 
the example of taste in his Contra Summa Gentiles: 
That which is asserted universally, by everyone, cannot possibly be totally false. 
For a false opinion is a kind of infirmity of the understanding, just as a false 
judgment concerning a proper sensible happens as the result of a weakness of the 
sense power involved. But defects, being outside the intention of nature, are 
accidental. And nothing accidental can be always and in all things; the judgment 
about savors given by every tasting cannot be false. (2.34) 
As noted by both Aquinas and Aristotle, when investigators disagree about what the 
results are while using sense perception (a method that is assumed to be otherwise 
public), this disagreement may be traceable to a weakness of the sense power or an 
injured sense organ. Thus, the reason for an unusual disagreement between parties 
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can be traced to a dysfunction or weakness of a cognitive mechanism. In more 
modern terms, Carnap writes:  
Physicists believe that agreement can in principle be reached to any degree of 
exactitude attainable by single investigators; and that when such agreement is not 
found in practice, technical difficulties (imperfection of instruments, lack of time, 
etc.) are the cause. (Carnap 1963, 409) 
Note that these claims about the shortcomings of cognitive mechanisms can be 
independently corroborated by the application of other methods that are themselves 
public. By such a procedure of cross-checking, public methods can be calibrated and 
the conditions under which any particular method is considered public is adjusted in 
turn. The scientist then comes to depend not only on surprising intersubjective 
agreement, but on surprising intermodal agreement, when faced with a conflict 
between competing methods.  
I would like to consider one more objection that might be levelled at the general 
approach of this argument. It might be argued that my decision to locate the 
emergence of methodological naturalism in Europe in the Middle Ages is 
fundamentally misguided. After all, the ancient Greeks seem to have been doing 
pretty good naturalistic science before then, and Muslim philosophers picked up 
where the Greeks left off. So why not locate the emergence of methodological 
naturalism in those contexts? Moreover, it is added, even if the medievals did eschew 
supernatural methods, so what? This does not seem to tell us anything interesting 
about how we should understand methodological naturalism today. 
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In response, I say two things. First, I do not dispute that the ancient Greeks 
appear to have been doing pretty successful naturalistic science.3 However, the 
contemporary sources relating exactly why this Greek naturalism flourished are few 
and obscure. In contrast, the medieval era is virtually teeming with contemporary 
critical commentary that grapples at length with the tension between faith and 
reason. Aristotle was reintroduced into the hostile atmosphere of medieval Christian 
Europe so abruptly that an epistemological crisis ensued and a wealth of literature 
was spawned. What is clear is that methodological naturalism was self-consciously 
established in the Middle Ages as part of an intellectual tradition having clear roots 
in Aristotle. Thus, I have sought a conception of methodological naturalism in 
medieval natural philosophy for the same reason that a man seeks his keys under the 
streetlight. It is not more likely to be there, but if it is there, there is a better chance 
of finding it.  
                                                     
3    A critic may argue that the flourishing naturalism of Greek science, for example, 
consisted in its rejection of superstitious supernatural explanations and their 
replacement by naturalistic ones. However, this rejection can be explained as the 
result of other methodological commitments of scientists besides methodological 
naturalism. So, supernatural explanations for epilepsy are rejected by Hippocrates in 
‘On the Sacred Disease’ on the grounds that the distribution of epilepsy is non-random 
and apparently hereditary, which is unlikely if the ailment has a divine cause 
(Hippocrates 1923, 151). So, the theory that the ailment has a divine cause predicts 
something that we do not see. Hippocrates also points to the fact that those who 
ascribe a divine cause to the ailment nevertheless usually recommend naturalistic 
remedies. Yet if the ailment can be cured by naturalistic methods, then it is reasonable 
that it would have a naturalistic cause. At the least, the ascription of a divine cause is 
redundant. In neither case is a preconceived commitment to metaphysical naturalism 
required in order to reject the supernatural theory.  
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Second, I do not wish to argue that because this epistemological conception of 
methodological naturalism emerged at the birth (or rather, rebirth) of science, it is 
the right conception for modern science. This would be to commit a kind of genetic 
fallacy. Instead, however, I argue that there simply is no science without this 
conception of methodological naturalism. Once medieval philosophers adopted this 
naturalistic epistemology, they were doing science. The relevance of medieval natural 
philosophy is, therefore, not that it witnessed the genesis of methodological 
naturalism within an existing science, so much as it witnessed the genesis of science.  
2.6 Back to the Battleground 
Does the methodological naturalism of science entail the eschewal of supernatural 
explanations? I have argued that this is not the case. Creationism, for instance, is not 
prejudicially locked out of science on the grounds that the theory posits some 
supernatural agent, but because creationism is usually justified by appeal to a divine 
revelation whose authority can only be recognized by an act of faith. Divine 
revelation justifies the claim that there was a global flood. Divine revelation justifies 
the claim that the Earth is less than 10,000 years old. But when the Bible is put back 
on the bookshelf, and these creationist claims are put under scientific scrutiny, the 
theories almost all fail under the light of reason and observation.  
To be clear, I am not alleging that creationism is defended solely by appeal to 
revelation, but that revelation is consistently introduced alongside more familiar, 
natural methods to justify creationist theories. For example, in their old Earth 
creationist manifesto Who Was Adam?, Fazale Rana and Hugh Ross speculate that 
‘attempts to identify evolutionary pathways to modern humans will ultimately prove 
unfruitful’ given the present state of the available evidence, which includes both ‘the 
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fossil record’ and ‘Genesis 1 and 2 as well as Mark 10:6 and Matthew 19:4’ (Rana 
2015, 48). Creationist theories are consistently supported by appeal to supernatural 
methods in conjunction with natural methods. The prominent young Earth 
creationist organization Creation Research Society, infamously demands that its 
members accept a statement of belief, the first principle of which is the following: 
The Bible is the written Word of God, and because it is inspired throughout, all its 
assertions are historically and scientifically true in the original autographs. To the 
student of nature this means that the account of origins in Genesis is a factual 
presentation of simple historical truths. (C.R.S. 2016)  
Thus, creationism is not scientifically respectable because its proponents explicitly 
rely on private, supernatural methods alongside more familiar, natural methods. 
Furthermore, when these supernatural methods are abandoned, and the creationist 
is forced to appeal to only public methods, no credible support is found for the 
creationist’s claims. Indeed, the creationist Duane Gish says: ‘we cannot discover by 
scientific investigations anything about the creative processes used by God’ (Gish 
quoted in Ruse 1982, 74).  
In contrast, some versions of Intelligent Design theory, or ID, present a unique 
problem. Insofar as it is publicly defended by appeal to public methods, ID may count 
as a scientific research program. A failed one, to be sure, but scientific nonetheless. 
Proponents of ID can join the ranks of proponents of other failed research programs, 
such as animal magnetism and phrenology. Given the present state of the evidence, 
it is clear enough that few scientists would take ID to be deserving of, say, equal time 
in the classroom or substantial research grants from public bodies. Yet in the 
minimal sense of being publicly justified only by appeal to public methods, ID is, by 
the lights of the thesis argued here, scientific. Is there any way to avoid this 
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conclusion? Perhaps one could argue that since ID proponents are almost always 
believing Christians, who privately justify ID to themselves (and within the greater 
Christian community) by appeal to revelation, ID is not honest science. After all, it is 
an open secret that revelation ultimately drives the ID research program (Forrest 
2004), yet these supernatural justifications are censored from official ID literature. 
However, if we are to arbitrate between honest and dishonest science according to 
the private justifications of its practitioners, we may be led to the conclusion that 
almost no science is honest. In any case, while the motivation for defending ID is 
almost always religious in nature, this does not entail that the defenses of the theory 
must themselves be.  
What these considerations show is that in the battle over the scientific 
respectability of creationism, methodological naturalism is not the silver bullet that 
it is commonly taken to be. Methodological naturalism was institutionalized in the 
Middle Ages as an injunction on appeals to supernatural methods in natural 
philosophy. Thus, science has intrinsic anti-supernatural epistemological 
commitments. The philosophers of science who try to demarcate their way to victory 
in this battle, by way of an injunction on supernatural metaphysics should, I think, 
desist. Nothing is gained except the growing suspicion among creationists that there 
exists a conspiracy to keep their theories outside of science. No great wall is needed 
to prevent incursions of undesirable metaphysical elements into the fortress of 
naturalistic science. There are other ways to treat supernatural entities that need not 
be so hostile or defensive. Indeed, an empirical outlook and an appeal to public 




3. The Epistemic Methods of Religion 
Reasoning will never make a Man correct an ill Opinion, which by Reasoning he 
never acquired – Jonathan Swift, A Letter to a Young Gentleman 
3.1 Introduction 
Having argued that religions make knowledge claims which are not eschewed out of 
hand within science, I now turn to the question of how those claims are formulated, 
developed and appraised. Religions have characteristic methods of forming and 
justifying beliefs. These methods are unlike those used in science. An important part 
of assessing whether some belief is justified is appraising the method by which the 
belief is justified. But before we can appraise the methods of religion, we must first 
be sure of what the methods are. So, what kinds of epistemic methods are 
characteristic of religion? While much has been written on the general nature of 
religious practices, rituals and beliefs, very little attention has been given to the 
methods by which religious folk of a variety of religious cultures form and justify their 
knowledge claims. If religious adherents wish to maintain that their religious beliefs 
are justified, they would be wise to show that those beliefs are delivered by methods 
that tend towards the truth. The challenge has been taken up by Christian writers 
such as William Alston (1991) and Alvin Plantinga (2000). Both of these writers aim 
to show that practitioners of traditional Christian epistemic methods are within their 
epistemic rights to do so.  
Typically, religious adherents claim that the success of their methods depends on 
the causal action of supernatural agents, such as ghosts, gods, demons, spirits, angels 
etc. The beliefs imparted to a believer during possession, or prayer, or a séance are 
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taken to have a supernatural origin. While the reader ought to remember to keep a 
distinction between the methods carried out by the religious in the pursuit of 
knowledge, and the practitioner’s explanation of how the method delivers 
knowledge, I shall nevertheless, in what follows, describe the religious methods 
incorporating the terms found within the practitioner’s explanation. It is tedious to 
preface every example with ‘the practitioner believes that …’ or something similar. In 
what follows, then, the reader will find spirits doing such-and-such, and God 
intervening here-and-there. Yet this permissiveness of language should not be seen 
as an endorsement of the metaphysical picture painted by the believer.  
3.2 Epistemic Methods 
Religions have many different methods for the achievement of many different aims. 
The present thesis explores only epistemic methods: methods which aim principally 
at the acquisition and justification of reasonable beliefs. Epistemic methods are 
procedures or experiences that are considered to be appropriate for both belief-
forming and credence-modifying with respect to some target discourse in suitable 
conditions. I will quickly define the key terms. A belief in a proposition p is here 
understood as a disposition to mental assent to p as expressed by some sentence S. 
Credence is here understood as a believer’s subjective probability that p is true, when 
p is understood under some S. Subjective probabilities are identified with betting 
ratios. So, someone with degree of belief d in a proposition expressed by sentence S 
is taken to be willing to pay $d for a wager that pays $1 if S is true (Talbott 2008), 
where d ≤ $1. Epistemic methods are considered appropriate for belief-forming and 
credence-modifying with respect to some target discourse. For example, pregnancy 
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tests are normally considered appropriate for justifying beliefs about pregnancy 
status, but not about the velocity of projectiles.  
Note that epistemic methods are procedures that are considered to be 
appropriate for belief-forming and credence-modifying under suitable conditions. 
This proviso (call it the approval proviso) is added since any particular epistemic 
method may fail, on a given occasion of use, to generate new beliefs or change 
credences. Consider an inconclusive pregnancy test. Perhaps the woman using the 
test has forgotten whether a positive result is indicated by a single or a double stripe, 
so she forms no new belief and her existing credences remain unchanged. Perhaps 
an anomalous triple-stripe appears due to a manufacturing blunder: again, the 
woman’s beliefs and credences are unaffected. Nevertheless, pregnancy tests remain 
epistemic methods. Whether or not an epistemic method, in some instance of use, 
actually happens to form any new beliefs or change any existing credences is 
irrelevant to its status as an epistemic method. Epistemic methods, under certain 
conditions of use, are just considered to be appropriate methods for forming beliefs 
and affecting credence levels.  
I add the approval proviso for another reason also: there may be a problem in 
identifying the genuine cognitive mechanisms responsible for belief change. Perhaps 
there are genuine cognitive mechanisms responsible for belief change of which we 
are unaware. Perhaps some mechanism we believe we have identified is in fact a 
cluster of conceptually distinct mechanisms. But these unknown mechanisms are of 
no interest to the present study. I am interested only in those alleged mechanisms 
that are considered to be appropriate for belief change, not the mechanisms that are 
actually responsible. I also must stress that I am not (yet) interested in which 
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methods are actually appropriate or effective. Many epistemic methods fail to be 
appropriate, in some normatively binding sense, for belief-forming and credence-
modifying. Indeed, these are the methods that are of particular interest to the present 
study, since it is my contention that religious epistemic methods are all like this: 
considered appropriate by religious adherents, but not in fact appropriate. This 
chapter, however, only describes the methods used. 
So defined, my notion of epistemic methods shares some overlap with William 
Alston’s notion of doxastic practices, which he describes as ‘a constellation of belief-
forming habits or mechanisms’ (1991, 155). While Alston’s doxastic practices are 
necessarily socially established practices, I take epistemic methods more broadly. 
Epistemic methods are methods that are considered by at least somebody to be 
appropriate for forming and modifying beliefs, but such methods need not be 
considered appropriate by the wider social group to which that person belongs. The 
madman who seeks the cure for cancer by spitting on a candle and listening to the 
resulting hiss is on my account adopting some epistemic method. Note further that 
while Alston considers doxastic methods to be prima facie justified in virtue of being 
socially established, I do not regard a method’s being socially established as any 
reason to recommend it. The consequences of this difference will become apparent 
in later chapters. 
Epistemic methods need not be deployed voluntarily or deliberately. Belief-
forming and credence-modifying habits may be so habitual, or natural, or innate, that 
the activity goes on without notice. Consider beliefs formed by sense perception. I do 
not actively decide to apply my sense of touch when I wake in the morning. I simply 
wake up, and involuntarily feel the softness of the pillow on my face. I thereby 
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unreflectively come to believe that the pillow is still beneath my head. This 
involuntariness is no blight on the epistemic method of tactile sense however. I 
consider myself entitled to the belief that the pillow is soft since the method of touch 
is one that I consider appropriate for forming and modifying certain kinds of beliefs. 
I will henceforth draw a distinction between active epistemic methods and passive 
epistemic methods. Active methods are voluntarily applied. Passive methods are not. 
The same method may sometimes be active and sometimes passive. I may wake up 
and involuntarily come to believe that the pillow is still beneath my head. And so 
here, tactile sense is a passive method. Alternately, I may wake in the middle of the 
night and spot a blurry patch beside my head. Unsure of what I am seeing, I may 
reach out with my hand, tentatively, to acquire some tactile information. I discover 
that it is simply the pillow beside my head. In this new case, tactile sense is being 
used as an active method. Some methods are, it seems, too complicated to be carried 
out passively, and so are exclusively active—radiometric dating, for example. 
3.3 Religious Epistemic Methods 
Religious epistemic methods are those procedures or experiences that are considered 
by religious communities to be appropriate for both belief-forming and credence-
modifying in suitable conditions. While some methods used within religious 
communities are also used in scientific communities, the methods of particular 
interest for the present study are those methods that are either (a) not also accepted 
within the scientific community, or (b) used in both religion and science, but with 
radical differences in what is understood to constitute suitable conditions of use. 
Mystical experience is an example of a method that is not accepted as justificatory 
within the scientific community. For an example of a method that is used in both 
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religion and science, but with radical differences in what is understood to be suitable 
conditions of use, consider deduction. When a contradiction is encountered in the 
course of scientific reasoning, this is taken to be evidence that at least one of the 
premises is false. As I outline in my discussion of religious paradox, religions 
sometimes accept dialetheia (true paradoxes), and therefore accept that deduction is 
reliable under conditions not accepted in science.     
3.3.1 Types of Religious Epistemic Methods 
There are two families of religious epistemic methods: phenomenal methods and 
logical methods. Phenomenal methods are a posteriori methods: they deliver beliefs 
about the world only by interaction with the world. What is characteristic of the 
phenomenal methods of religion is that the efficacy of the method is explained by the 
action of supernatural agents. In contrast, logical methods are a priori methods; the 
beliefs derived do not depend on interaction with the external world, but on logic. 
What is characteristic of the logical methods of religion is an acceptance of true 
paradoxes (dialetheia) and an acceptance of sacred propositions which are 
understood to be immune to revision. The logical methods of religion are constrained 
by the norm-guiding religious notions of the sacred and the taboo, which draw a 
circle around the domain of tolerated criticism. The notions of the sacred, the profane 
and the taboo are judged according to the approval and disapproval of supernatural 
agents.  
Within the family of phenomenal methods of religion, there are four types:  
1. Divination  
2. Acquaintance  




And within the family of logical methods, there are two:  
5. Inference  
6. Paradox.  
These six methods are distinctively religious, and the epistemological conflict 
between science and religion stems, in every case, from the use of these methods, on 
account of their inability to generate agreement in belief outputs, although that will 
not be argued for in this chapter. 
3.3.2 Divination 
Divination is a widespread religious epistemic method, found in the histories of all 
religions. In the Shaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, George 
Gilmore defines “divination” as follows: 
The supposed art of discovering the will of the gods, of forecasting the future from 
indications ascribed to them, or of deciding from phenomena supposedly 
supernatural the correct course of action to be followed (1953, 450).  
So understood, divination is a form of supernatural communication by proxy. 
Information is delivered from the supernatural agent, via some natural messenger, 
to the practitioner. These messengers may be any kind of living or non-living sign, 
and divination may be carried out actively or passively by the practitioner. Divination 
is usually undertaken according to a sophisticated interpretative scheme, and lengthy 
training is often required for religious novices to become expert in the method. The 




 3.3.2.1 Active Divination: Living Objects 
Divination is often purposively carried out on living things, including plants, 
animals, and humans. Most commonly, the observed movements and behaviours of 
animals, especially in relation to various sacred markers, are the signs by which some 
supernatural message is delivered. This particular kind of divination is called 
divination by behaviour. To give an example of divination by animal behaviour, the 
Kenyah people of Northern Borneo had been observed to judge whether the next rice 
crop would be a success by watching the movements of water beetles as they floated 
atop a prepared, water-filled gong (Hose and MacDougall 1912, 113). These beetles 
were emissaries of Laki Ivong, god of the harvest.  
Unusual physical characteristics of living things may also be the object of 
divination. The Devil’s mark, for example, was an identifying sign found on the 
bodies of witches during the European witch trials. It was described, by the witch-
hunter John Bell in 1705, as having the following appearance: 
Sometimes like a blew spot, or a little tate, or reid spots, like flea biting; sometimes 
also the flesh is sunk in, and hallow, and this is put in secret places, as among the 
hair of the head, or eyebrows, within the lips, under the arm-pits, and even in the 
most secret parts of the body.’  (Bell quoted in Macdonald 1997, 507) 
Sometimes these marks were undetectable, other than being numb patches of skin, 
leading European witch-hunters to the practice of “pricking” suspected witches with 
brass needles. What kind of explanation was given as to the origins of such marks? A 
supernatural explanation was given: the marks were argued to have been impressed 
on the skin by the grip of the devil’s claw. In other cases, the mark was taken to be a 
kind of teat, through which demons found nocturnal nourishment.  
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Perhaps the most grotesque form of divination of the living is divination by 
ordeal (Rose 1908, 777). Divination by ordeal has routinely been used as a method 
for the determination of guilt and innocence. There are two types of divination by 
ordeal: one positive and one negative.  
In the positive case, some person, suspected of having committed some crime, is 
subjected to treatment that would normally injure that person. If the accused fails to 
be injured, this is due to the causal intervention of some supernatural power, and so 
this result is seen either to incriminate or exonerate the accused depending on the 
source of supernatural power (i.e. was the intervention from a divine or demonic 
source?). The following example is found in A. B. Ellis’ 1887 ethnography, The Tshi-
Speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast of West Africa:  
A husband who suspects his wife of having been unfaithful to him, but is unable 
to prove it, while the wife strenuously denies her guilt, subjects her to an ordeal. 
He obtains from a priest, to whom he states the case, certain leaves, which, the 
priest informs him, possess medicinal or magical qualities. These leaves he mixes 
with water in a calabash, in the presence of his wife, while an earthen pot 
containing palm-oil is placed over a fire. When the oil is boiling the wife has to 
dip her hand in the water in which are the leaves, and then at once plunge it into 
the boiling oil. If the hand should sustain no injury, she is guiltless; but if it be 
scalded, she is guilty. (200—1) 
Early Modern European witch trials were famously rife with positive divinations by 
ordeal. The well-known method of “swimming a witch” was an ordeal by water that 
consisted in the suspect being bound and thrown into a body of water, while 
connected to a rope. If the suspect sank, she was retrieved and declared innocent. If 
the suspect floated, she was thereby shown to be guilty. The basis for the ordeal by 
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water was the widely-held belief that water, a symbolically pure substance, would 
refuse to receive those tainted by the spiritual crime of witchcraft (Zguta 1977, 221). 
In the case of negative divination by ordeal, some accused person is subjected to 
treatment that would normally leave them unharmed. If the accused is thereby 
harmed, this is due to the intercession of some divine or supernatural power, and so 
the accused is declared guilty. An example of negative divination by ordeal is the 
Medieval trial by eucharist (Schaff 1885, §79 p.362—3). A cleric suspected of some 
capital crime, such as murder, adultery or theft, would be made to take the bread and 
wine of the eucharist. If he is able to consume it unharmed, he is not guilty. If he 
chokes, or falls ill, this is a supernatural sign declaring his guilt.  
 3.3.2.2 Active Divination: Non-Living Objects 
Divination may be purposely carried out on non-living objects. These include man-
made artifacts such as books or machines, natural geological and meteorological 
phenomena such as volcanoes or clouds, as well as the celestial bodies and the lifeless 
bodies of dead creatures.  
Haruspicy, or the reading of entrails, is perhaps the best-known example of 
divination of a non-living object by its physical characteristics. The practice featured 
prominently in ancient Etruscan and Roman religion, and is still practiced today 
among other historically disconnected religious cultures. In Peru, for example, 
entrails of guinea pigs are used as diagnostic tools by traditional healers who take the 
animals’ bodies to be rich with signs (Pratt 2007, p.120).   
Kinetic artifacts are also the object of divination. The movement of pendulums is 
noted as a method used by Malay traditional healers to answer all manner of 
questions (Rose 1908, 779). In central Africa, we find a wide variety of so-called 
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friction oracles, the most elaborate of which might be the Congolese galukoji, an 
accordion-like device, with a carved head at one end. The galukoji is held in the lap, 
while the practitioner recites a list of names of suspects of some crime. The head of 
the galukoji springs upwards and downwards as names are read out, but on the 
utterance of the guilty party’s name, the head will spring forth to its limit, and that is 
the guilty party (LaGamma 2000, 56). 
Straddling divination by behaviour and divination by physical characteristics we 
find astrology: a culturally widespread form of divination carried out according to 
the position and movement of celestial bodies. Astrology is difficult to classify strictly 
as a form of divination, since the celestial bodies themselves have often been 
considered, by all kinds of early religious communities, not simply as signs of the 
divine, but as divine agents themselves. Furthermore, although it is the case that the 
standard model in most cultures has ‘God or gods and goddesses communicate with 
humanity via the stars, giving notice of their intentions’ (Campion 2015, 107), some 
astrological systems, such as the Chinese horoscope, do not assume the existence of 
any supernatural agency to explain their efficacy. Therefore, not all astrological 
methods are religious methods.  
Note further that the general method of making predictions according to the 
positions and movements of celestial bodies is a method heartily endorsed within 
science. Astronomy and geoscience are both fields that make predictions on the basis 
of the movement of the celestial bodies. One important difference between the 
astrologer and the astronomer concerns the kinds of questions deemed to be 
answerable by appeal to the heavenly bodies. Thus, the duration of military sieges is 
predicted according to the astrology of the Māori (Campion 2015, 112). Ptolemaic 
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astrology makes predictions about which marriages will be happy or unhappy. And 
famously, the star of Bethlehem revealed the location of the baby Jesus to the Magi. 
In contrast, astronomy, as a modern scientific discipline, does not make predictions 
such as these, which concern specific details of events in our cultural and personal 
lives. 
 3.3.2.3 Active Divination: Visions  
Commonly, in religious cultures having a specialized role for shamans or visionaries, 
visions or apparitions are induced as a means of symbolic communication between 
the supernatural and natural realms. Visions are most commonly elicited by the 
infliction of bodily stresses, such as by self-torture, sleep deprivation and fasting. 
They may also be elicited by the administering of psychoactive drugs, or by repetitive 
and lengthy rituals involving focused attention.  
Psychoactive drugs figure prominently in the ‘vision quest’ ceremonies of 
indigenous North and South American religions: decoctions of peyote cactus and 
ayahuasca are consumed. Moreover, the hallucinogenic compound ibogaine is used 
to elicit visions in the bwiti sect of Christianity practiced largely in West Africa. In 
these cases, hallucinogenic drugs are administered in the context of some ceremony 
(often a man’s coming-of-age ceremony), and the visions undergone by the initiate 
can be either prophetic or diagnostic (Cohen 1998, 54).  
As noted, bodily stresses and self-torture figure prominently in the quest for 
visions. The following list of vision-inducing methods across shamanistic 
communities can be found in Noll (1985, 447): focused suggestive attention, pain 
stimulation, hypoglycemia, dehydration, forced hypermotility, temperature 
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stimulation, acoustic stimulation, seclusion, sensory deprivation, sleep deprivation, 
kinetic stimulation and hyperventilation.  
The visions had by practitioners may be seen as existing in a space external to the 
believer, or as a kind of internal mental imagery. Whereas external-type visions are 
more commonly elicited via amplifying sensory stimulation, internal-type visions 
more commonly require sensory deprivation, especially of the visual system. So, for 
example, both Russian Shelkup shaman and Samoyed mystics wear blindfolds in 
their quests for visions. Similarly, Eskimo and Aboriginal mystics seek visions while 
lying prostrate and unmoving in dark and silent conditions (Noll 1985, 447).   
A common method of eliciting visions is scrying, or crystal-gazing. This is a 
popular form of active divination in which visions are elicited by focusing attention 
on some reflective object, such as a mirror, still lake, or polished crystal.   
 3.3.2.4 Active Divination: Dreams 
Although dreams are more commonly used as a passive epistemic method, dreams 
may sometimes be purposely induced for the sake of divination. One example of 
active divination of dreams is the ancient Greek method of incubation. The 
practitioner of incubation would sleep in a sacred temple belonging to some chosen 
god, petitioning the deity for a message about future events (Stroumsa 1999, 193—
4). Incubation was particularly popular as a tool for the diagnosis and treatment of 
illness. The gods would visit the patient and reveal an appropriate treatment. This 
method was not only taken up by the ancient Greeks. Indeed, it has been argued on 
archeological and textual evidence that the practice of incubation lived on in the early 
Christian world, possibly as a continuation of the pagan tradition, although this is a 
disputed claim. Within the Christian tradition of incubation, it seems that the Church 
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may have replaced the sacred temple as dormitory and patients would find their 
dreams to be visited by intermediary saints rather than pagan gods (Graf 2014, 133—
7).  
 3.3.2.5 Passive divination: Dreams 
The fantastical imagery of dreams makes fertile ground for interpretation. It is no 
wonder, then, that strange and unsettling dreams would be the objects of divination. 
Indeed, the divination of dreams is one of the most common, and most ancient, 
epistemic methods found in religion. The popularity of religious dream 
interpretation is probably due to a popular folk metaphysical view of the relation 
between the soul and the body. A common theme of many primitive societies is that 
the soul leaves the body during sleep, and this is taken to explain the efficacy of the 
method of dream divination. As the soul roams about, it encounters a world not 
normally accessible to the world of embodied sense experience. The contents of 
dreams are very often taken to be prophetic. 
Indeed, the popularity of the method cannot be overstated. The Bible contains 
close to ninety verses referring to prophetic dreams. Dream divination was 
particularly popular in the medieval Muslim world, with large and impressive 
volumes produced to aid their interpretation. One particularly important text was 
Ibn Sirin’s Dictionary of Dreams. In this work, he notes that not every kind of dream 
is amenable to divination. Non-divinable dreams are of seven kinds:  
1. Dreams had during periods of great distress  
2. Erotic dreams involving nocturnal emission  
3. Nightmares  
4. Dreams brought on by demons  
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5. Dreams brought on by Satan  
6. Self-interested dreams that serve to fulfil waking desires  
7. Dreams caused by pain from a physical ailment (Al-Akili 1991, xix)  
Interestingly, the early Christian theologian Tertullian also argued that not all 
dreams were divine signs. Among Tertullian’s typology of dreams he describes 
‘incoherent dreams brought on by the ecstatic soul that are not open to narration or 
interpretation’ (Miller 1994, 68—9). While Christian and Muslim traditions seem to 
have agreed that some dreams should not be the objects of divination, this was not 
accepted by other religious cultures. The Ten’a people of Alaska, for example, appear 
to have accepted all dreams as containing prophetic messages (Jetté 1911, 242).  
The dreams had by animals, despite our relative lack of epistemic access to these, 
may also have been the object of divination by some religions. A particularly 
interesting case is described by Elsdon Best. He notes that New Zealand Māori 
hunters saw the involuntary twitches and barks of sleeping dogs as an indication that 
those dogs were reliable for catching kiwi upon waking (1898, 126). Aristotle also 
considered the question of whether the dreams of animals were prophetic (1963, 
463b). Interestingly, Aristotle was led to conclude that the existence of animal 
dreams (inferred from their involuntary bodily movements while sleeping) actually 
spoke against the theory that all dreams could be prophetic. Aristotle’s reasoning 
was that the gods would have no reason to give prophetic dreams to unreasoning 
brutes.  
 3.3.2.6 Passive divination: Visions 
Spontaneous, non-induced visions may appear to be in external space, or they may 
be internal visions, impressed on the imagination by some supernatural force. Lucia 
97 
 
Santos’ apocalyptic visions of 1917 were approved as ‘worthy of belief’ by the Catholic 
Church. These were certainly external visions. Santos first witnessed the Virgin Mary 
appearing above an oak tree in a field. She later describes one vision of an angel 
carrying a flaming sword as occurring ‘at the left of [a statue of] Our Lady and a little 
above’ (Matter 2001, 132).  
Despite their alleged supernatural origins, the phenomenon of internal visions is 
often connected with temporal lobe epilepsy. There is a great deal of literature on this 
observed connection, which has been noted since the time of Hippocrates, who 
dubbed the condition the ‘sacred disease’, while insisting of course that the condition 
had quite natural causes. In a more recent study of the connection between epileptics 
and religious experience, the following account of a non-elicited internal vision is 
described:  
[The patient] had a vision in which he was in the cockpit of an aeroplane flying 
over a mountainous region of France. The aircraft gained altitude and brought 
him to a different land, a land of peace. He had no cares and no burdens. He felt 
that the power of God was upon him. (Dewhurst and Beard 1970, 500) 
The patient proceeded to convert to Christianity. 
 3.3.2.7 Passive divination: Omens 
There is a more general class of passive divination, in which signs may be embodied 
by living or non-living objects encountered in daily life, without having been 
contrived. The signs embodied by these objects are usually called omens. The 
messages conveyed by omens are often not very informative. Such messages may be, 
in the most general sense, simply auspicious or simply foreboding. 
Involuntary human bodily movement is commonly taken to be an omen. Yawns 
and sneezes are particularly common examples. The Ten’a Alaskans regarded yawns 
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as having been sent by protector spirits to contradict one’s train of thought. Thus, if 
one were to yawn while worrying about the downward trend of a loved one’s state of 
health, the yawn is an omen that they will recover (Jetté 1911, 243). Sneezes are 
described as omens in the Problemata, a work falsely attributed to Aristotle. 
Interestingly, it is noted in this work that the ancient Greeks considered sneezes to 
be ominous if occurring in the morning, but auspicious if occurring at night (1927, 
962b). Disagreeing with the Greeks, the Ten’a saw the originating location in the 
nose as the deciding factor: if a sneeze begins with a tickling in the right nostril, this 
indicates food and plenty ahead. Tickling in the left nostril is a bad omen (Jette 1911, 
243).  
The sudden appearance of certain animals, especially birds, has been a near 
universal omen in religious cultures, although the significance of this omen differs 
across cultures. The appearance of people, as well as animals, may also be taken as 
an omen. In the Christian tradition, for example, John the Baptist is sometimes 
identified as a harbinger of the coming Messiah. Meteorological phenomena have 
also made fertile objects of divination. We find, for example, the Jewish and Christian 
traditions taking the rainbow as a good omen: a symbol of the covenant God made 
with Noah after the global deluge. 
 3.3.2.8 Passive Divination: Miracles 
The observation of miracles is also a kind of divination, albeit one in which the 
interpretive scheme is relatively impoverished. To observe some miracle is to observe 
some physical event that has a disembodied spirit or force as a proximate cause. To 
describe some event as miraculous is to ascribe some proximate supernatural cause 
to the observed event. In his classic essay ‘On Miracles’, Hume provides the following 
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definition in a footnote: ‘a trangression of a law of nature by a particular volition of 
the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent’ (1966, X, i,).  
Thus, there are two notable marks of a miracle. The first is that miracles are quite 
unlike other forms of divination which can often resemble natural magic, in the sense 
that such effects are often regular, controllable, and repeatable. Miracles are no part 
of the ordinary course of nature; they are violations of it. Their happening is typically 
unpredictable and unexpected. Secondly, miracles need not necessarily carry any 
deeper significance or connection to part of a recurring pattern of supernatural signs. 
To be sure, some interpretive scheme will be applied to the observation of any miracle 
post hoc, but this scheme will be relatively pared-down or ad hoc e.g. a statue that 
cries blood may be ascribed a supernatural cause, and may be called a miracle. Only 
later will it be given some interpretation as a sign, especially if the miracle can be 
related to some later event such that it can be seen as having portended.    
3.3.3 Acquaintance 
For the most part, divination requires a subtle understanding of the signs and 
symbols that mediate knowledge between the supernatural and natural realms. In 
contrast, some religious epistemic methods provide direct evidence of the 
supernatural. Thus, whereas divination is an epistemic method with a large 
inferential component, some religious epistemic methods are argued to directly 
acquaint the practitioner with the supernatural objects of belief. An analogy is often 
made to the deliverances of the senses: I am aware that the shirt I am now wearing 
is green. How am I aware of this fact? It seems that my belief stems from my direct 
cognitive contact with the shirt itself (in this case, through the faculty of vision). 
Similarly, methods of religious acquaintance allow practitioners to perceive a 
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supernatural reality directly via some separate or supervenient cognitive faculty 
whose proper operation, under suitable conditions, is informative about 
supernatural beings, among other metaphysical and moral matters. As the ancient 
mystic Plotinus put it, during mystical experience the divine is ‘like a thing of sense,’ 
since it is ‘immediately perceived’ (1999, 43). The practice of cultivating this quasi-
perceptual experience is usually given the term mysticism, and its practitioners 
labelled mystics. Mystical experience can be defined as the direct experience of 
supernatural objects by means other than our natural cognitive faculties.  
There is an important feature of mystical experience that I urge the reader to keep 
in mind. In contrast with divination, which is a collection of disparate methods 
practiced in a variety of conflicting ways and taken to answer a wide variety of 
dissimilar questions, mystical experience often produces some surprising agreement 
among its practitioners. Mystics often come to similar conclusions about the nature 
of their experiences and about the fundamental, metaphysical and moral insights 
delivered by the method. The idea of ‘unity’ is a persistent theme of mystical 
experience and mystics often describe uniting with a supernatural being, or of the 
supernatural being visiting the soul (Teresa of Avila 1921, p. 125). Because of this 
feature of mystical experience, it is very common for practitioners to agree on the 
claim that the self or soul is absorbed by a supreme being during the experience. 
While mysticism is focused on the individual’s efforts to achieve communion with 
some supreme being, there remains a supernatural cause that gives authority to the 
experience. This supernatural being meets the mystic ‘with a divine grace which both 
purifies and illumines the soul’ (Beckwith 1953, 68). 
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Mystics claim that the fundamental nature of reality is only properly known or 
understood during a mystical experience, whereas at other times everyday 
experience shrouds this ultimate truth in darkness. Thus, the deliverances of our 
natural cognitive faculties are argued to be illusory in contrast. The 16th century 
mystic Teresa of Avila writes, for example, that during the ‘prayer of union’, God 
‘deprives the soul of all its senses that He may the better imprint in it true wisdom’ 
(1921, p.125). The senses may err, but God cannot. 
Although predominantly practiced as a religious method, mysticism is not only a 
religious activity and mystics have often come to the practice without any religious 
or theistic interpretation of their experience. That being said, it is apparent that 
mysticism has been sanctioned by some religions at some stages of their histories 
and that mystical experiences have been interpreted as having divine causes. This is 
further taken to be a kind of evidence for the truth of various theistic claims. That 
being said, there is notable disagreement about which supernatural claims are 
thought to be justified by mystical experience. Indeed, some mystics experience a 
single godhead, some experience several deities, and still others experience a variety 
of lesser spirits (Fales 1996, 305). Thus, while there is a degree of agreement with 
regards to the deliverances of mystical experience, there are notable differences as 
well. Russell remarked on this point: 
While the witnesses agree up to a point, they disagree totally when that point is 
passed, although they are just as certain as when they agree. Catholics, but not 
Protestants, may have visions in which the Virgin appears; Christians and 
Mohammedans, but not Buddhists, may have great truths revealed to them by the 
Archangel Gabriel; the Chinese mystics of the Tao tell us, as a direct result of their 
central doctrine, that all government is bad, whereas most European and 
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Mohammedan mystics, with equal confidence, urge submission to constituted 
authority. (Russell 1935, 180) 
Despite Russell’s warning, it must be kept in mind that the mystics still agree up to a 
point. There is notable convergence in the contents of first-person reports of the 
phenomenology of mystical experience. This has led several writers to systematically 
analyse the phenomenological characteristics of mystical experience. Several of these 
analyses have resulted in measures of mystical experience that have been put to work 
in psychology, neurotheology and psychopharmacology (Griffiths, 2006; Pahnke, 
1966). William James was the first to present a systematic analysis of the 
phenomenological characteristics of mystical experience. In his seminal work, The 
Varieties of Religious Experience, James lays out the following four marks of 
mystical states: 
1.  Ineffability: The experience defies expression. 
2.  Noetic Quality: Mystical states are states of insight into depths of truth 
unplumbed by the discursive intellect. 
3. Transiency: Mystical states cannot be sustained for long. 
4.  Passivity: Although the oncoming of mystical states may be elicited by a variety 
of procedures, when the characteristic sort of consciousness once has set in, 
the mystic feels as if his own will were in abeyance. (James 1999, 414—16)  
Following James, Walter Stace (1960) gives the following nine characteristics in his 
phenomenological typology of mystical experience: 
1.  Unity: Subject is either aware of an internal oneness of all consciousness or of 
an external oneness of all physical objects. 
103 
 
2.  Transcendence of Time and Space:  Subject feels outside of time or outside of 
three-dimensional space, sees the “unreality” of time or space. 
3.  Deeply Felt Positive Mood: Subject feels intense bliss, peace or love, often 
assisted by tears. 
4.  Sense of Sacredness: Subject feels a sense of awe or reverence for the 
experience. 
5.  Objectivity and Reality: Subject feels deep insight or illumination, with a sense 
of certainty about purpose or values. 
6. Paradoxicality: Subject mentally assents both to a proposition and its negation. 
The truth of both propositions is claimed to be understood as unproblematic. 
Subject becomes a “temporary dialetheist”. 
7.  Alleged Ineffability: Subject takes the experience to be beyond words, non-
verbal, impossible to describe. 
8.  Transiency: The intensity of the subject’s experience peaks at some point, after 
which the experience subsides. The experience is temporally discrete. 
9.  Persisting Positive Changes in Attitude and Behaviour: Subject feels greater 
appreciation and good feeling toward both self and others.    
By far the most popular contemporary measure of mystical experience, Hood’s 
Mysticism Scale (Hood 1975) includes five phenomenological factors of mystical 
experience, which correspond roughly to the first five factors noted by Stace. Besides 
Hood and Stace, Russell noted the following three core doctrines associated with 
mystical experience:  
1.  Unity: that all division and separateness is unreal, and that the universe is a 
single indivisible unity.  
2. Moral Nihilism: that evil is illusory; that is to say that good and evil, while 
seemingly opposite, are identical.  
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3.  Temporal Nihilism: that time is unreal, and that reality is eternal, not in the 
sense of being everlasting, but in the sense of being wholly outside time. 
(Russell 1935, 179) 
The evidence upon which these typologies are based is largely the oral and written 
testimony of a broad sample of mystics from a variety of different religious traditions. 
As can be seen in their ordering of the characteristic qualities of mystical experience, 
Stace, Hood and Russell give priority to the theme of unity. Unity beliefs are regarded 
as absolutely central to mystical experience. James says that ‘in mystic states we both 
become one with the Absolute and we become aware of our oneness. This is the 
everlasting and triumphant mystical tradition’ (James 1999, 457). On the same point, 
Stace writes that unity is the ‘one basic, essential, nuclear characteristic, from which 
most of the others inevitably follow’ (1960, 110). Indeed, there is no need to quote 
philosophers. We may as well let the mystics speak for themselves. The following is 
a list of verbatim first-person reports from practitioners of mystical states 
exemplifying the theme of cosmic unity:  
‘I didn’t know where I ended and my surroundings began.’ 
‘The sense that all is One, that I experienced the essence of the Universe.’ 
‘I was able to comprehend what oneness is.’  
‘The complete and utter loss of self… The sense of unity was awesome…’  
‘All things are connected.’ (Selected from Griffiths 2008, 19) 
As with the other religious epistemic methods described so far, mystical experience 
may be actively sought or may fall upon a person passively. When actively sought, 
mystical experience is elicited by many of the same procedures already described for 
eliciting active visions. The reader may remember that most of these procedures 
demanded some form of sensory deprivation or hyper-stimulation, and the role of 
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psychoactive drugs was also noted. That such drastic and often painful measures are 
necessary might lead one to think that mystical experience is pathological: the result 
of a disordered, distressed or dysfunctional mind. Russell was of this opinion, 
writing:  
From a scientific point of view, we can make no distinction between a man who 
eats little and sees heaven and the man who drinks much and sees snakes. Each 
is in an abnormal physical condition, and therefore has abnormal perceptions. 
(1935, 188) 
But, as C. D. Broad put it, perhaps you simply have to be a bit “cracked” to get “peep-
holes” to the supernatural (2014, 198). That our cognitive faculties are used in an 
abnormal way is no evidence that their deliverances will be unreliable when the 
putative objects of the experience are themselves abnormal. Indeed, anyone familiar 
with the Magic Eye illusion series knows that the only way to see the hidden image 
is to look at the page with a diverged focus.  
3.3.3.1 Active Mystical Experience: Devotion 
Devotion has often been often used as a means to elicit mystical experience. 
‘Devotion’ is here defined as enthusiasm, adoration, attentive preoccupation, 
submission or obedience with respect to the object of devotion, where the object of 
devotion may be a person, a totem, a spirit or a god. Note that religious devotion is 
commonly part of the ritual practice of religion in a way that does not qualify it as an 
epistemic method. For example, a Muslim might practice devotion in praying five 
times a day, but this is not in order to attain mystical insights, or to change any of his 
beliefs at all. Such devotional practices are simply intended to gratify Allah.  
In Indian religious traditions, devotion figures prominently as a means to 
mystical experience. This devotion is usually played out as a relationship between 
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guru and devotee. The devotee is encouraged to adore the guru and to make the guru 
the object of persistent attentive preoccupation. By way of guru devotion, the devotee 
may reach supernatural truths immediately. The guru acts as the source of 
supernatural knowledge, and devotion allows supernatural knowledge to flow from 
the guru to the devotee. Thus, devotion from the devotee to the guru generates 
something akin to a conduit by which the mystical, transcendent experience of 
ultimate truth may flow. That a conduit is nurtured between guru and devotee by the 
act of devotion is stressed in these traditions. Take, for example, what the new age 
guru Adi Da Samraj (a.k.a. Franklin Jones) had to say on the matter of guru devotion:  
You enter more profoundly into this turning to Me, which becomes surrender to 
Me, which is merely Beholding Me and being able to “Locate” My specific 
Transmission of My Transcendental Spiritual Nature and Presence, Which 
Ultimately Reveals My Very State—Which Is the State, the Divine Self-Nature. 
(Adi Da Samraj 2004) 
Although making use of many more capital letters, Adi Da’s words are reminiscent of 
Christ’s exhortation to devotion: ‘I am the way, the truth and the life. No one comes 
to the father except through me.’  
Indeed, devotion is a persistent theme in Christian traditions, with the Holy Spirit 
taking up the position of the Indian guru as the object of devotion. Teresa of Avila, 
the quintessential Christian mystic, characterizes devotion as a means to mystical 
experience when she says that ‘true union can always be attained by forcing ourselves 
to renounce our own will and by following the will of God in all things’ (1921, 140). 
Teresa’s devotion culminates in ecstatic, mystical experiences of union with the 




3.3.3.2 Passive Mystical Experience  
Mystical experiences may sometimes set on a believer spontaneously, without having 
any contrived conditions as a means of elicitation. As was also noted for passive 
internal visions, temporal lobe epilepsy is commonly associated with this kind of 
mystical experience.  
As far as the great religious traditions go, the biographical Puratan Janamsakhi 
appears to indicate that Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhism, had just such a passive 
mystical experience as he ventured to bathe in a local river. There is no indication 
that Nanak had deliberately sought such a mystical experience. A poetic description 
of this experience, apparently written by Nanak himself, appears as the first 
composition of the Sikh sacred scripture, the Granth Sahib. It begins with a paradigm 
description of the mystical experience of unity, emphasizing the oneness of God, who 
is transcendent as well as immanent. He has a ‘timeless form’, being unbegotten, self-
existent, ‘not produced from the womb’ (Nanak 1970, 1). 
More controversially, passive mystical experiences may come in the form of near 
death experiences. Near death experiences are mystical experiences, in which the 
believer is brought into contact with a supernatural, unitary consciousness, after 
having been assumed to be dead or very nearly dead. Such experiences are often had 
alongside a particular assortment of standard visions, including a vision of a tunnel 
or tunnels, a supernatural ‘being of light’ who communicates some message, a vision 
as of leaving the body and viewing it from a different perspective and, frequently, 
visions of deceased friends and loved ones (Engmann 2014, 6). Accounts of near-
death experiences are not restricted to the modern era. Plato, in his Republic, 
discusses the myth of the hero Er, who was slain in battle. Twelve days later, says 
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Plato, ‘he returned to life and told them what he had seen in the other world’ (1955, 
XI §3). By Plato’s account, Er’s soul left his body and came to a mysterious place 
where there were two openings in the earth and two other openings in the heavens 
above. Great judges were seated, who commanded the just to ascend to heaven, and 
the unjust to descend. The myth of Er is unmistakably similar in some respects to 
modern descriptions of near-death experiences. 
3.3.3 Innate Beliefs 
Whereas mystical experience is analogous to perception in that the supernatural 
objects of belief are presented to the practitioner, beliefs about the supernatural may 
also be formed in a way analogous to other forms of innate knowledge. By this 
method, one does not reason one’s way to belief in the supernatural, and neither does 
one directly perceive supernatural goings-on. Instead, beliefs about the supernatural 
just flourish in the human mind. Human beings have a natural predisposition to 
acquire beliefs about the supernatural under the right kinds of conditions, in a 
similar way, it could be argued, to how we are disposed to acquire beliefs about 
numbers or morality. Note also that whereas mystical experience is radically unlike, 
or even transcends, everyday experience, innate methods bring forth belief in the 
supernatural in a quite ordinary way. Mystical experience is radical, ineffable, 
paradoxical, blissful etc. Innate methods are not like this. Their exercise is associated 
with a comparatively humdrum phenomenology. 
Some religious traditions permit the faithful to form new beliefs and to adjust 
existing credences according to this dispositional capacity, since this capacity is taken 
to have been instilled in us by supernatural beings who wish us to have veridical 
beliefs about their nature. Thus, the efficacy of innate supernatural belief is 
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ultimately guaranteed by the beneficence and omnipotence of some supernatural 
being.  
The most well-known account of such an innate capacity is given by John Calvin. 
Calvin calls this innate disposition to supernatural belief a ‘sensus divinitatis’, or 
sense of the divine. Calvin notes in his Institutes: ‘There is within the human mind, 
and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity’ (1845, I, iii, 1). Calvin’s 
explanation for the existence of this awareness is that it has been implanted in us by 
God, engraved on our minds. Calvin makes clear, however, that this awareness begins 
as a mere seed that requires attentive care in order to grow. The innate sense that 
there exist supernatural beings is a kernel of the truth of divine reality, a truth so 
radical that none may fully attain it. He writes: ‘But though experience testifies that 
a seed of religion is divinely sown in all, scarcely one in a hundred is found with who 
cherishes it in his heart, and not one in whom it grows to maturity, so far is it from 
yielding fruit in season’ (1845, I, iv, 1). While proponents of a Calvinist-styled sensus 
divinitatis differ in their accounts of its precise nature, for present purposes, it is 
enough that all share in the belief that the faculty consists either in innate belief or 
an innate tendency to form beliefs about supernatural beings, under suitable 
conditions. They also believe that the efficacy of this method depends entirely on a 
god having crafted the faculty such that, when functioning optimally, accurate belief 
in the supernatural results.   
Alvin Plantinga has given perhaps the most well-known contemporary account of 
the sensus divinitatis. He argues that this cognitive faculty can be understood as 
operating as an input-output mechanism, taking a broad range of experiences as 
inputs and producing theistic beliefs as outputs. Consider the following example. One 
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lies to a friend and consequently one feels guilty. This feeling of guilt has a tendency 
to cause one to believe that God is disappointed. The input, a feeling of guilt, tends 
to produce a theistic belief as an output, a feeling that God is disappointed. This 
feeling may be as of a ‘brooding presence’ of divine chastisement (2000, 182). But 
then why do we not all feel God’s disappointment after lying to a friend? Plantinga 
points to the corruptive noetic effects of sin on the sensus divinitatis to explain this 
kind of failure. 
Arguments for the innateness of belief in the supernatural are not restricted to 
the Calvinist tradition. Both the Stoic and Epicurean schools of Greek philosophy 
held that the innateness of belief in the supernatural spoke in favour of the existence 
of supernatural beings. Another analogue may be found in Islamic theology: the 
religion of the Qur’an is referred to as the Din Al-Fitrah, a pure monotheistic religion 
originally imprinted on the heart and nature of man. For now, however, I should like 
to look further into the Greek arguments. 
In his De Natura Deorum, Cicero borrows the arguments of the Epicureans to 
defend belief in supernatural agents. He writes that ‘nature herself has imprinted a 
conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe is 
there but possesses untaught some “preconception” of the gods?’ (1997, I: 16). 
Indeed, Calvin himself explicitly drew on Cicero’s arguments in developing his 
conception of the sensus divinitatis. Cicero goes on to state that the innateness of 
certain religious beliefs recommends those beliefs:  
The belief in the gods has not been established by authority, custom or law, but 
rests on the unanimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is 
therefore a necessary inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather an innate 
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concept of them; but a belief which all men by nature share must necessarily be 
true; therefore it must be admitted that the gods exist. (1997, I: 17) 
Cicero’s description echoes Plantinga’s conception of the sensus divinitatis as an 
input-output mechanism. Cicero ponders: ‘For when we gaze upward to the sky and 
contemplate the heavenly bodies, what can be so obvious and so manifest as that 
there must exist some power possessing transcendent intelligence by whom these 
things are ruled?’ (1997, II: 2). The belief in the supernatural is no calculated 
deduction, no argument from design. Rather, one beholds the glory of the night sky 
and belief in a beneficent supernatural being simply arises within us.  
On all accounts, innate belief in the supernatural is not a kind of perception of 
supernatural agents. The supernatural agent plays no proximate causal role and is 
not the immediate object of the experience. The causal role played by the 
supernatural being is limited to the initial design of the human mind, and the 
immediate objects of experience are such natural things as rainbows and feelings of 
guilt.  
Indeed, on the Epicurean and Stoic accounts, it seems unclear whether the gods 
are required to make any causal contribution to the belief whatsoever. On some 
interpretations, no gods are required for the innate faculty to be imprinted in our 
minds. Instead, a providential mother nature has ensured that we come to know 
about the gods (Sedley, 2011). The gods have not personally caused us to believe in 
them in any way. If that’s so, it may be the case that the innativism propounded by 
the Stoics and Epicureans is no religious epistemic method at all (having no 
proximate cause in any supernatural being) but instead, it may be an early 
naturalistic (or proto-naturalistic) explanation of the pervasiveness of religious belief 
in human beings. 
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To conclude, unlike mystical experience, which provides the practitioner with an 
immediate presentation of the supernatural, innate methods generate veridical 
beliefs about the supernatural, without requiring that the supernatural being be the 
object of the experience. Instead, beliefs about supernatural beings are proximately 
caused by experiences of other objects (stars, guilty feelings, rainbows etc.), while the 
reliability of the belief forming mechanism is guaranteed by the action of 
supernatural agents.  
3.3.4 Testimony  
Whether religious or not, all rational human beings form new beliefs, or change old 
ones, in the light of the say-so of parties who are taken to be generally trustworthy. 
So why have I included testimony in a discussion about the distinctive epistemic 
methods of religion? The reason lies in the unique sources of testimony accepted in 
religious traditions. Specifically, religions accept the testimony of supernatural 
agents, whether at first or second hand, as reasonable sources of evidence. 
Let me be clear on the distinction between first and second hand religious 
testimony. In the case of second hand religious testimony, it is permissible within 
religions to accept the testimony of some person whose source for their testimony is 
some religious method. I call this kind of testimony religious transmission. That is 
to say, if one suspects that person A arrived at some belief P by the use of some 
religious epistemic method, then one may take the testimony of A that P to justify 
believing that P. This is an unsurprising consequence of the acceptance of two 
principles: (1) that religious epistemic methods reliably deliver true beliefs and (2) 
that testimony between honest human beings also reliably delivers true beliefs. 
Religious transmission is the transmission of the first-hand deliverances of 
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supernatural agents via second-hand testimony. The strength of the testimonial 
evidence will depend on both the trustworthiness of the testimonial source, as well 
as the source’s proficiency with the religious epistemic method by which the belief 
was delivered.  
As for first hand religious testimony, it is taken to be sometimes reasonable to 
accept the testimony of supernatural agents directly. This is supernatural testimony. 
One may take the testimony of B that P to justify one’s believing that P, where B is a 
supernatural agent. The strength of the evidence here depends on the 
trustworthiness of the supernatural source itself. Estimating the trustworthiness of 
the supernatural source is particularly difficult, since many religious cultures posit 
not only reliable and benevolent spirits, but additional unreliable and mischievous 
spirits whose aim is to mislead believers. 
Supernatural testimony may be delivered directly to the audience via some 
temporary vessel, such as a human body (as is the case during spirit possession) or a 
holy book (as is the case for scriptural religions). These are examples of supernatural 
testimony which are publicly accessible. Alternatively, supernatural testimony may 
be delivered to a person directly through a sort of private mental transmission, as per 
spirit mediumship, or during a religious vision, or through what is sometimes 
referred to within the Christian tradition as ‘the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit’.  
Testimonial evidence is of central importance within the Abrahamic religions, in 
which scripture is often identified with the word of God. Karl Barth, the most notable 
Christian theologian of the twentieth century, wrote that ‘the principle behind every 
theological dogma is: Deus dixit’ (Barth 1991, §1:10). And through the mouth of 
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Muhammad, Allah says that the Qur’an ‘could not possibly be authored by other than 
God … It is infallible, for it comes from the Lord of the universe’ (10:37). 
3.3.4.1 Supernatural Testimony: Spirit Possession 
The most popular and widely distributed method of supernatural testimony is spirit 
possession, which can be found in religious traditions worldwide. Spirit possession 
is defined as the hold exerted over an object by some supernatural entity. This object 
is usually a living human body, although it may also be any animate or inanimate 
object. In what follows, I focus on spirit possession of living persons. The testimony 
of the intruding spirits is taken to be evidence for all kinds of claims. Janice Boddy 
notes some of the various intruding spirits and their manner of occupation of the 
body: 
These forces may be ancestors or divinities, ghosts of foreign origin, or entities 
both ontologically and ethnically alien. Some societies evince multiple spirit 
forms. Depending on cultural and etiological context such spirits may be 
exorcised, or lodged in relatively permanent relationship with their host (or 
medium), occasionally usurping primacy of place in her body (even donning their 
own clothes and speaking their own languages) during bouts of possession trance. 
(Boddy 1994, 407) 
Possession may be active or passive, that is to say, involuntary or sought. As Ioan 
Lewis writes of these different kinds of possession: ‘the first is an ascent of man to 
the gods: the second the descent of the gods on man’ (1971, 50). For examples of the 
former, voodoo and shamanic possession states are usually actively and quite 
consciously sought. In contrast, Islamic jinn possession is universally passive, falling 
on an unwilling victim. 
As Boddy notes above, the invading spirit may be some supreme god or powerful 
divinity, or any kind of lesser spirit. The supernatural testimony that forms the basis 
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of religious justification is usually gained during divine, as opposed to demonic, 
possession states. While the gods may wish to offer important prophecies or special 
knowledge to the audience, demons more often torture their victims with bouts of 
unruly and violent behaviour. While demon possession is a source of informative 
testimony, this is more often diagnostic than it is prophetic. 
Any proper discussion of spirit possession must include some reference to the fact 
that it predominantly affects one gender over the other. The demographics of 
possession exhibit a very clear gender asymmetry. Lewis first observed that 
possession by maleficent spirits predominantly affects women. Interestingly, in 
patriarchal and polygynous societies with established exorcism rituals, married 
women are overwhelmingly prone to demon possession. This observation has been 
widely corroborated (see Harris [1957], Messing [1958], and Gomm [1975]). In cases 
of demon possession, the possessed party exhibits hysterical and seemingly 
involuntary behaviours, often including speaking an indecipherable tongue. Still, 
there may also be intelligible speech. When there is, the demon usually informs the 
audience about the reasons for entering the possessed party. The demon may also 
suggest the remedy for the possession state. In zar possession cults, this often 
involves the invading spirit demanding gifts such as jewellery, hats or sunglasses in 
exchange for releasing its hold on the body (Lewis 1971, 80).  
Spirit possession is an important feature of Christian traditions. Someone who is 
possessed by God and used as a means of communication is referred to as a ‘prophet’, 
and the history of Christianity has seen no shortage of these. I would like to discuss 
one (admittedly unorthodox) example. Before his death in Waco, Texas, after a 
prolonged siege at the hands of the FBI, the prophet and leader of the Branch 
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Davidian church, David Koresh, claimed to have written ‘two messages, from God, to 
the F.B.I.’. In these messages, delivered to the authorities during the siege, Koresh’s 
own personality is displaced while God speaks through him. Through the vessel of 
Koresh, God reminds the F.B.I., ‘You’re not rejecting a man by fighting against David 
My servant, no, for I have given and revealed my name to him.’ He then goes on to 
describe his nature ‘I AM your life and your death. I am the spirit of the prophets and 
the Author of their testimonies’ (Koresh 1993). Despite this self-proclaimed divine 
authority, other Christian preachers were skeptical. Indeed, at least one pastor 
offered the F.B.I. his assistance in exorcising the demons that he took to be 
possessing Koresh (Lewis 1998, 38). Thus, any authority that the invading spirit 
might self-profess is liable to be criticised (usually by religious outsiders), and the 
existence of both divine and demonic possession within the Christian tradition is 
liable to make any appraisal of any particular possession claim extremely 
problematic.  
As for demon possession within early Christianity, Jesus’ messianic claim was 
measured, in large part, by his ability to cast out demons from the possessed, since 
this symbolised the prophesied destruction of the kingdom of Satan in the Messianic 
age (Weiss 1953, 402). One might be tempted to think that contemporary Christians 
in developed countries are overall skeptical of possession. No modern Christians 
seriously believe in a silly superstition like demon possession, but this belief would 
belie an arrogant intellectualism on our own part. A sobering 2013 YouGov poll of 
1000 Americans found 72% of “born again” Christians, 59% of Protestants and 59% 
of Catholics believed in demon possession. (YouGov 2013). These beliefs are not 
without biblical sanction. In the Bible, demons are described as usually residing in 
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tombs, old ruins or the desert and prefer to invade the bodies of sinners over the 
righteous (Weiss 1953, 402).  
In Islam, there is a distinction between possession by Jinn and possession by a 
qarīn. Possession by Jinn, or demons, may occur when these have been sent by 
Shaytan. In these cases of possession, the behavioural effects are pronounced. 
Seizures and glossolalia are common. On the other hand, every person (except 
Muhammad) has their own subversive demon, a qarīn, which is allocated to them 
from birth. The qarīn is a person’s constant companion spirit, whose role is usually 
limited to tempting one to be sinful. Yet the qarīn may also possess its human 
counterpart from time to time, especially out of jealousy of a sexual partner, and 
behave in ways out of the control of the possessed party (Drieskens 2004, 154).  
3.3.4.2. Supernatural Testimony: Incarnation 
In the above examples, spirit possession occurs by a process of temporary 
displacement, in which the executive role of some existing personality is thwarted 
and the body is given over to the invading spirit(s). In such cases, we usually say that 
the possessed party is ‘no longer herself’. But possession occurs, not only by a process 
of displacement, but also by a process of incarnation, in which the supernatural 
agent occupies some body permanently, with no possibility of the return of any prior 
personality. It may be that the God is simply born and lives an earthly life. In the 
Bhagavad Gita, Krishna claims to be one of a series of incarnations of Vishnu: 
‘Although I am unborn, everlasting, and I am the Lord of all, I come to my realm of 
nature and through my wondrous power I am born’ (Bhagavad Gita 1962, 4:6). And 
Jesus is described in the Bible as the incarnation of God: ‘The Word became flesh 
and dwelt among us’ (NKJV 1988, John 1:14).  
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Note that the divinity need not be born in human form. Incarnation may also refer 
to a permanent displacement of some existing personality by some deity or higher 
spirit, who continues to occupy the body and could, in principle, not be removed or 
replaced by the original occupant. Incarnation is permanent spirit possession and 
vitally important in the religious traditions which acknowledge the phenomenon. 
The reason for this importance is that the testimony of God on Earth is often, but not 
universally, taken to be entirely reliable.   
To take another unorthodox case, consider the incarnations of Ti and Do, leaders 
of the infamous Heaven’s Gate cult, who were propelled to infamy after members 
performed a mass suicide as a means to board the comet Hale-Bopp in 1997. The 
following is an excerpt from an essay available at the cult’s website, which remains 
online as of July 2016:  
In the early 1970's, two individuals (my task partner and myself) from the 
Evolutionary Level Above Human (the Kingdom of Heaven) incarnated into 
(moved into and took over) two human bodies that were in their forties. I moved 
into a male body, and my partner, who is an Older Member in the Level Above 
Human, took a female body. (We called these bodies "vehicles," for they simply 
served as physical vehicular tools for us to wear while on a task among humans. 
They had been tagged and set aside for our use since their birth.) (Applewhite 
1995) 
Incarnation is a particularly popular theme in Indian religions, with Vishnu 
repeatedly taking human form over successive ages, especially during times of moral 
or political decline as a social corrective (Bhagavad Gita 1962, 4:7).  
It is quite natural, to the Western mind, to imagine that the testimony of an 
incarnation of God would be infallible. In the Abrahamic traditions, God is 
omniscient and omnibenevolent: all-knowing and with our best interests at heart. 
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Such a being, it seems, would be compelled to tell the truth and nothing but the truth. 
Yet outside of the Abrahamic religions, divine testimony is not always considered an 
infallible guide. Indeed, in Indian traditions regular testimonial unreliability can 
even be considered evidence for the claim to godliness. For example, Sathya Sai Baba, 
a recently deceased guru considered by millions of Hindu believers to be an 
incarnation of Vishnu, makes unreliability an art. Lawrence Babb relates the 
following story: 
In early 1979 many devotees believed that [Sai Baba] would be coming to Delhi in 
March. One informant, a strong devotee, recalled to me later that he had asked 
him to come and that “Baba” had told him that he would. But he did not come, 
and when my informant related this tale to some people who are quite close to the 
deity-saint, they laughed and said, “You didn't actually believe him, did you?” 
(1983, 120) 
Babb goes on to explain that the persistent unreliability of Sai Baba’s testimony is a 
clue to his divinity. He notes: ‘within the tradition in which Sathya Sai Baba operates, 
unaccountability is an extremely important characteristic of divinity’ (1983, 120). 
The gods are light-hearted, unpredictable, and joyful. They indulge in what is called, 
Lila, or play, with their creation and lesser mortal beings are playthings. This 
frivolousness, for want of a better word, is characteristic of their innocent, childlike 
nature; evidence for their claims of divinity. Hence, the notion that supernatural 
testimony must be infallible or perfectly reliable is no universal idea.  
3.3.4.3 Supernatural Testimony: Mediumship 
Supernatural testimony may also be delivered via a spirit medium, who has a special 
skill of clairvoyance (an ability to see spirits) and/or clairaudience (an ability to hear 
them). The medium communicates messages directly from the spirit seen or heard. 
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Mediums often operate independently, outside of any organized religious setting and 
without the endorsement of any established religion. Indeed, mediumship appears 
to flourish outside of the confines of any established community of religion. There is 
evidence suggesting that mediumship gained noteworthy popularity in the West after 
the growth of spiritualist movements in the 19th century in the United States, a time 
of notable religious experimentation and a turning away from traditional religious 
doctrines and methods. We find in the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry 
Thoreau, a skeptical and dismissive attitude to the growing popularity of the method 
as it flourished during their own lifetimes (Wilson 1968, 248).   
3.3.4.4 The Limits of Religious Testimony 
Science and religion differ with respect to what they consider to be reliable sources 
of testimony, but they also differ with respect to the norms that guide the treatment 
of testimony within their respective contexts of investigation. Specifically, there 
exists a religious norm of secrecy which applies to a special class of sacred 
knowledge. Such knowledge is deemed too valuable, too subtle, too precious or too 
pure to fall into the hands of the uninitiated. This religious norm of secrecy can be 
most clearly seen when contrasted against a scientific norm that encourages the open 
dissemination of knowledge. For this reason, I shall first discuss the scientific norm, 
before outlining the religious norm of secrecy. 
According to Robert Merton, the institutional goal of science is to advance the 
boundaries of knowledge (1942, 122). There is, for that reason, a scientific imperative 
to communicate one’s findings to the broader community. This imperative is 
incentivized, Merton argues, by the establishment of a currency of recognition, 
according to which priority of discovery is paramount. This lure of recognition 
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incentivizes the dissemination of new scientific discoveries quickly and widely. The 
aim is to be the first to publish results, the first to make the claim public, the first to 
be known as the discoverer of some fact. Even scientists who come a close second get 
at least some credit, especially if the discovery is made independently. Alfred Russel 
Wallace might come to mind here. 
In addition, Merton outlines a scientific norm he dubs communism, which is the 
principle that the substantive findings of science are ‘a product of collaboration and 
are assigned to the community’ (Merton 1942, 121). The norm of communism states 
that scientific knowledge rightly belongs to, or should be made available to, everyone. 
The norm works to ensure that the results of scientific investigation are publicly 
available. Does science accept such a norm? Does this norm truly guide the 
dissemination of scientific results? The idea that science is, as a matter of fact, 
absolutely free from secrecy is clearly a utopian one. Indeed, it seems that if there is 
such a norm, it is very often ineffective. Secrecy persists in scientific settings often 
exactly because of the incentive of the status that comes with priority of discovery. 
One does not tell one’s colleagues too much about important, but as yet unpublished, 
results. The fact that there is sometimes theft of new scientific ideas and methods 
entails that there will be a tension between the norm of communism and the 
incentive of personal status. To get any personal status, the scientist very often must 
keep her mouth tightly shut. Yet according to the Mertonian norm of communism, 
any selfish secrecy of this kind would just stand in violation of the norm. This 
selfishness is a lamentable example of scientists behaving badly. I think this is about 
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right. Even if secrecy is an unfortunate result of the rat race of modern science, 
methodological secrecy, in any scientific setting, would be a violation the norm.4 
In contrast, many religions adopt a norm of secrecy for at least some parts of their 
teachings. Religious doctrines are deemed too sacred or too subtle to be available to 
the general public. Instead, religious specialists are charged with the transmission 
and protection of secret knowledge. It is this tendency towards a hierarchy of 
knowledge-holders that separates the scientific norm of communism from the 
religious norm of secrecy. Sure, science produces its fair share of specialists, but these 
specialists are not generally charged with withholding knowledge from the public or 
from neophytes, quite the opposite. And again, it is true that much scientific talk is 
fundamentally impenetrable to the layman, but this impenetrability is not a 
deliberate ruse designed for the purpose of maintaining some institutionalized goal 
of secrecy. In contrast, religions have quite different motives for keeping their secret 
doctrines out of the wrong hands. As Mark Teeuwen notes:  
Such intentional concealment is explained as a defensive measure, taken to shield 
the secrets from various dangers. Secret matters must be protected from contact 
with the world’s impurities, from the ignorant criticism of those who do not 
understand them, from the pressures of historical change, and, not least, from 
competitors in the religious arena. (2006, 2)   
                                                     
4  Of course, secrecy is very often maintained with regards to scientific results, when 
such results are sensitive to such things as national security or copyrights and patents. 
We might consider, for example, biological and nuclear weaponry or pharmacology. 
These social constraints on the dissemination of scientific knowledge, although very 
real, do not arise from within nuclear physics or from within pharmacology, but from 




While Teeuwen here emphasizes the defensive maneuvers of religious knowledge in 
the face of heterodox thought, he goes on to note that secrets may also be kept from 
religious neophytes simply on the grounds that the revealed knowledge would be of 
no use given a lower level of religious training (2006, 11). Teeuwen takes examples 
from Mahayana Buddhism to illustrate the norm of religious secrecy, but there is a 
better contemporary example available in the Church of Scientology. 
Religious secrecy is a highly formal and regulated affair within the Church of 
Scientology. Specifically, the Church withholds core myths from members until they 
have reached the rank of Operating Thetan Level Three (OT3). It is only at the stage 
of OT3 that initiates are exposed to the Xenu myth, which explains the origins of 
human existential suffering as being caused by the souls of slaughtered 
extraterrestrials inhering in human bodies. In order to be initiated to OT3, members 
of the Church must be invited by higher ranking specialists, and must be prepared to 
sign a nondisclosure agreement.  
While it is true that young scientists-in-training are also taken through their 
studies gradually, beginning only with the most simple of experiments, there is no 
established norm that prohibits precocious or curious students from acquiring 
knowledge at higher levels.  
What is the source of the religious norm of secrecy? The norm is encouraged in 
order to protect sacred knowledge: a form of knowledge that must be treated 
differently, ceremoniously set apart from other forms. These have been called by Roy 
Rappaport Ultimate Sacred Postulates, and more will be said about the role of these 
postulates in the following section. The general idea is that some religious doctrines 
are not intended to be heard by certain groups on pain of supernatural disapproval. 
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The transfer of such knowledge to the wrong people may incur supernatural penalties 
on those responsible. Thus, owing to the spiritual gravitas attached to the knowledge 
in question, interpersonal testimony is regulated in an attempt to deflect 
supernatural punishment. The twin notions of the sacred and the taboo are therefore 
responsible for the norm of secrecy.     
3.3.5 Inference 
As it was for testimony, so it may also seem strange to discuss general inference in a 
chapter devoted to the epistemic methods that are distinctive of religion. Logical 
deduction, for example, is happily deployed by scientists, so there is no indication 
that deduction is a uniquely religious way of reasoning. Certainly, deduction is an 
especially important method for natural theologians and for Christian philosophers 
of religion, but there is nothing about deduction as a method of inference that marks 
it out as a distinctively religious method. Having said that, there are important 
differences between science and religion with regards to the sanctioned limits of 
critical thought, and the proper scope of the reliability of deduction. In this section, 
I describe the religious tendency towards what I call quasi-axiomatization. This is 
the adoption of inviolable first principles or core doctrines, resulting directly from 
religion’s holding certain propositions sacred, and so making their criticism or 
revision taboo.  
The idea that certain objects and activities are sacred, and so ought to be revered 
and protected, is universally shared among the world’s religions as Émile Durkheim 
famously showed. Indeed, the notion of the sacred is so centrally important in 
religious thought that Durkheim took the following definition of religion to be 
appropriate: ‘a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that 
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is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one 
single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them’ (Durkheim 
1995, 44). 
While I remain unconvinced by Durkheim’s definition of ‘religion’,5 his reference 
to sacred things as ‘set apart and forbidden’ is important for a proper understanding 
of religious inference, since the label ‘sacred’ can be applied just as well to religious 
propositions or doctrines as to religious objects or activities. Thus, just as it is 
forbidden to bring footwear, impure and profane, into the prayer hall of a sacred 
mosque, certain ideas, words, names, beliefs, moral principles and physical and 
metaphysical theories are also set apart and given special treatment. As I showed in 
the previous section, certain doctrines are kept secret from untrustworthy or 
uninitiated groups, and this ensures that such doctrines are protected from a certain 
amount of critical challenge. Such doctrines may be kept secret, but they may also be 
afforded a privileged or fundamental position within any system of inference. These 
privileged doctrines are then treated as both beyond critical appraisal and 
unquestionable (Dawes 2016, 12). 
                                                     
5 The sacred and the taboo are not unique notions to religion. Anyone in doubt can 
attempt defacing a war memorial. However, their normativity, within religious 
contexts, is derived from their connection to supernatural agents. the existence of 
gods and spirits who might disapprove of our activities provides the metaphysical 
backdrop to the sacred and the taboo in a way that secures their status as religious 
notions. In relation to a discussion of Māori tapu, Jean Smith calls this the 
‘ultrahuman sanction’ commanded by tapu objects (1974, 25). In any religion, the 
power of the sacred and the taboo can always be traced to some origin with a spirit or 
a god.  
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One way to understand the way in which religious doctrines can be beyond critical 
appraisal is to say that the sacred has a strong effect on the credences of theories, 
leading religious adherents to adopt so-called “sticky” beliefs: beliefs with an 
epistemic probability (credence) of 1. Any theory with an epistemic probability of 1 is 
unassailable. Thus, even in the face of evidence that disconfirms the sacred doctrine, 
the believer with a sticky credence is forced to change the credences of other auxiliary 
hypotheses elsewhere in the web of belief, since no matter what the evidence may be, 
the sacred doctrine cannot be affected. It is immune to challenge. That sacred 
doctrine commands a sticky probability was noted by the Dominican philosopher-
theologian Joseph Bochenski in his analysis of religious discourse: ‘all sentences 
designated by the heuristic rule [e.g. a rule such as that whatever has been revealed 
to Muhammed is true] have to be considered as possessing the probability 1’ 
(Bochenski quoted in Rappaport 1999, 291—2).    
Another way to understand the way in which sacred doctrines are beyond critical 
appraisal is to point to the fact that sacred doctrines do not merely enjoy a high 
epistemic probability, but are understood as fundamental to the inferential system 
of which they are a part. They cannot be derived from any other propositions and yet 
they are accepted despite a lack of proof. It is this feature of sacred doctrines that 
leads me to call them quasi-axiomatic, and which leads the anthropologist Roy 
Rappaport to call these doctrines Ultimate Religious Postulates (1999, 287). On 
Rappaport’s account, Ultimate Religious Postulates behave much like the axioms of 
logic or mathematics. They are both accepted without proof and serve as 
fundamental to systems of thought that include many more claims than themselves. 
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Yet there are also important differences. Rapport notes the following five differences 
between Ultimate Religious Postulates and the axioms of mathematics and logic:  
1. Ultimate Religious Postulates cannot be derived from systems of a higher 
logical type, whereas in principle this is the case for the axioms of 
mathematics and logic. 
 2. Ultimate Religious Postulates fail to play the same role in terms of defining 
the set of derivable consequences. Various contrary derivations are 
possible. 
3. The scope of the applicability of Ultimate Religious Postulates is typically 
wider than that of axioms, which are often only taken to apply in special 
regions of logic or mathematics (e.g. plane geometry).  
4. Ultimate Religious Postulates are neither self-evident, nor regularly 
manifested in material relations, nor necessarily true.  
5. The acceptance of Ultimate Religious Postulates obligates one to 
membership of a particular community. (1999, 287—289).    
Rappaport stresses this last difference, noting that Ultimate Religious Postulates are 
often assented to in the context of some public act or performance demonstrating 
allegiance to the community. Indeed, he refrains from describing the attitude had by 
the religious towards their sacred postulates as one of belief. Instead, what 
characterizes the shahādah, for example, as an Ultimate Religious Postulate is that 
it is a public statement committing one to the Muslim community. Thus, these 
fundamental points of doctrine often have the form of performative utterances, in 
J.L. Austin’s sense. The social dimension of accepting these postulates, then, is an 
important difference between them and axioms. 
While these differences show that Ultimate Sacred Postulates are not inferentially 
equivalent to the axioms of logic and mathematics, a case might be plausibly made 
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that sacred doctrines are treated in the same way as any other fundamental theory in 
physical science would be. Therefore, this aspect of religious inference is no different 
in kind from similar inferential practices in the sciences. The theory of general 
relativity, it could be argued, is equally sacred, in the sense that it is set apart and 
treated differently. It is not regularly exposed to criticism. It is protected at all costs. 
It follows that the quasi-axiomatization of key doctrines is not a distinctively 
religious method. Scientists engage in quasi-axiomatization too. According to this 
argument, science suffers from its own set of biases and quasi-axiomatic sticky 
beliefs, none of which are seriously open to refutation and none of which, it is added, 
are amenable to any kind of religious evidence.   
Although there is some merit to this argument, there are important differences 
between Ultimate Religious Postulates and the most fundamental theories of science. 
Perhaps most fundamentally, scientists are not expected to publicly commit to the 
most fundamental theories of science in the way that religious believers must commit 
to Ultimate Religious Postulates. Indeed, a range of attitudes are permissible towards 
even the most fundamental theories of science. Tentative acceptance would be taken 
as an insufficient degree of commitment where Ultimate Religious Postulates are 
concerned. Moreover, there is an important sense in which the believer’s self-concept 
is defined by membership of the group. Doubt is actively discouraged with regard to 
the Ultimate Religious Postulates, since to publicly doubt is to publicly renounce.  
3.3.6 Paradox 
Bodies of religious knowledge often contain contradictions, but then it is equally true 
that within the body of scientific knowledge, one can easily find contradictory views. 
In general, contradictions in the body of scientific knowledge arise as disagreements 
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between rival theories, or as inconsistencies internal to one theory or another. These 
inconsistencies make up the body of scientific problems, and part of the aim of 
science is to resolve these inconsistencies. The inconsistencies of science are taken 
to be works in progress. In contrast, contradictions within bodies of religious 
knowledge are often not taken to be problematic at all. They are not works in 
progress, but the finished article. Indeed, sometimes contradictions form integral 
parts of religious doctrine. Strictly speaking, religions accept, not contradictory 
theories, but paradoxical theories. A paradox is not simply a contradiction, but a 
peculiar kind of contradiction. Matthew Bagger has defined a paradox as a claim that 
is self-contradictory, but which is nevertheless able to ‘tempt our assent’ (2007, 3—
4). A paradox is a contradiction that makes an attractive candidate for belief. 
Paradox—sometimes called sacred mystery—is at the heart of much religious 
discourse, yet in the naturalistic study of religion, little focus has been put on the 
reasons for the centrality of paradox. One of the most popular explanations for the 
persistence of religious paradox is that religious language attempts to describe an 
ineffable supernatural reality, a reality that can be grasped, but not properly 
described. Religious language attempts, as F. Max Müller put it: ‘to give utterance to 
the unutterable, to express the inexpressible’ (Müller quoted in Bagger 2007, 6). 
Paradoxical language is, then, an attempt to put into words a reality (or at least, to 
put into words a particular sort of religious experience) that evades our crude or 
limited conceptualizations. Paradoxical language doesn’t describe; it gestures. 
But such an explanation of religious paradox is quite unsatisfactory. It excludes 
those religious traditions which, far from taking their sacred mysteries as clumsy 
gestures towards a deeper ineffable truth, take their paradoxes to be accurate 
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descriptions of that reality. Such realist interpretations of religious paradox may 
derive from mystical experience (e.g. a sincere belief that ‘black is white and white is 
black’ [Stace 1960, 65]). Alternatively, realist interpretations of religious paradox 
may derive from theology: paradoxical formulations of the doctrine of the trinity, for 
example, are not taken to be clumsy gestures towards the truth, but the actual truth. 
Thus, religious paradox can be either mystical (when such paradoxes are taken to be 
either gestures at the ineffable or accurate descriptions of reality) or theological 
(when such paradoxes are taken to derive from sacred doctrine). 
Furthermore, religious paradoxes are commonly put to a different purpose 
altogether. Often, paradoxes are not gestures or descriptions at all; they are not really 
about anything. They are just tools. There exist religious traditions in which 
paradoxes have an instrumental purpose. They are not put forward as gestures 
towards an ineffable truth or as accurate descriptions of a transcendent reality, but 
rather as a means by which one can elicit other desirable cognitive states, such as 
mystical states or trance. The koan of Zen Buddhism is a paradigm example of 
paradox used as a religious instrument. Meditation on the paradoxical proposition is 
supposed to break down one’s conceptualizations of the world, to reveal the ultimate 
reality beneath. 
So, religious paradox can be seen as falling into three classes:  
1.  Mystical Paradox: A figurative or accurate description of a state of affairs 
observed during a mystical experience.  
2. Theological Paradox: A paradox that results from logical deduction from 
sacred doctrines. 
3.  Instrumental Paradox: A paradox that is a mere tool, which is used to elicit 
religious experiences.  
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Of these three classes, the mystical and theological paradoxes are examples of how 
the scope of deduction is expanded within religion to accept certain kinds of 
contradictions as unproblematic. They show that religions sometimes accept what 
are thought of as true paradoxes. Instrumental paradoxes, on the other hand, acting 
only as tools, are not examples of deduction being treated differently in religious 
contexts. Indeed, instrumental paradoxes are merely a means by which mystical 
experience is elicited. Instrumental paradoxes can therefore be classed alongside 
those other methods which have already been surveyed for the production of mystical 
states, such as sensory hyperstimulation, sensory deprivation, the ingestion of 
hallucinogenic drugs and focused attention. 
3.4 Concluding Thoughts on the Epistemic Methods of Religion 
Religious epistemic methods all depend on a particular metaphysical view: 
supernatural agents interact with our cognitive faculties to generate beliefs about the 
world. The logical methods of religion may not appear to depend on such a 
metaphysical picture, but once the twin notions of the sacred and the taboo are 
properly understood as tied to supernatural agency, it can be seen that these methods 
also derive their alleged reliability from the same metaphysical picture. 
It bears repeating that the religious epistemic methods I have surveyed in this 
chapter are only those that are not also shared by the sciences. These are, then, the 
distinctive epistemic methods of religion. Naturally, religious people use methods 
that are also used by scientists, but these shared methods are of no interest to the 
present study, since they are no part of the conflict. The central argument of this 
thesis just is that the epistemological conflict between religion and science is a 
conflict of methods. It is enough for me to say, then, that insofar as there does not 
132 
 
exist any difference in the methods used by religion and science, there is no 
epistemological conflict. 
I have tried to stress, by providing examples of many of the same epistemic 
methods being used among diverse religious traditions and supporting a variety of 
conflicting belief systems, that religious methods are striking in their failure to 
generate agreement about their belief outputs. This failure is a historical anomaly. 
Historically isolated religions share so many of the same epistemic methods, and yet 
fail to share any significant overlap in belief as a result. It is strange that methods 
which have routinely failed to generate independent agreement have nevertheless 
survived in the epistemic practices of religious cultures through the last several 
millennia. The very retention of these methods requires an explanation. Alas, I do 
not have an explanation to hand, but for whatever reason the methods have been 
retained, this widespread acceptance of religious methods which fail to generate 
agreement is the cause of the conflict between religion and science. 
Before concluding, it pays to mention that acquaintance, or mystical experience, 
is the only method of religion that generates any notable agreement between 
independent practitioners from different religious traditions. Mystics, of all epochs 
and cultures, have tended to arrive independently at many of the same beliefs. They 
believe, for example, that the universe is one, that opposites share a common 
universal essence, and that good and evil are not ultimately distinct. This agreement 
is worth noting, but, as I will argue later, the beliefs of mystics, while able to be 
corroborated by other mystics, are unable to be convincingly corroborated by any 
other methods. If there is some deeper reality that the mystic is getting access to, no 
other methods provide access to it.  
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In a discussion on the reliability of mysticism, Russell once wrote that we ‘men of 
scientific temper … shall naturally first ask whether there is any way by which we can 
ourselves obtain the same evidence at first hand’ (1935, 181). In Russell’s opinion, 
the first step to corroborating the mystic’s claims consists in having a personal 
mystical experience for oneself. Russell is, I think, plain mistaken on this point. To 
have some personal acquaintance with mystical states only shows that mystical 
experience is reproducible, and this is exactly what is already established by the 
notable intersubjective agreement between mystics. The addition of one more mystic 
to the pile hardly changes the logic of the situation. Having a personal mystical 
experience may happen to raise the layman’s credence that mystical experience is 
reliable, but it should hardly give any confidence to we ‘men of scientific temper’ who 
Russell claims to be speaking for. If men of scientific temper truly desire to 
corroborate the claims of the mystic—if they wish to show that such experiences are 
knowledge conferring—independent support for the mystic’s claims is needed. 
Indeed, it seems as though getting independent support for the claims of the mystic 
ought to be easier to get than mystical experience itself. Mystical experience is 
exceedingly rare and difficult to attain, often taking years of dedicated practice, and 
so it is hardly a practical option for most people to pursue. Some psychedelic drugs 
appear to be able to reliably elicit such experiences, but then some proponents of 
mysticism, such as William Alston, argue that artificial means will not elicit a 
veridical mystical experience. Thus, it may be prohibitively difficult to have a 
personal mystical experience. This, however, should not pose any problem in 
principle, since we ought to be able to corroborate the information derived from a 
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mystical experience by other methods. Men of scientific temper ought to be searching 
for this other corroborating evidence. 
If I may make an analogy that makes clear where Russell makes his mistake, there 
are plenty of conspiracy theorists who are skeptical that Neil Armstrong walked on 
the moon. We do not rebut these conspiracy theorists by telling them to go to the 
moon themselves. This is no realistic option. It is as impractical as it is unnecessary. 
Instead, the conspiracy theorists are directed towards other lines of evidence, such 
as moon rocks, photographs, video footage, the results of telescopic observations and 





4. Religious Diversity 
Sometimes naïve, sometimes penetratingly noble, sometimes crude, sometimes 
subtle, sometimes cruel, sometimes suffused by an overpowering gentleness and 
love, sometimes world-affirming, sometimes negating the world, sometimes 
inward-looking, sometimes universalistic and missionary-minded, sometimes 
shallow and often profound. - Ninian Smart, The Religious Experience of 
Mankind 
4.1 Introduction 
The great diversity of religious opinion demonstrates that human beings are not very 
good at discovering religious truths. It seems that we are persistently led into error. 
There is no convergence around a set of religious beliefs that are probably true, and 
there is no convergence around a single set of religious epistemic methods that are 
probably reliable. The overwhelming majority of religious believers must be in a state 
of ignorance. At most, a tiny minority has got things right. Religious diversity, then, 
poses the following problem for the defender of religious belief: on what grounds can 
it be reasonable to think that one belongs to the tiny minority of religious experts, 
and not to the overwhelming majority of religious ignoramuses? One’s own sense of 
confidence in the truth of one’s own religious beliefs does not count for much, since 
this confidence appears to be shared by all religious believers. 
The problem of religious diversity has been well known since ancient times. A 
famous fragment from Xenophanes marvels at the fact that while the Thracians say 
their gods have blue eyes and red hair, the Ethiopians say their gods are snub-nosed 
and black (Kirk and Raven 1962, 168). Of course, the point of Xenophanes’ wry 
observation is not that Thracian gods must truly be red-headed while Ethiopian gods 
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must truly be black, but rather that religious beliefs typically have dubious 
genealogies. Indeed, he adds that if horses had hands, they would draw their own 
gods in the image of horses. Thus, our conceptions of the gods appear to say more 
about our own, very human, natures than about anything supernatural. The diversity 
of gods is a reflection of the diversity of mankind.  
In the first book of his De Natura Deorum, Cicero wrote of religion:  
There is in fact no subject upon which so much difference of opinion exists, not 
only among the unlearned but also among educated men; and the views 
entertained are so various and so discrepant, that, while it is no doubt a possible 
alternative that none of them is true, it is certainly impossible that more than one 
should be so. (1997, i. II. 5)  
It should also be added that, for these ancient writers, the true extent of religious 
diversity was poorly understood. After the voyages of discovery, a far greater number 
of divergent religious traditions was unveiled. The problem was exacerbated with 
each new description of a foreign religious culture. The probability that one’s own 
view is correct shrinks with every addition of every new conflicting view to the pile. 
Today, the list of world religions is not only long, but daily growing. It includes such 
oddities as atheistic Buddhism, UFO religions, psychedelic religions, new age 
mystical movements and the famous “cargo cults” of Melanesia and Papua. 
Mainstream religions commonly laugh these stranger candidates out of contention 
as serious candidates for religious truth. But why? On what grounds?  
And let’s take a moment of silence to remember the religions that are no longer 
with us. As often as we witness the birth of a new religion, we witness the extinction 
of another. The polytheism of the medieval Norsemen left an indelible mark on the 
culture of Northern Europe, and yet nowadays the religion persists only as an 
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assortment of cultural fragments, a word here or there, a superhero movie. The 
magnificent civilization of ancient Egypt was molded by a religious system that 
dominated every aspect of Egyptian life. Yet the artifacts by which we are acquainted 
with that religion are nowadays little more than curiosities for the cabinets of 
Egyptologists. The great pyramids, for all their forgotten sanctity, are glorified tourist 
attractions. How many other religions have perished without leaving any 
monumental headstones such as these? We may assume that the number of these 
cannot be counted. How many more have perished through deliberate acts of 
oppression, genocide, and war? Surely, more than presently exist. 
The innumerable variety of religions, both extinct and extant, with their 
contradictory doctrines and conflicting rituals, makes the task of finding the one true 
religion, if there is one at all, Herculean. The probability that one has, without much 
difficulty, happened upon the right religion is vanishingly small. Yet so often, 
religious ideas are not only believed, but beloved and held indubitably. This goes as 
much for the Mormon as it does for the Sikh. Each party believes that her own 
justification is superior in force to the justifications of others. The religious person, 
against all odds, typically believes that she is among the tiny minority of religious 
experts. 
On what grounds can religious belief be maintained when the chances that one 
has happened upon the one true religion are so low, and when it appears that all 
believers have an equally strong sense that they are justified in their own belief? 
There are three popular apologetic strategies to counter the problem of religious 
diversity, and in their simplest forms they run as follows: 
1. All religions are basically right. 
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2. All religions are partly right. 
3. My religion is right, and the others are wrong. 
The first apologetic strategy belongs to a school of thought called ‘pluralism.’ 
According to the pluralist position, most famously propounded by John Hick, all the 
world’s religions, while superficially inconsistent, are actually differing 
conceptualizations of an ineffable, noumenal ultimate reality. On this account, 
religious diversity is the result of our diverse religious perceptions and conceptions, 
but none of these different conceptions can be considered more accurate than any 
other. 
The second apologetic strategy belongs to a school of thought called 
‘perennialism’. According to the perennialist position, despite the wide-ranging 
differences between the world’s religions, there exists a common core of mystical 
wisdom that all religions express at the foundations of their creeds. On this account, 
religious diversity is largely just accidental, yet the common core of mystical wisdom 
among religious traditions is in agreement. On the perennialist account, all religions 
have things partly right. 
Lastly, I will examine William Alston’s exclusivist solution to the problem of 
religious diversity. Alston accepts as common sense that not every religion can have 
it right. But Alston argues that it may nevertheless be rational to maintain one’s 
religious belief in the face of religious diversity, since religious diversity does not give 
the religious person any reason to think that there exist any superior alternatives to 
her own religious epistemic practices.    
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As I will show, none of these approaches cure the problem of religious diversity, 
which remains among the most serious objections to the claim that there exist 
reliable religious epistemic methods.  
4.2 Pluralism 
John Hick is the most famous proponent of a variety of religious pluralism, according 
to which the various world religions, while superficially contradicting each other, are 
all responses to our experience with a fundamental noumenal reality that Hick terms 
‘the Real’ (1989, 278). Hick argues that there need not be any overlapping 
propositional content between the contents of religious doctrines in order for 
different religions to be correct. Make no mistake. Hick is no anti-realist; religions 
make knowledge claims that may be true or false. Yet the diversity of the world’s 
religious teachings need not lead us to skepticism concerning religious belief, since 
religious belief is grounded in different reactions to a common object, the Real, and 
in a desire to transform one’s life from self-centredness to Reality-centredness (1985, 
86). Thus, it is mistaken to think that there is just one true religion-one religion that 
both accurately describes religious truths and which efficaciously transforms human 
life from self-centred to reality-centred. Each religion provides a context in which 
individuals encounter and respond to the Real on different terms.  
But are we not all human beings? If there is a religious reality, shouldn’t we expect 
to find a common conception of it, given our common epistemic faculties? Hick does 
not think so. His argument for religious pluralism begins with the observation that 
the universe is religiously ambiguous. Our world admits to various religious and non-
religious interpretations. The descriptions of the universe offered by different 
religions are therefore descriptions of different phenomena. None of these 
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descriptions can claim to be better supported by the evidence, yet all strive to express 
something about how the world appears to the believer and how one ought to live 
within it. As Hick writes, the different interpretations are to be taken as ‘alternative 
soteriological “spaces” within which, or “ways” along which, men and women can 
find salvation/liberation/ultimate fulfilment’ (1989, 240).  
What does Hick mean by the term ‘religiously ambiguous’? His meaning is 
something like this. Cosmological arguments, design arguments, arguments from 
evil, arguments from religious experience, from divine hiddenness etc.: none of these 
are conclusive and many fail to be convincing at all. The premises of these arguments 
are open to either religious or naturalistic interpretations, and we inevitably 
understand them in the light of our own interpretative framework. Moreover, even if 
the arguments were able to lend support to some religious position, the premises 
themselves have no objectively quantifiable probabilistic value (1989, 12). So, the 
strength of the arguments will ultimately be subjectively determined from within 
one’s own worldview anyway. Given that this is the situation, we are all within our 
rights to believe what our experience tells us is the case (1989, 13). That is to say that 
it is reasonable to follow some kind of principle of credulity, according to which we 
are within our epistemic rights to believe that the universe is the way it appears to us, 
until we have good reason to doubt that our experience is veridical. All of our various 
worldviews are equally reasonable to hold. It just so happens that the world appears 
religiously to some people. 
But doesn’t the universe tend to, under normal circumstances, appear in more or 
less the same way to independent observers? When a duck is present under normal 
conditions, everyone agrees a duck is present. When there is a loud noise, everyone 
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gets a fright. On what grounds, then, should we assume that the universe is 
religiously ambiguous, when in most other contexts the universe is not particularly 
ambiguous at all?  
To arrive at religious ambiguity, Hick’s thesis depends on the Kantian distinction 
between noumena and phenomena. In adopting a Kantian metaphysics, Hick 
believes he can account for the diversity of the world’s religious teachings without 
impugning their validity. The Real, the fundamental noumenal reality, if it is to be 
experienced at all, must be experienced in some way. We do not have direct 
epistemic access to the noumenal Real, but we do have access to the phenomena. 
Thus, our different perceptions of, and conceptions of, the Real explain why there is 
so much religious diversity, despite all religions having a common object of 
veneration. He says:  
The differences between the root concepts and experiences of the different 
religions, their different and often conflicting historical and trans-historical 
beliefs, their incommensurable mythologies, and the diverse and ramifying belief-
systems into which all these are built, are compatible with the pluralistic 
hypothesis that the great world religions constitute different conceptions of and 
perceptions of, and responses to, the Real from within the different cultural ways 
of being human. (1989, 375—6)   
Hick’s pluralism has often been compared to the fable of the blind men and the 
elephant. One blind man feels the trunk and declares that it is a tree. Another feels 
the tail and declares it is a rope. Yet another feels the tusk and declares it is something 
made of porcelain. Of course, none of the men know what it is like to actually see the 
elephant, yet it is clear that they are in fact experiencing the elephant by way of their 
existing concepts and expectations. John Godfrey Saxe’s poem, The Blind Men and 
the Elephant, concludes:  
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So, oft in theologic wars,  
the disputants, I ween,  
tread on in utter ignorance,  
of what each other mean,  
and prate about the elephant  
not one of them has seen! (2007, 29) 
For Hick, not only has nobody seen the elephant as it really is, but it is not even 
possible to accurately describe the elephant’s real properties. The fundamental 
noumenon underlying religious experience is ineffable, lacking all positive 
characteristics. Yet since our beliefs about the Real are grounded in our phenomenal 
experience, we are right to believe what we do (including that the Real has certain 
positive characteristics). We can only accept what seems to us to be the case. What 
other policy could we maintain? Our phenomenal experience is our only legitimate 
guide. So, Hick argues, religious diversity is perfectly compatible with the theory that 
all religion is an attempt to articulate and relate to a common noumenon.  
Hick is right in his judgment that extensive religious diversity is logically 
compatible with the hypothesis that religious belief is caused by our reaction with a 
common noumenal substrate. However, bare logical compatibility is not very good 
evidence that a hypothesis is true. Indeed, if the world’s religions agreed on a few 
more important doctrines (say, for starters, that religion is grounded in a reaction to 
an experience with an ineffable noumenon), this interesting fact would not only be 
compatible with Hick’s thesis, but would actually constitute evidence for it. The fact 
that the phenomena of religious experience differ so radically is reason to suspect 
that the object of the experience is not held in common. 
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Hick’s rebuttal to this point is predictable. He has already argued that the Real is 
ineffable. There is no such thing as an accurate description of its positive attributes, 
and so we should not expect any convergence around any particular description. As 
Philip Quinn puts it: ‘we must assume that every guise in which [the Real] can appear 
is a disguise’ (1995, 149). Thus, it is unlikely that there would be agreement 
concerning that which no-one can veridically experience or faithfully describe. Yet 
even if we accept Hick’s claim that nothing can literally be said of the Real, this does 
not preclude agreement in its figurative or poetic descriptions.  
It is true that there is nothing in Hick’s argument which implies that we should 
expect any religious agreement. Yet it is strange that when agreement is so easy to 
find for matters concrete and empirical, disagreement is the norm for matters 
religious. In any case, the objection does not show that Hick’s pluralism is internally 
inconsistent. However, the charge of inconsistency can be successfully made once we 
learn what Hick has to say about soteriology, and specifically, once we learn how Hick 
thinks we are able to meaningfully talk about salvation or liberation.   
Hick identifies the common motivating factor of “post-axial” religions (a set 
comprised of the “great world religions” of the near and far east) as the shift from 
self-centredness to Reality-centredness. Salvation, or liberation, is the culmination 
of this shift. But how, if the Real has no positive characteristics, may we come to shift 
our attention away from the self, and towards the Real? If salvation depends on 
relating oneself in the proper way to the Real, then in which direction ought I to 
turn? How will I know when I am approaching the Real, and how will I know when I 
am distancing myself from it? To solve this problem, Hick outlines a pragmatic 
account of truth which he terms mythological truth. This is a ‘practical truthfulness,’ 
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that ‘rightly relates us to a reality about which we cannot speak in non-mythological 
[literal] terms’ (1989, 248). If some description of the Real is mythologically true, 
then it serves the pragmatic purpose of positioning us in the right relation to the Real 
with regards to salvation. If a statement is mythologically true, then it is not to be 
taken literally (1989, 348). Since Hick claims that mythological truths are not 
assertoric, he believes that their existence does not undermine his pluralism. Victoria 
Harrison clarifies this point:  
At the literal level different religions describe different phenomena and hence do 
not contradict one another, and at the mythological level there is no contradiction 
because, not being literally true or false, myths are just not the sorts of things that 
can be in contradiction.’ (2015, 263)  
Yet Hick has now unknowingly tied his own noose. Even if mythological truth is not 
assertoric, even if it only serves the purpose of placing us in the “right relation” to the 
Real, we may now reasonably ask what the right relation is, and whether our 
mythology guides us towards that relation. We may ask whether the mythology is 
effective. Whatever the right relation is, it is fair to assume that there must be an 
opposite wrong relation which one might adopt. Therefore, if it is the case that 
mythological truth serves to place us in the right religion to the Real, it seems to be 
the case that different religions, through their different mythological exhortations, 
place believers in different relationships with their divine object(s). Indeed, different 
mythologies from different religious cultures often recommend opposite courses of 
action in the quest for salvation or liberation. It follows that some may be right and 
some may be wrong. So which is it? Jihadism or pacifism? Asceticism or sybaritism? 
These are very different, even contradictory, relationships with the Real that have 
been endorsed by different religions through the course of history. Different 
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mythologies underwrite these relationships, and there do not seem to be any 
independent grounds for taking up one mythology over any other. How am I to tell 
whether my religion is salvific if I have no independent way to tell? Thus, given the 
extent of religious diversity, it would be unreasonable to suspect I am positioning 
myself correctly with respect to the Real. It would be unreasonable to suspect that I 
am among the tiny minority of religious experts. 
Hick anticipates this problem, and suggests that it can be solved in the following 
way:  
The basic criterion [for grading religions] is the extent to which they promote or 
hinder the great religious aim of salvation/liberation. And by salvation or 
liberation I suggest that we should mean the realisation of that limitlessly better 
quality of human existence which comes about in the transition from self-
centredness to Reality-centredness (1985, 86) 
But such a suggestion is patently question-begging. What is required is some 
independent criterion by which we can identify which religions are successful at 
achieving the aim of salvation and which are not. But Hick gives this problem very 
glib treatment. He says ‘the ways to salvation/liberation are many and varied,’ and 
then continues ‘we should respect ways other than our own, whether or not we can 
truly appreciate them,’ and concludes ‘so far as we can tell, they are equally 
productive of that transition from self to Reality which we see in the saints of all 
traditions’ (1985, 86—87).  
But are all religions equally salvific so far as we can tell? Frankly, so far as I can 
tell, I cannot tell. Hick fails to provide any criterion independent of one’s religious 
tradition by which to judge whether any religion is producing salvation. A related 
problem is that, in lieu of any such independent criterion, the claim that every 
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religion is equally salvific is improbable, given their very diverse and incompatible 
mythologies. Without any independent corroboration of the salvific effects of, say, 
violent jihad compared to vows of silence, it is an odd and improbable assumption 
that both of these methods will yield the very same result. In lieu of any further 
information, we must assume that different processes produce different results. 
Thus, the more probable hypothesis (if we assume that salvation is some kind of state 
that can be achieved by some kind of method[s]) is that very different methods are 
likely to produce different results.  
Hick says that we see salvation at work in the saints of all traditions. But who are 
these saints that Hick is referring to? By what independent criterion can we recognise 
them as saintly? Indeed, the behavior of those men typically labelled ‘saintly’ often 
takes us by surprise. Satya Sai Baba is regarded as a saintly, if not godly, figure by 
millions of Indians, and yet it is alleged that he regularly preyed on young boys. Are 
we then to assume that he is not a saint? That he is a saint, but that pederasty was a 
weakness attributable to his mere humanity, and therefore not to be considered 
saintly behaviour? Or are we to assume that pederasty is actually one of the marks of 
the saintly life? I have no way to tell. The first Guru of Sikhism, Nanak, preached a 
pacifist doctrine: ‘no-one is my enemy, no-one is a foreigner.’ The tenth and final 
Guru, Govind Singh, preached holy war: ‘Lawful is the flash of steel. It is right to draw 
the sword.’ Muhammad, regarded as the greatest of all men by Muslims around the 
world, famously kept sex slaves, had upwards of ten wives (in violation of, or as a 
convenient exception to, Islamic law), consummated his marriage with Aisha when 
she was approximately nine years old, and executed over 600 surrendered Jewish 
men of the Banu Qurayza tribe. Is this what it means to be Reality-centred? Are these 
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saintly lives? I do not know who Hick’s saints are and I cannot pretend that it is just 
obvious who they are.   
The lack of any independent measure makes the identification of true saints a 
hopeless task. The fundamental issue is that the salvation which is so essential to the 
state of sainthood is always defined within the religious tradition to which one 
belongs. This may make it obvious to the believer, from her point of view, who the 
true saints are, but it is not clear to any outsider. At one point, Hick says that ‘the 
fruits of openness to the divine Reality are gloriously evident’ in the lives of religious 
men and women on the path to Reality-centredness (1985, 91). This is just table 
thumping. Such an answer is of no help to me, since I simply do not see these 
‘gloriously evident’ fruits; or rather, what is labelled a fruit by some religions seems 
often to me to be a vegetable.  
In a discussion on the marks of saintliness, William James states the problem 
most clearly:  
If, for instance, you were to condemn a religion of human or animal sacrifices by 
virtue of your subjective sentiments, and if all the while a deity were really there 
demanding such sacrifices, you would be making a theoretical mistake by tacitly 
assuming that the deity must be non-existent; you would be setting up a theology 
of your own as much as if you were a scholastic philosopher (1999, 360)  
Yet faced with this situation, James’ advice is to ‘test saintliness by common sense, 
to use human standards to help us decide how far the religious life commends itself’ 
(1999, 363). That is to say, the salvific fruits of the religious life can be measured in 
the same way that we might measure other, more mundane, moral fruits. 
Unfortunately, for James and Hick, there is no such singular ‘religious life’ that we 
can test by our common sense moral intuitions. Religions are various, and their 
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associated mythologies suggest very different relationships with the Real. It is 
unlikely that they are equally productive of salvation. Moreover, the idea that human 
standards approximate divine standards needs some justification. The reason that 
costly religious practices, such as violent jihad, place such extreme demands on their 
practitioners is that such practices are not measured by human or secular standards, 
but by the standards of supernatural beings, whose expectations are rather different 
from ours. A life of self-torture may recommend itself to no sane person, but it may 
be precisely what the gods demand from us in exchange for some heavenly reward. 
The basic problem for James’ argument is that different religions may be equally 
effective at producing happy and virtuous people, but not equally effective at saving 
people.  
To return to Hick’s notion of mythological truth, if it is not true that violent jihad 
effects personal salvation, then the statement ‘violent jihad effects personal salvation’ 
is a mythology that is not only assertoric, but truth-apt and wrong. If selfless service 
to others produces personal salvation, then this can be truthfully stated. Indeed, if 
mythological truth were our only tool by which we could gesticulate about salvation, 
then Hick could not truthfully say, as he does, that ‘the ways to salvation/liberation 
are many and varied’. Yet he takes this latter claim to be quite accurate. 
This all goes to show that Hick’s pluralism is only skin deep. While he argues that 
all religions are basically right, he accepts that some religions have to be more right 
than others, more efficacious at producing salvation. Some of the religious practices 
are more effective than others. However, Hick argues that we ought to be even-
handed in our judgments about the salvific efficacy of other religious traditions. His 
argument depends on the epistemological claim that it is beyond the ken of the 
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human mind to decide which religions are more likely to be on the money and which 
ones are failing dismally. Indeed, on this point I think he is right. Probably, it is 
beyond our ken to decide which religions are succeeding and which are failing, but 
that’s no defense of religious belief against the problem of religious diversity—quite 
the contrary; it is a recapitulation of the problem. In Hick’s own words: 
For each of these long traditions is so internally diverse, containing so many 
different kinds of both good and evil, that it is impossible for human judgement 
to weigh up and compare their merits as systems of salvation. It may be that one 
facilitates human liberation/salvation more than the others; but if so this is not 
evident to human vision. (1985, 86) 
Well, if it is not evident to our various modes of investigation which religions are 
succeeding and which are failing, then it is possible (nay, likely) that one’s own 
system is among the set of failures, and so one requires a special reason to believe 
that one is among the privileged group of religious experts and not among the group 
of religious ignoramuses. The problem of religious diversity stands. 
Hick’s last defense is his principle of credulity: we are within our epistemic rights, 
he says, to believe that the world is the way it appears to us until such time as 
disconfirming evidence arrives on the scene. Perhaps so, but religious diversity is just 
that: disconfirming evidence arriving on the scene. Religious perception generates 
widespread disagreement and this is evidence that at least one party has made a 
mistake or is somehow impaired.  
Hick’s principle of credulity can only be maintained in the face of religious 
disagreement on the assumption that the universe is religiously ambiguous. If the 
universe were not religiously ambiguous, then religious diversity would be evidence 
against the reliability of religious perception. Only after we assume that the universe 
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is religious ambiguous does it make sense to expect that our religious perceptual 
faculties will generate disagreement. So, on what grounds should we assume the 
religious ambiguity of the universe? It seems that Hick’s only evidence for the 
religious ambiguity of the universe is the fact that there is extensive religious 
disagreement.  
This is an inversion of our common-sense methodology for perceptual claims. On 
our regular methodology, we do not infer to the existence of an ambiguous 
phenomenon from intersubjective disagreement unless we have, at the very least, 
identified the phenomenon under investigation as common to both parties. This can 
usually be achieved by having multiple observers agree on some relevant aspects of 
their experience. Yet if a Haitian mystic has a vision of Papa Legba, and a Bangladeshi 
mystic has an experience of prostrating himself  in the unitive presence of Allah, then 
given the great distance between them, given the differences between their 
mythologies, given the lack of any surprising common features shared by Papa Legba 
and Allah and given the lack of any independent evidence for a common object 
behind the guises of ‘Papa Legba’ and ‘Allah’, our regular methodology should lead 
us to the inference that if there are any real objects of the mystics’ experiences, they 
are two different objects.  
4.3 Perennialism 
Perennialism is the thesis that all religions agree on a minimal set of claims, typically 
known via mystical experience. This overlapping propositional content, this 
agreement, is the totality of true supernatural knowledge. So, it is crucial to the 
perennialist’s claim that there exist some amount of propositional agreement 
between the world’s religions. The perennialist does not argue in the style of Hick, 
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that every religion engages with the same reality in a different way. No. The 
perennialist argues that religions deal with the same fundamental reality in the same 
way. Therefore, before discussing any of the perennialist’s supernatural hypotheses, 
I will briefly outline what kind of agreement is commonly found between different 
and isolated religions.  
First of all, no-one would dispute that there are examples of religious agreement 
among remote communities that derive from a common historico-cultural source. 
Samoa and Poland, for example, are predominantly Christian countries. The distance 
between these two countries is immense and there had been, before the arrival of 
Europeans, no contact between these two cultures for eons. However, it is no surprise 
that both communities are now predominantly Christian. The historical 
dissemination of Christianity via missionaries during and after the age of discovery 
is well documented. Let us imagine, however, that European explorers had arrived 
in Samoa to discover the isolated native people already wearing crosses and already 
believing in a trinitarian god. This discovery, that Samoans had arrived at Christian 
doctrines independent of cultural diffusion, would have counted as extremely good 
prima facie evidence for the existence of reliable religious methods.  
Is there any surprising agreement like the unlikely scenario described above? 
Well, almost. Isolated religions occasionally share surprising and detailed overlap, 
particularly with respect to their origin myths, the existence of human souls, spirits 
that live without the body, and the existence and nature of the afterlife. In some cases, 
the resemblance is jaw-dropping. For example, in ancient Greek mythology, a 
primordial Earth mother and sky father bore a progeny of lesser gods who rule over 
certain natural domains, such as the oceans. Likewise, Polynesian mythologies 
152 
 
commonly describe a primordial Earth mother and sky father, whose resulting 
progeny make up the system of lesser gods who rule over special domains. Another 
common mythological idea is that of the world egg: a primordial egg out of which the 
universe was born. Such a myth can be found throughout Eurasia, North Africa and 
Oceania. There is simply no reasonable diffusionist hypothesis according to which all 
such resemblances are the result of a common cultural source, no serious hypothesis 
of prehistoric Graeco-Polynesian contact. These are surprising examples of religious 
agreement that cannot be accounted for by cultural diffusion. History cannot 
unriddle cases like these.  
The probability that we would find the idea of a cosmogenic world egg in any given 
religion is higher than the probability that we would find the idea of a cosmogenic 
pepper grinder. The probability that we would find the idea of ancestor spirits is 
higher than the probability that we would find the idea of fingernail spirits. The 
distribution of ideas is not random. This non-random distribution requires 
explanation. There are few, if any, religious universals, yet there are nevertheless 
recurrent themes that we are more likely to find than others. The rate of the 
recurrence is well above chance (Boyer and Bergstrom 2008, 113). That so many 
independent myths describe a primordial egg, that so many describe a sky father and 
an earth mother, that so many describe the souls of the dead descending to an 
underworld far off in the west, that so many myths describe the earth being fished up 
from out of the primordial waters by a heroic demigod, all of these similarities are 
puzzling. Any successful explanation of the sources of religious belief must be able to 
account for the particular distribution of religious parallelism, while also allowing for 
the tremendous diversity about which there is no question. This situation creates 
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something of a tightrope. Indeed, this puzzling agreement poses as much of a 
problem for the theist as it does for the atheist. For this reason, I will give this 
problem its own treatment in chapter six. Perennialism, as we shall see, fails to 
account for most of this agreement, focusing as it does on the reliability of 
acquaintance and mystical experience at the expense of other religious methods.  
To explain the non-random distribution, one might hypothesize that some 
religious methods are reliable. These methods, by way of some mechanism as yet 
unknown to us, place practitioners into contact with a supernatural realm. Such an 
argument, call it the Argument from Religious Agreement, might run as follows: 
1. Otherwise isolated religions share some surprising overlap in their 
doctrinal contents that cannot be accounted for as the result of a shared 
cultural history.  
2. If this overlap in content cannot be accounted for as the result of a shared 
cultural history, it must result from the independent exercise of reliable 
methods. 
3. These reliable methods are the distinctive epistemic methods of religion 
Therefore, the overlap in content among the world’s religions is accounted 
for by the independent exercise of reliable religious epistemic methods. 
This argument, or some version of it, is the cornerstone of the perennialist position. 
The perennialist argues that there is a common core of religious truth, some deep 
wisdom or supernatural experience which all the world’s religions express as a part 
of their total doctrine. However, the perennialist is not usually interested in the 
examples of agreement alluded to above (world eggs, sky fathers, ancestor spirits 
etc.). Instead, the perennialist takes the deliverances of mystical experience to put 
the practitioner into contact with a divine or ultimate reality, and believes that this 
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experience, along with its associated fundamental moral and soteriological insights, 
is accurately described by many religious traditions.  
Aldous Huxley’s Perennial Philosophy (1945) is the most famous work drawing 
together the supposedly common teachings of the great world religions, claiming that 
such teachings are common expressions of deep religious truths. Huxley focuses on 
the mystical wisdom of the “great world” religious traditions in their shared claim to 
a unitive knowledge of the divine. However, he acknowledges that this knowledge is 
not restricted to scripture-based religions, as he says that even the ‘traditional lore of 
primitive peoples’ contains the rudiments of this knowledge (Huxley 1945, vii). 
Huxley takes a relatively large subset of all religious knowledge claims to be accurate. 
William James is somewhat more skeptical about this latter claim. He maintains that 
there are non-negligible differences between the doctrines of different religions, that 
ultimately, ‘feeling is the deeper source of religion’ and that popular religious 
doctrines have almost invariably been garbled by philosophical and theological 
considerations that corrupt the original content much like ‘translations of a text into 
another tongue’ (James 1999, 470). For James, the task of uncovering perennial 
mystical wisdom is more difficult than Huxley might imagine. This task, he says, 
belongs to philosophy. Rather than generating a priori conceptions, definitions and 
deductive arguments for some divinity, the role of philosophy is to appraise existing 
doctrines, to reject those that conflict with scientific or historical facts and to point 
us in the direction of those perennial doctrines which are common and essential to 
different religions. Lady Philosophy can lead us towards the set of verified religious 
hypotheses: ‘from dogma and from worship she can remove historic incrustations’ 
(James 1999, 496). While James and Huxley disagree over exactly how much 
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doctrinal agreement we should expect to find among religions, they agree that there 
is a core of common religious truth that can be uncovered by mystical experience.  
One may accept the claim that mysticism does tend to generate some amount of 
independent agreement between practitioners, while rejecting the claim that 
mystical experience is a reliable source of knowledge. There are two reasons why we 
might be doubtful about the mystic’s claim to reliable knowledge. 
The first reason is that mystics agree overwhelmingly that mystical experience 
delivers knowledge that is utterly unlike the mundane knowledge of our everyday 
experience; so much so that it is commonly taken to be either inherently self-
contradictory or ineffable. Now, if we assume there are no true contradictions, then 
given that the knowledge is self-contradictory, it is no knowledge at all. If, on the 
other hand, the knowledge is ineffable, then we have no way to appraise its truth 
value. Of course, this latter position leaves open the possibility that mystical 
experience may be veridical—it may be an experience that places the mystic in 
contact with a deeper, spiritual reality—but if this reality is not independently 
verifiable, nor even capable of being described, then mysticism cannot be shown to 
be reliable. If the mystic’s claims are simply not amenable to independent 
confirmation, then so much the worse for the mystic’s claims. 
The second reason that we may be unconvinced that the mystic is arriving at bona 
fide knowledge is that the agreement delivered by mystical experience, when it is not 
self-contradictory or ineffable, is not particularly surprising. There is a certain 
obviousness to most of the unitive metaphysical and moral claims of the mystic that 
makes the existence of independent agreement unremarkable. The most common 
mystical claim is that all things are one. Reality is an indivisible whole. Good and evil 
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are one and the same etc. This is not terribly unlikely agreement. Monism is one of a 
limited number of obvious metaphysical alternatives. Either there is (a) nothing at 
all, (b) just one thing or (c) Several things. Now perhaps monism is correct and the 
mystic comes to learn this through mystical union with a divine mind; or perhaps 
monism is just the most attractive option to the human mind when it is in some state 
of trance or ecstasy. In either case, the observation that mystics converge on monism 
never had a terribly low prior probability. (Consider how strange it would be, in 
contrast, if mystics from different eras and cultures independently agreed that there 
were precisely 17 things). 
Moreover, while the question as to which of (a), (b) or (c) is correct remains a 
matter of philosophical speculation, we have no independent support for the truth of 
(b). This does not show that the mystic is wrong by any means. However, it does 
show that independent agreement converging on one proposition from among a 
limited number of relatively likely alternatives is not particularly strong evidence for 
the reliability of the method used, and that this is especially so when the question is 
an open one regarding the ultimate number of components of the universe, since we 
have little independent support to suggest that the mystic has indeed hit the nail on 
the head.  
On the other hand, and as I will discuss in chapter six, there is a great deal of 
incredibly surprising and unlikely religious parallelism which the perennialist simply 
neglects to discuss. This surprising religious agreement is some of the best evidence 
available for reliable religious methods, and yet the perennialist prefers to focus on 
the relatively banal example of mystical agreement: all things are one. Since I will be 
saying more about this topic in due course, I will refrain from saying too much about 
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it here, but what I will say is this: The fact that many religious societies independently 
attest to the existence of a cosmogenic egg is utterly extraordinary and too 
improbable to be a mere coincidence. Many other religions independently converge 
on the belief that the world formed from a pair of primordial parents. A perennialist 
does not, and indeed, could not argue that both the primordial egg and primordial 
parents myths are both true and literal expressions of a single fundamental truth. 
They are contradictory accounts of the origin of the universe.  
4.4. Exclusivism  
Against Hick’s permissive pluralism, William Alston thinks it is quite reasonable to 
believe that Christianity is the one true religion. That being said, he also argues that 
Sikhs may be entitled to think the very same thing about Sikhism, and that Siberian 
shamans may be entitled to think the same thing about their shamanism so long as 
certain conditions hold. Indeed, every religious believer could, in principle, have 
good reasons to accept her own tradition as veridical. Yet Alston’s is nevertheless an 
exclusivist position: at most one of the world’s religious traditions has got things 
right. Specifically, Alston takes it that he is quite within his rights to continue to use 
his own preferred religious epistemic method, which he terms Christian Mystical 
Practice or CMP.  
Alston has two central arguments that together challenge the claim that religious 
diversity invalidates religious epistemic methods. Firstly, he argues that different 
religions use quite different epistemic methods to develop and appraise beliefs. 
Therefore, he argues, religious diversity is not evidence of intra-practice unreliability, 
and only establishes that the results of different methods do not converge. Secondly, 
he argues that religious diversity is not evidence indicating that any particular 
158 
 
method is the unreliable one. One is entitled, therefore, to “sit tight” with the 
methods that one is fluent in using, since religious diversity is not evidence that one’s 
own method is unreliable.  
Alston’s first argument runs as follows. The mystical practices of different 
religions are not identical. There are important differences in the ‘overrider systems’ 
of the mystical practices of different religions. These differences are extensive enough 
to justify our classifying them as different methods altogether. Now, when the 
religious person applies his own particular method, the outputs of the method are 
internally consistent. That is to say, none of these distinct methods habitually 
generates contradictory beliefs. Therefore, religious diversity is not evidence of 
internal inconsistency (1991, 269). Religious diversity is just evidence that different 
epistemic methods generate different results.  
What does Alston mean here by ‘overrider system’? An overrider system is a set 
of procedures for evaluating the likelihood that some output of an epistemic method 
is true. It is especially important with regards to those beliefs we have some 
independent reason to doubt (1991, 187). Alston says that the overrider system of 
each method ‘determines how we go from prima facie to unqualified justification’ 
(1991, 189). Overriders of beliefs divide into two kinds: rebutters and underminers. 
A rebutter is a background belief that contradicts the belief in question. An 
underminer is a reason for supposing that the method justifying the belief may not 
be performing reliably in the present context (1991, 191). Practices with very different 
overrider systems cannot be counted as different branches of one and the same 
practice. Typically, the background beliefs of different religions differ, and so 
different rebutters may be brought to bear on any religion’s mystical practices. 
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Moreover, the conditions under which mystical perception is taken to be reliable (i.e. 
the underminers) differ from tradition to tradition (e.g. as was noted in the previous 
chapter, the Ten’a Alaskans understood all dreams to contain prophetic messages, 
whereas in medieval Islamic dream divination, only a subset of dreams were 
construed as prophetic messages. So, these different traditions accept quite different 
underminers). 
The overriders for our everyday perceptual beliefs are familiar and command an 
almost universal assent. Imagine that one day I see a red flash dart past my window. 
I form an immediate belief that a macaw just flew past. After applying my overrider 
system, however, I come to be sceptical about that belief. I have the following rebutter 
at hand: there are no wild macaws, as far as I’m aware, in New Zealand. I also have 
the following underminer. The red flash was moving particularly quickly. There are 
other overriders too of course: the window is small, and so the object was in my frame 
of vision only briefly. I heard no parrot calls, either before or after the event. I was 
watching a documentary on macaws at the time, and so I might have had macaws on 
the brain etc. On balance, I decide it is unlikely that a macaw flew past the window. 
What about the overrider systems for religious methods? What are their 
associated rebutters and underminers? Alston argues that each religious tradition 
sanctions a different overrider system for its mystical practices. It may be the case 
that some beliefs of some people who claim to have had mystical perceptions may be 
overridden within some traditions. As an example, Alston considers the case of Jim 
Jones, of the People’s Temple, who reported that God revealed to him that it was His 
will to have all those at Jonestown commit suicide. Alston notes that: ‘it seems very 
unlikely, given the account of the nature, purposes, and pattern of activity of God in 
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the Christian tradition, that God would command any such thing’ (1991, 190). Thus, 
concludes Alston, Jones’ revelation is simply discordant with the Christian tradition. 
The Christian community, then, is right to think that Jones was mistaken in some 
way. The idea is that there was a rebutter of the alleged revelation that Jones’ failed 
to apply.   
Now, it is interesting to note that Alston thinks the least controversial candidate 
for an overrider is internal inconsistency (1991, 170). A large enough number of 
internally inconsistent belief outputs would be evidence that the method in question 
is unreliable. Thus, Alston argues that since mystical practices, as practiced within 
each religious tradition, do not generate a large number of internally inconsistent 
belief outputs, religious diversity is not evidence that some single mystical practice is 
unreliable. Of course, one mystic may arrive at a belief that contradicts some belief 
held by mystics of another stripe, but this is no problem. Typically, says Alston, there 
is no internal inconsistency generated by any particular mystical practice. 
But Alston is just plain wrong about this. Mysticism, as practiced within most 
religious traditions, does generate a large number of internally inconsistent belief 
outputs. I need only point to the vast literature on mysticism, surveyed in the 
previous chapter, according to which avowedly paradoxical, inconsistent and 
contradictory beliefs are characteristic outputs of mystical experience. There is no 
shortage of direct quotes from mystics themselves that make clear that many of the 
belief outputs are paradoxical. Furthermore, the paradoxical nature of mystical 
experience is supposed to be a hallmark of the depth and awe-inspiring mystery of 
that kind of knowledge. Either Alston is unaware of the pervasiveness of paradoxical 
deliverances of mystical experience, or he simply does not count these mystics as 
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giving literal descriptions of their experience, but if the latter, why should we say that 
reports of their experiences are reliable?   
Now, I admit, the above objection depends on understanding ‘mysticism’ 
somewhat narrowly. In Alston’s sense ‘mystical perception’ does not only apply only 
to what was termed ‘mystical experience’ in the previous chapter, but also to a variety 
of associated religious methods from which mystical experience is often difficult to 
untangle: visions, prophetic dreams, the internal testimony of the holy spirit etc. So, 
while there is good evidence that mystical experience routinely generates internally 
inconsistent outputs, and so is unreliable, this is not evidence that indicts any of these 
other associated practices. That being said, the objection at least shows that Alston 
would be forced to reject an important subset of relatively highly esteemed religious 
epistemic methods as unreliable on the grounds of internal inconsistency. 
What can we say about the associated religious practices with which Alston is 
concerned, such as dreams and visions? Are these internally inconsistent too? To find 
out, we would have to identify some mystical practice within some religion, and 
observe what kinds of outputs resulted. However, it is very unclear exactly how to 
draw a non-trivial line between different religions according to their different 
mystical practices, even given what Alston has to say about differences in overrider 
systems. As Evan Fales notes: ‘the mystical practices of snake-handling Pentecostals 
more closely approach loa possession in Haitian Voodoo than they do the leadings of 
the Inner Light experienced by a sedate Philadelphia Quaker’ (1996, 30). An appeal 
to different overrider systems just does not seem to help us draw a line between 
religions, since this leads us to triviality.  
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This triviality is seen better when we consider again Alston’s example of Jim 
Jones’ suicidal revelation. Alston argues that Jones’s alleged deliverance from the 
Christian god is overridden by a rebutter that Jones failed to apply. That rebutter is 
that God’s purposes and behaviour are inconsistent with Jones’ suicidal revelation. 
If Jones’ belief is overridden by this rebutter which is a part of CMP, and if Jones 
failed to take this particular rebutter seriously, then Jones was using a distinct, non-
Christian mystical practice. Simply in virtue of accepting the apocalyptic revelation, 
Jones accepted a different set of overriders and so does not count as having applied 
CMP. Yet by adopting this kind of procedure, Alston can trivially define his way to 
internal consistency. This is a point also noted by Fales: ‘rescuing the internal 
consistency of a practice by excising from it all conflicting elements is to trivialize the 
claim of consistency’ (1996, 29).  
In response to this concern, Alston would say that Jones’ suicidal revelation is 
overridden by a rebutter within Christianity as a socially established religious 
tradition. Therefore, says Alston, since Jones’ revelation is entirely out of step with 
the conception of God within Christianity as a socially established religious tradition, 
Jones failed to apply CMP. Whatever Jones was preaching, it was not consonant with 
Christianity as a socially established religious practice. Yet Jones described Jesus as 
‘the greatest of prophets from time immemorial,’ and among his final words to his 
congregation, he justified the mass suicide by quoting from John (10:18): ‘No man 
may take my life from me; I lay my life down’ (Jones quoted in McGeehee 2017). 
Nearly one thousand members of the People’s Temple sect followed Jones to Guyana, 
and ultimately to death. The argument that Jones was not a Christian, or that the sect 
was not a socially established branch of Christianity, is simply unconvincing. 
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However, if we broaden the scope of the term ‘mystical practice’ such that 
different religious traditions tend share many of the same practices in common, then 
the problem of internal inconsistency is doubly intensified. Not only do such 
practices generate inconsistency with regards to the results of mystical perception, 
but they also generate disagreement about what the rebutters and underminers of 
mystical perception are. There is no convergence with regards to beliefs about the 
world, and no convergence with regards to beliefs about the bounds of reliability of 
mystical practices. The problem of internal inconsistency is much greater than Alston 
presumes. 
All this shows that there is a stark contrast between the overrider systems of 
religion and perception. Regular perception generates internal consistency both 
about its results and about its underminers. Indeed, regular perception has many 
underminers that generate universal assent. Every member of the epistemic 
community is familiar with these underminers, even if they cannot verbalise them. 
No developmentally normal human being, from any community, accepts that visual 
identification is more reliable when applied to very small and very fast moving 
objects than to large and slow moving ones. We reliably discover the underminers of 
perception by a process of cross-checking with other methods. Alston himself 
acknowledges that the underminers of perception are discovered by a process of 
applying a variety of tests that rely on a variety of different faculties (1992, 70). Yet 
we have no ability to cross check the deliverances of mystical perception, since, as 
Alston notes, religious perception is an autonomous epistemological enterprise. ‘We 
are simply unable,’ he says, ‘to go about testing a particular report of perception of 
God in the ways we can test reports of sense perception’ (1992, 72).  
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If religious perception is autonomous in the way that Alston says, then how could 
religious believers, from distinct religious communities, ever converge around true 
beliefs about what the underminers of mystical practice are? In principle, there could 
be no cross-checking by which we could establish that some patch of epistemic 
territory was more solid than any other. And if the underminers are themselves 
constitutive of mystical practices—if the underminers determine what kind of 
mystical practice we’re engaging in—then how could we ever converge around the 
truth with respect to which religion is likely true? We are given no rational procedure 
for choosing between “competing” mystical practices, and the internal inconsistency 
is, therefore, not only widespread but in principle unavoidable. Thus, Alston’s first 
argument for exclusivism fails. Religious diversity is often evidence of (unavoidable) 
intra-practice unreliability. 
I turn to Alston’s second argument for exclusivism. This runs that the mere 
existence of religious diversity is a fact that is silent about which, if any, of the 
competing religious practices is the reliable one. He says, ‘in the absence of any 
external reason for supposing that one of the competing practices is more accurate 
than my own, the only rational course for me is to sit tight with the practice of which 
I am a master’ (1991, 274). In other words, the existence of disagreement between 
competing mystical practices is no threat to any particular mystical practice, since no 
particular mystical practice is more firmly established than any other. By ‘firmly 
established’ Alston means that there is no particular mystical practice that is better 
socially established, or which delivers a more tangible degree of self-support. For the 
Christian, this self-support comes in terms of an increase in ‘serenity, peace, joy, 
fortitude, love and other “gifts of the spirit”’ (1991, 276). For believers of other 
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religions, self-support may take up a different form. Yes, there is disagreement, but 
this disagreement does not, on its own, indicate which of the available religious 
alternatives is the best one. Believers are therefore entitled to sit tight with whatever 
they are familiar with. 
This is an expert sleight of hand by which Alston stacks the deck. Alston omits to 
mention the fact that the problem of religious diversity not only forces us to decide 
which mystical practice is reliable, but also to decide whether any are. Alston says 
that he has no external reasons to think that some competing mystical practice is 
more reliable. This may be true, but Alston ignores the question of whether there are 
any external reasons to think that some non-religious epistemic method might be. 
Perhaps there are non-religious methods that deliver more accurate information 
about allegedly supernatural things than the deliverances of mystical perception. 
Even if we accept Alston’s claim that the social establishment and self-support of a 
mystical practice lend warrant to that practice, reason and sense perception are more 
widely socially established and more convincingly self-supported than mysticism 
anyway. Therefore, if the deliverances of mystical perception clash with the 
deliverances of reason, the believer would not be rational to “sit tight” with her 
mystical practice. 
Having said all this, there is another problem to note. Alston’s exclusivism faces 
the same problem that the perennialist position stumbled over. For the diversity of 
the world’s religions is only one small part of a larger problem. There is also 
surprising religious agreement that has to be accounted for. Religions worldwide 
share puzzling overlap, especially in their mythologies and cosmogonies. Indeed, for 
Alston’s Christian exclusivism, the problem is arguably more severe than for either 
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the Christian perennialist or the Christian pluralist. Alston’s personal brand of 
Christian monotheism generates relatively little agreement among separate 
investigators independently applying their various mystical practices. Alston’s brand 
of Christianity is largely an oddity in the history of religious thought, despite being, 
for purely historical reasons, the dominant religion in the world today. 
Why, exactly, is this problem particularly acute for Alston? The reason is that if 
some reliable religious methods exist, then the religious beliefs that garner a greater 
degree of independent agreement are, all things being equal, more probably 
generated by those methods. If exclusivism is right, and there are some reliable 
religious epistemic methods, then we ought to be able to identify which methods are 
reliable partly by their convergence on similar belief outputs. Christianity has few 
elements that are independently corroborated by a range of alternative religious 
methods. It is very improbable, therefore, that CMP is reliable.  
In contrast, compare the tenets of Christianity with the tenets of the following 
mock religion that I dub the ‘Church of the Surest Bet’. The Church of the Surest Bet 
is a syncretist religion that takes up only those beliefs that exhibit remarkable or 
surprising recurrence in isolated cultures. The Church’s doctrines are decided by a 
meta-study of the belief outputs of religious methods. The doctrines of the Church of 
the Surest Bet would probably consist in something like the following: An Earth 
mother and sky father produced four divine children who are devoted to the 
maintenance of certain biospheres, such as the oceans, forests, rivers and animals. 
From the waters all things were formed, including dry land, plants, animals, and 
human beings. Human spirits survive death and remain in the Earthly realm for 
some period of time before either entering the bodies of newborns, or departing for 
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the underworld, depending on the quality of their behavior in this life. These spirits 
may also be manipulated into entering physical objects, statues and amulets, in order 
to protect their relatives from spiritual harm. Condemned spirits travel far into the 
west, where they descend into the underworld. There once was a very serious flood, 
survived by only a handful of people. Even-toed ungulates are sacred.6 
The Church of the Surest Bet is far better justified by independent agreement than 
Christian monotheism. Sure, it might not be a socially established religion, but the 
degree of independent agreement converging around those particular mythological 
claims is a better indicator of truth than social establishment anyway. If Alston takes 
independent agreement to be at least some indicator of reliability (and he does), then 
it seems he will struggle to explain why Christianity is rationally preferable to the 
Church of the Surest Bet.  
4.5 CONCLUSION 
Neither the perennialist, the pluralist nor the exclusivist can successfully defend the 
reasonableness of religious belief against the evidence of religious diversity, which 
remains the strongest evidence against the claim that religious methods are reliable. 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the ongoing emergence of new religious 
movements and the extinction of others compounds the problem for the defender of 
reliable religious methods. For with the addition of each new and contradictory 
                                                     
6  This last note on the totem of the religion covers a variety of animals commonly 




religious doctrine, the argument that the methods generating the doctrines are 
reliable gets weaker and weaker.  
The perennialist’s argument is perhaps the strongest of the lot. In arguing that 
mysticism is a reliable religious method, the perennialist can at least appeal to 
evidence of convergent agreement between mystics of different cultures and eras. 
The weakness of the perennialist’s argument, however, is directly tied to the 
weakness of the propositions about which the practitioners agree. The proposition 
that everything is one thing does not immediately suggest any obvious predictions 
which we might then proceed to test. Moreover, the proposition that everything is 
one should be taken to possess a relatively high prior probability, and so the existence 
of intersubjective agreement among mystics is not incredibly surprising. One final 
point to note is that even if it is assumed that the deliverances of mystical experience 
are entirely uniform in all mystical traditions, there does not appear to be, at present, 
any other methods that might convincingly corroborate the mystic’s claims. This has 
led some defenders of mysticism, such as William Alston, to argue for the rational 
autonomy of mystical practices. Mystical practices, says Alston, are not to be 
appraised by the same standards as perception. Mystical practices have their own in-
house rules and standards. I will have more to say about this argument in §7.9. For 
now, I will only suggest that the lack of independent corroboration for the mystic’s 
claim is a very serious shortcoming.  
I would also like to suggest that the preceding discussion of religious diversity has 
been carried on under the shadow of a more fundamental debate. That debate 
concerns the extent to which a disagreement with others counts as evidence against 
one’s own view. Why is disagreement with others any kind of evidence at all? When 
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should a disagreement with others lead one to suspend one’s own belief? What is a 
reasonable response to religious disagreement?  I will now turn to these questions, 




5. Religious Disagreement 
Few sometimes may know, when thousands err — John Milton, Paradise Lost 
5.1 Introduction 
The problems posed by religious diversity can be understood more clearly by 
examining the epistemological implications of religious disagreement. In particular, 
they can be understood by asking the question: on discovering a disagreement 
between oneself and others, what is the rational response? And more relevantly to 
our present discussion, what is the rational response to the discovery of such an 
enduring and pervasive disagreement as we find in the case of religion? After all, if 
we were entitled to be dogmatic in the face of disagreement, if we were quite within 
our epistemic rights to ignore the testimony of others, then religious diversity would 
pose no problem for the religious person as to whether religious belief is justified. 
What sort of evidence is disagreement? We disagree often and about all kinds of 
things: the quickest way to get to the bus stop, who the lead singer of the Kinks was, 
whether this song is any good etc. Although such disagreements may cause us to 
change our beliefs, it is odd to think of disagreement itself as a sort of evidence. 
Disagreement is a peculiar kind of evidence. Whereas material evidence can either 
confirm or disconfirm what we already believe, disagreement with our peers, if it has 
any effect at all, has only the ability to disconfirm. Persistent disagreements can be a 
cause of social disharmony, and yet the criticism of strongly held ideas is also valued 
as a means of discovery, especially in fields such as philosophy and science. ‘I may be 
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wrong, and you may be right,’ Popper liked to say, ‘and with an effort, we may get 
closer to the truth.’  
Sometimes, very little effort is required to resolve disagreements. This is 
especially so when disagreement arises in a context in which there happens to be 
agreement on how the dispute should be rationally resolved. The situation is a 
familiar one: you and I are having a beer at the local pub. We start to disagree over 
some bit of trivia, perhaps: ‘which is bigger: a megalodon or a humpback whale?’ You 
say a megalodon; I say a humpback. Without a word, we both pull out our 
smartphones and check Wikipedia. Just like that, our disagreement is quickly 
resolved. You are right, it seems. Megalodons were probably a bit bigger, but only by 
a nose. I grumble. You gloat. We go back to drinking our beers. Of course, the method 
we have used for resolving our dispute is fallible—perhaps a vandal has been 
wreaking havoc with the ‘humpback whale’ page—but we accept the method for the 
time being, since it is reliable enough for the purposes of settling a trivial dispute.  
So then, what about cases in which the disagreement under consideration, unlike 
the example above, cannot be settled by some agreed procedure, such as whipping 
out our smartphones or consulting an expert? Some disagreements are just like this. 
They seem to go on endlessly, having no shared principles of dispute resolution. They 
do not last twenty minutes, but twenty generations. These disputes do not appear to 
lead anyone closer to the truth, or to a suitable compromise. Social disharmony and 
conflict is often the result. Pervasive and intractable religious disagreement is a 
paradigm example. The same old arguments have been hashed and rehashed. 
Personal stories of hope, redemption and grief are recounted. Alleged evidence is 
given of the supernatural, the natural, the observable, the unobservable etc. Few 
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change their minds. When minds are changed, the reasons given are often 
unconvincing. It all seems to be in vain. Faced with such prolonged disagreement, 
what should we do? Check Wikipedia again? Consult a priest or a philosopher? Or 
do we require a radically different approach? 
In his influential paper ‘Reasonable Religious Disagreements’, Richard Feldman 
has argued that the existence of irreconcilable religious disagreement is a good 
reason for everyone to adopt an agnostic attitude towards contentious religious 
propositions: the believer and the atheist alike should drop their commitments and 
converge on a conciliatory middle ground. Feldman’s argument, in brief, is that if we, 
as investigators, come to a disagreement after having shared our evidence, this 
disagreement is evidence that one party to the dispute has made some kind of 
mistake. Yet if our opponent is an epistemic peer, having roughly similar cognitive 
abilities to our own, we have no reason to believe that she is more likely to be 
mistaken than that we are. It follows that all parties ought to withhold belief with 
respect to the contentious proposition until more relevant evidence is brought 
forward.  
This brief outline of Feldman’s argument will be developed in due course. But I 
can sketch, equally briefly, where I think the argument goes wrong. Feldman 
overlooks the fact that religious disagreement, in practice, is very often generated by 
the use of distinctively religious epistemic methods which are prone to deliver 
conflicting information to believers. Since the secular person has good reasons to 
reject these methods, it follows that the secular person is not obliged to give up her 
belief. The argument, then, is that persistent religious disagreement, like religious 
diversity in general, is generated by methods that are prone to deliver conflicting 
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belief outputs. It follows that the mere existence of irreconcilable religious 
disagreement is not on its own a good reason for the scientist qua secular person to 
adopt a conciliatory middle ground. 
Feldman’s paper begins with the following question: is it possible for epistemic 
peers to continue to disagree about some religious matter, after all parties have fully 
shared their evidence, and while still maintaining that all parties are behaving 
reasonably? In short, he asks whether reasonable religious disagreement is possible. 
His conclusion is that reasonable religious disagreements are not possible. He 
suggests that persistent religious disagreement between epistemic peers should 
cause all parties to suspend judgment with regards to the contentious proposition(s). 
Since religious disagreement is so widespread and since religious and non-religious 
views can be found at all levels of education and intelligence, it seems that almost 
everyone who doesn’t live in a cave ought to adopt an agnostic attitude.  
This is a surprising conclusion, since it pushes hard against our everyday practice. 
In practice, we do not jump ship on our views simply because someone disagrees with 
us, and Feldman’s suggestion that we ought to strikes most people as impractical, not 
to mention spineless (Elga 2011, 164). A simple disagreement should not cause us to 
abandon our most cherished beliefs since ‘the things that one believes about 
fundamental questions in life are partly constitutive of one’s sense of identity’ 
(Simpson 2013, 568). We disagree with our friends and our enemies just because we 
are unique individuals, and any suggestion that all parties to a dispute ought to 
abandon their beliefs seems repugnantly conformist and epistemically cowardly. It 
is not immediately obvious how Feldman would reach such a troubling conclusion, 
but there are several key assumptions in his argument that pave the way. 
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5.2 Preliminary Assumptions 
To begin with, Feldman assumes the Uniqueness Thesis, which states that for any 
proposition p and any body of evidence E, exactly one doxastic attitude is the rational 
attitude to have toward p on the basis of E, where the possible attitudes include 
believing p, disbelieving p and suspending judgment. (Feldman 2011, 148) One might 
want to amend this principle to accept a more finely grained range of doxastic 
attitudes, such as degrees of belief or credences. Thus amended, the Uniqueness 
Thesis would state that for any proposition p and any body of evidence E, exactly one 
credence level is the rational attitude to have toward p on the basis of E. So, the 
introduction of more finely grained levels of confidence does not change the core of 
the Uniqueness Thesis: that any given body of evidence uniquely determines just one 
rational attitude to a proposition. The Uniqueness Thesis is a very strange 
assumption. It strikes some as obviously false, while for others it appears close to a 
truism. The Uniqueness Thesis implies that, in ideal circumstances, two rational 
investigators with the very same evidence should have all the same doxastic attitudes 
towards all the same propositions. They should be led by the evidence to agree. If the 
available evidence E recommends believing p, then there is no rational road to 
disbelieving p given E. Reasonable disagreement is still a possibility, however, and 
Feldman notes two causes of reasonable disagreement. 
First, epistemic peers may not have fully shared their evidence. If the evidence 
has not been fully shared, then each investigator will reason from two different 
bodies of evidence, and will arrive at different conclusions. We might think of two 
equally intelligent jurors, Anne and Bart. While Anne paid close attention to the trial, 
took notes etc., Bart was tired, inattentive and even slept through the important bits. 
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During deliberation, Anne and Bart come to disagree over whether the defendant is 
guilty. Obviously, this is due to the fact that Anne has seen more of the evidence than 
Bart, who has not been paying attention. Yet Anne is unaware that Bart has been 
napping, and Bart is unaware that Anne has been paying excellent attention. While 
Anne and Bart remain ignorant of their different sets of evidence, they may continue 
to disagree and for quite rational reasons. One might think that this conclusion 
pushes against the Uniqueness Thesis, for what we have here is a case in which 
rational agents have been led to disagree, but remember that the Uniqueness Thesis 
only dictates that a particular body of evidence uniquely determines just one 
rational attitude towards a proposition. It just so happens that, in this case, Anne and 
Bart have different bodies of evidence. Once Anne brings Bart up to speed, Bart ought 
to revise his verdict in Anne’s direction. So, reasonable disagreement may be caused 
by differences in evidence sets. 
Second, reasonable disagreement may be caused by a disparity in the cognitive 
capacities of the disputants involved. My elderly mother-in-law sometimes forgets 
that the story she is currently telling me is the same one she told me just half an hour 
beforehand. She is not irrational, but the strength of her memory is typical of most 
octogenarians. In such cases, it is natural that I will disagree with my mother-in-law 
about whether the story she is telling is new to my ears. In a case such as this, my 
disagreement with my mother-in-law can be rationally maintained, since she is 
apparently not my epistemic peer. I am simply in a better position to evaluate the 
available evidence than she is. I am aware of how unreliable her memory is, while she 
has failed to notice that her memory is failing. Thus, she would be rational to 
maintain her own belief, and I would be rational to maintain mine. We would 
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continue to disagree over whether she is repeating herself. In such a case, I have 
independent reason to think that I am right and that she is wrong.  
So, disagreements may be rationally maintained when the evidence is not fully 
shared between epistemic peers, or when the disputants are not epistemic peers. But 
some disagreements just cannot be rationally maintained at all. Feldman argues that 
when a dispute is more like a “fair fight”, then a disagreement should count as 
evidence against one’s own position. Indeed, when a dispute is a fair fight, Feldman 
says that one ought to give equal weight to the views of one’s opponent. What does 
it mean, however, for a dispute to count as a fair fight? Is any dispute a fair fight? 
After all, in the real world it is apparently the case that (1) no two people are exactly 
alike in their ability to evaluate evidence and (2) no two people have exactly the same 
bodies of evidence. In short, reality dictates that there are no epistemic peers and the 
evidence is never fully shared. Indeed, when we consider religious disagreements, 
some of the evidence held by the disputants is allegedly not even able to be shared. It 
is private, intuitive or “spiritual”.  
5.3 No Epistemic Peers? 
In answer to (1), Feldman defines ‘epistemic peer’ in an unhelpfully vague way. He 
takes it to refer to disputants who are ‘roughly equal with respect to intelligence, 
reasoning powers, background information, etc.’ (2011, 144). This imprecision in his 
definition is obviously problematic from the outset: if A and B are roughly equal in 
intelligence, then might it not be the case that A is slightly cleverer than B? And might 
not this slight difference serve as justification for A to maintain her belief in the face 
of a disagreement with B? When is the threshold of rough equality crossed? I think 
we would improve Feldman’s definition by replacing the phrase ‘roughly equal’ with 
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‘indiscernible’. This allows the term to be applied uniformly in real cases, and avoids 
any problematic ambiguity in scope.  
 However, I am still not satisfied with Feldman’s definition. Adam Elga has better 
characterised epistemic peerhood as the quality of being just as likely as the other 
disputant to be right in the case of some disagreement (2011, 169). Elga notes that 
we grant the status of epistemic peerhood to others only with respect to given fields 
of expertise. He says: ‘one might count an advisor as a peer with respect to arithmetic 
but as less than a peer with respect to . . .’ (2011, 169). To my mind, this is a major 
improvement on Feldman’s definition. I would go one step further, and define 
epistemic peerhood in terms of one’s relative competency with some epistemic 
method(s). On this account, my mother-in-law may very well be my epistemic peer 
with respect to multiplication, but not with respect to memory. I therefore advance 
here what I believe to be an improved definition of ‘epistemic peerhood’:  
Epistemic peerhood: a relation that holds between epistemic agents A and 
B, given equal competence in their use of the same epistemic methods.  
What I mean by ‘equal competence’ may be unclear. To be equally competent at 
applying a particular epistemic method, one must be equally likely (or indiscernibly 
likely) to generate belief outputs that would be independently corroborated by 
separate investigators if they were to apply the very same method. Moreover, 
competency with methods is nonadditive. If we are otherwise impeccable cognizers, 
but my sense of hearing is unreliable half of the time, while your sense of smell has 
the same problem half of the time, we are not thereby made epistemic peers on 
balance. Different questions demand different cognitive skills, and one cannot be an 
expert apart from being an expert at applying those skills within some particular 
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domain of inquiry. Having an unreliable nose is no impediment to identifying 
Beethoven’s fifth symphony, and if our disagreement concerns this piece of music, 
your malfunctioning nose places you under no obvious disadvantage. 
5.4 No Fully Shared Evidence? 
To answer the objection that epistemic peers never fully share their evidence in real 
cases, Feldman argues that although epistemic peers may have quite different sets of 
evidence, this difference has a negligible effect on the rationality of the disagreement, 
since once both parties discover that the other has some undisclosed evidence for 
their conclusion, this evidence of evidence counts as evidence. If both parties are 
epistemic peers, then both parties are equally placed with regards to this private, or 
forgotten, or unspoken, or incommunicable evidence. Even though a compelling 
argument may have been forgotten, even though some personal religious experience 
may be incommunicable, even though one might just have a bare sense of confidence 
that one is on the right track, these facts would hardly count as evidence that 
outcompetes the evidence provided by one’s peers’ undisclosed reasons. The fact is, 
both parties have evidence that the other has private evidence that has led them to 
their preferred conclusion. Therefore, there is nothing about one’s own private 
evidence that privileges one’s own position, since one has evidence that one’s 
opponent has evidence of the very same kind. In slogan form: evidence of evidence 
is evidence.  




5.5 Feldman’s argument 
Finally, we can set up Feldman’s argument with regards to religious disagreement. 
Religious disagreements are intractable. They are pervasive and irreconcilable. They 
have been going on for centuries without resolution. Most civil people have heard all 
the arguments, and have agreed to disagree. Yet if we assume that the Uniqueness 
Thesis is true, and if we assume that the disputants are epistemic peers, then religious 
disagreements simply cannot be rational to maintain. All parties should by now have 
agreed to adopt a conciliatory middle ground. We should all have put our beliefs on 
ice. We should be waiting for more evidence to turn up: the solution to religious 
disagreement is agnosticism. 
The argument is that, after having shared all their evidence, epistemic peers 
continue to disagree about important religious propositions. The disputants do not 
seem to be cognitively impaired, and the available evidence has been raked over ad 
nauseam. Religious experts, philosophers of religion, sociologists of religion, 
theologians, historians, mystics and professional skeptics have the same body of 
evidence available. Given the Uniqueness Thesis, there is only one rational attitude 
to have toward any particular proposition given the same body of evidence. Given 
that the disagreement is between epistemic peers, none of the disputants is more 
likely to be the bearer of that unique rational attitude than any other. It follows that 
none of the disputants can maintain the disagreement at the same time as 
maintaining that their opponent is being reasonable (this is a consequence of the 
Uniqueness Thesis. For if your opponent is being reasonable, then you are not and 
vice versa). So, if both parties accept that the other party to the dispute is an 
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epistemic peer, then both parties ought to withhold judgment towards the 
contentious religious proposition until more evidence is forthcoming.  
What sorts of religious disagreements is Feldman talking about? By ‘religious 
disagreement’, Feldman really means the dispute between the theist and the atheist. 
Feldman’s conclusion, then, implies that suspension of judgment is the proper 
attitude for all parties to adopt across the gamut of existing religious belief, including 
religious disbelief or atheism. In a dispute between the theist and the atheist, if both 
parties take their opponent to be reasonable, then both parties should suspend 
judgment until further evidence arrives on the scene. The theist and the atheist 
should converge on a sceptical middle ground. Both should give up on their dogmatic 
belief, and settle for agnostic non-belief.  
To many of us, Feldman’s conclusion will seem intuitively wrong. But the strength 
of Feldman’s argument is seen more clearly when we apply his principles to simple 
examples in which two epistemic peers disagree about the results of the same method 
(usually some perceptual method). In these highly-simplified cases, Feldman’s 
principles seem to lead us to the intuitively correct result. Feldman considers an 
example in which two epistemic peers disagree over whether the Dean is in the Quad: 
Suppose you and I are standing by the window looking out on the quad. We think 
we have comparable vision and we know each other to be honest. I seem to see 
what looks to me like the dean standing out in the middle of the quad. (Assume 
that this is not something odd. He’s out there a fair amount.) I believe that the 
dean is standing on the quad. Meanwhile, you seem to see nothing of the kind 
there. You think that no one, and thus not the dean, is standing in the middle of 
the quad. We disagree. Prior to our saying anything, each of us believes 
reasonably. Then I say something about the dean’s being on the quad, and we find 
out about our situation. In my view, once that happens, each of us should suspend 
judgment. We each know that something weird is going on, but we have no idea 
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which of us has the problem. Either I am ‘‘seeing things,’’ or you are missing 
something. I would not be reasonable in thinking that the problem is in your head, 
nor would you be reasonable in thinking that the problem is in mine. (2011, 150—
1) 
This conclusion seems around about right, and the analogy with religious 
disagreement is clear. You “see” God, and I do not. We cannot both be right. And so, 
Feldman concludes, the only reasonable attitude to take to religious disagreement is 
non-belief (not disbelief). To maintain a religious disagreement, one would need 
some special reason to dismiss the testimony of one’s opponent. It seems that one 
must either say that the evidence has not been fully shared, or that the opponent is 
not truly an epistemic peer, yet Feldman believes that these options are not on the 
table in most cases. 
5.6 Maintaining Belief in the Face of Disagreement 
I think there are good reasons to disregard the testimony of religious believers while 
nevertheless accepting that all the material evidence has been fully shared and that 
the disputants are epistemic peers (at least, in Feldman’s sense of that term). How 
can I have my cake and eat it too? I argue that it is typically the case that religious 
believers have rationally adopted an irrational epistemic system. Religious people 
typically apply religious methods to religious questions. Religious disagreement 
stems from a more fundamental conflict between opposing epistemic systems. 
Therefore, I maintain that first-order disagreement about contentious religious 
propositions may be rationally maintained in most cases, while higher order 
disagreements about the relative merits of rival epistemic systems may not always 
be. To reach that conclusion, I adopt a form of benign epistemic relativism. In doing 
so, I follow a path already trodden by Goldman (2010).  
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Epistemic relativism is the thesis that there is more than one epistemic system 
that one might rationally adopt. This relativism need not be global or nihilistic. This 
is not epistemological anarchism. Indeed, while there are multiple epistemic systems 
that one could rationally be led to adopt, only one epistemic system is rational. 
Goldman argues that even in a world with only one normatively correct epistemic 
system, it may be rational, given one’s evidence, to adopt an incorrect epistemic 
system. Examples are not hard to dream up. The North Korean child may come to 
believe, for rational reasons based on the testimony of elders, that anything the dear 
leader says is true, but while the child comes thereby to adopt an incorrect epistemic 
system, it is nevertheless a rational choice, given her evidence. Similarly, I argue that 
religious believers are often led, for quite rational reasons, to accept that religious 
methods are reliable and effective, and that religious disagreement stems from the 
acceptance of such methods. 
Given that the epistemic systems of epistemic peers may differ, there may be 
reasonable religious disagreements even given the same body of evidence. Agents 
may still reasonably disagree if they apply different epistemic systems to the same 
body of evidence. In short, Goldman says:  
Two agents can have different bodies of evidence that bear on norm correctness 
and are relevant to the reasonability of their respective attitudes.’ and ‘Where two 
agents are equal with respect to material evidence but differ with respect to norm 
evidence—though the correct norm‐ system stays fixed—it is legitimate for their 
attitudes toward a given proposition to diverge. (2010, 208—9)  
Such a position emphasises the distinction between evidence relevant to epistemic 
norm acceptance (norm evidence) and evidence relevant to material disputes 
(material evidence). This position accepts that there is a matter of fact about what 
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the correct epistemic norms are, but charges that different bodies of norm evidence 
may lead to justified (but mistaken) beliefs about what the correct epistemic norms 
are. This may lead to disagreement among epistemic peers downstream once 
different epistemic systems are applied to identical bodies of material evidence. Yet 
such disagreements will nevertheless be reasonable, and will stand between 
epistemic peers who have fully shared their material evidence.  
Note that this conclusion is compatible with the Uniqueness Thesis, since 
uniqueness is not restricted to one’s first order evidence. The Uniqueness Thesis only 
says that given some body of evidence there is one unique, rational attitude to have 
with respect to some proposition. If that body of evidence is supplemented with other 
higher order, norm evidence, then we have a new total body of evidence that uniquely 
determines just one rational attitude. 
Now my objection to Feldman’s conciliatory view can be clearly stated. Epistemic 
peers may be led by quite rational considerations to accept incompatible epistemic 
systems. Having done so, disputants may come to different conclusions concerning 
the same body of material evidence, since they have applied different epistemic 
methods to the same questions. In the case of religious disagreement, it is typical that 
one party has used religious methods. Disagreement routinely results from the use 
of religious methods, and moreover, we do not have any knowledge of the conditions 
under which the methods typically produce independent agreement. Therefore, since 
the atheist is not, one can only assume, applying religious methods, the atheist may 
reasonably maintain her disagreement with the theist. The theist, in applying 
religious epistemic methods, is no longer the atheist’s epistemic peer.  
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Although the disputants would count as epistemic peers in Feldman’s sense 
(roughly equal with respect to intelligence etc.), they would not count as epistemic 
peers in my sense, since a religious believer is not equally competent at applying the 
most effective epistemic methods to religious questions. Indeed, the religious 
believer is applying methods that routinely fail to generate independent agreement, 
while affording the results of those methods a very high evidential weight.  
5.7 The Disanalogy of the Dean in the Quad 
Consider again Feldman’s Dean in the Quad analogy. In Feldman’s analogy, we 
disagree about whether the Dean is in the quad when we are both applying the same 
epistemic methods to the same question. Both of us are looking out the window from 
similar angles, under similar lighting and having similar visual abilities to see if the 
dean is in the quad. Since we both have eyes and we both know how to use them in 
the normal way, we are epistemic peers insofar as that is concerned. We are applying 
a public method, the conditions under which agreement is generated being well 
established and explained in terms of the causal effects of light on our sense organs. 
We are competent users of vision. We know that agreement is commonly generated 
by the faculty of vision under certain favourable conditions, and we know that the 
present conditions are those favourable sorts of conditions. If we happen to disagree 
while using our eyes, under such conditions, then we know that one of us must have 
gone wrong somewhere. We have independent means of discovering who has gone 
wrong where and, furthermore, we are also aware of the kinds of conditions that 
would normally lead to a total breakdown of agreement (e.g. in the dark, over great 
distances, or for objects moving at great speed). 
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It should be clear already, then, that there is an important disanalogy in 
Feldman’s argument. Let’s compare the ‘Dean in the Quad’ example with the 
situation as we find it vis à vis religious disagreement. In the case of a disagreement 
with atheists, theists typically disagree after having applied religious methods. 
These are methods that the atheist does not share. It follows that there is an 
extremely important disanalogy between a religious disagreement, of the sort that 
might hold between a theist and an atheist, and the straightforward kind of 
disagreement that holds for ‘Dean in the Quad’. In the case of religious disagreement, 
it is not the case that both parties have applied the same public method under 
favourable conditions, that they have unexpectedly encountered a disagreement 
about what the results are, and have concluded that ‘something must have gone 
wrong somewhere’. On the contrary, in the case of religious disagreement, it is 
typically the case that incompatible epistemic systems are being applied. Thomas 
Kelly is another philosopher who has cried foul over these kinds of disanalogies in 
the literature on disagreement (2011, 208). Such toy examples are used to pump our 
intuitions that we ought to give equal weight to the testimony of our peers in any and 
all cases. Yet such toy examples only manage to successfully pump these intuitions 
because we are so intimately familiar with the epistemic methods described and the 
favourable conditions under which they tend to generate agreement.  
I propose we amend the ‘Dean in the Quad’ to make the analogy a better fit with 
religious disagreement understood in light of my discussion of the epistemic methods 
employed by religious communities. Let us imagine that some large section of the 
population, call them ‘sniffers’, routinely relies on subtle variations in odour to detect 
deans in quads, while most other people use their eyes. Indeed, sniffers regard vision 
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as systematically unreliable when it comes to observing deans in quads. One day, you 
and I are standing at the window, looking out over the quad. You say: ‘Fancy that! 
The dean is in the quad again,’ pointing towards the quad. I am puzzled, and reply: 
‘What are you talking about? I don’t see the dean there.’ I proceed to ask how you 
came to believe that the dean was in the quad, and you tell me that you are a sniffer. 
‘Oh, I see,’ I groan, rolling my eyes. At this point, I would be wise to disregard your 
testimony that the dean is in the quad, since I cannot see him, and I am aware that 
you are using a method that routinely generates disagreement under all conditions 
(both between sniffers and the general population, as well as between sniffers and 
other sniffers). It is obvious that if I used my eyes to detect the dean, but you used 
your nose, I would be forced to disregard your evidence, since noses make for sorry 
dean-detectors.  
Moreover, if sniffers were commonplace—part of some bizarre cultural fad—then 
it would be par for the course that there would be irreconcilable disagreement about 
whether any particular dean was in any particular quad since noses do not generate 
agreement about deans in quads under the stated conditions. Disagreements about 
deans in quads would be humdrum and predictable, and non-sniffers would grow 
exhausted of the endless controversy generated by the sniffers’ acceptance of this 
peculiar and inappropriate method. Moreover, whenever any disagreement arose 
about a dean in a quad, non-sniffers would quickly infer that one party must be a 
sniffer, since agreement is otherwise par for the course under the right conditions. 
Such disagreements would not count as surprising evidence that someone had gone 
wrong in applying a public method like vision. On the contrary, each new 
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disagreement about a dean in a quad would be yet more evidence of the disagreement 
generated via the method of sniffing.  
The analogy should be clear. The important thing that persistent religious 
disagreement tells us is that religious methods, such as alleged perception of the 
divine or divination or dream interpretation etc. routinely produce conflicting 
testimony. Upon unearthing a religious disagreement, the secularist is entitled to 
retain her belief just because it is clear one party is probably using religious methods, 
which routinely generate disagreement.  
5.8 Religious Disagreement Without Religious Methods 
I have so far argued that scientists (or more broadly, anyone applying secular 
methods) may disregard the testimony of religious believers on the grounds that their 
beliefs are generated by the use of methods that fail to indicate that the scientist may 
have gone wrong in applying any of her methods. The results of religious methods do 
not serve as indicators for error in the results of secular methods. If that is so, then 
when might it be reasonable for a religious disagreement to cause one to adopt a 
conciliatory middle ground?  
I answer that if the theist has arrived at her belief entirely through the use of 
public epistemic methods, then the scientist and the theist ought to put their 
disagreement on ice until they can discover what has gone wrong. What I would wish 
to emphasise, however, is that such a situation is not typical of religious disagreement 
at all. Generally speaking, religious disagreement is a product of one party’s use of 
religious methods.  
One might be unconvinced that religious methods really are the root cause of the 
disagreement. It might be argued instead that religious methods make up only one 
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small part of the religious person’s myriad reasons for her beliefs. Therefore, since it 
is possible, as Elga notes, that ‘we may sensibly ask what a given agent believes, 
bracketing off or factoring off or setting aside certain considerations’ (2011, 169), we 
may sensibly ask what the religious believer thinks her evidence supports excluding 
the evidence provided by religious methods. It may be the case that, after setting 
aside such religious reasons, religious belief persists for reasons that are grounded in 
public methods. Indeed, there are no shortage of arguments for the existence of God 
that can be drawn from natural theology. For example, cosmological arguments and 
design arguments may justify belief in a deity. These are deductive arguments for 
belief in God and they are public so far as I can tell. Therefore, there are at least some 
reasons for religious belief that are not generated by religious epistemic methods.  
The above considerations seem to indicate that for most of the disputants to a 
religious disagreement, if we subtract the evidence afforded by religious epistemic 
methods from the believer’s body of evidence, we may still be left with a perennial 
religious disagreement which is grounded in shared and public methods. Once we 
have peeled off a few layers of private reasons, there is a public argument to be found 
at the heart of the disagreement. If the disagreement is like this, if it is really a public 
dispute hidden behind a fog of private justifications, then it would follow that 
religious disagreement still gives the atheist and the theist reason to move to a 
conciliatory middle ground. 
The question is, then, whether it the case that religious belief persists once the 
evidence generated by religious epistemic methods is disqualified. Typically, it does 
not. Indeed, this is a point that has been urged more often by theists than atheists. 
Alvin Plantinga has famously argued that natural epistemic methods hardly suffice 
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for the formation of reasonable religious belief. Anyone who reasons their way to 
religious belief is taken to be without sufficient justification. Plantinga puts the point 
colourfully: 
Christians do not reason as follows: ‘What is the best explanation for all that 
organized complexity and the rest of what we see about us? Well, let's see, perhaps 
there is an omniscient, omnipotent, wholly good being who created the world. Yes 
that's it; and perhaps this being is one of three persons, the other two being his 
divine son and a third person proceeding from the first two (yet there are not three 
Gods but one); the second person became incarnate, suffered, was crucified, and 
died, thus atoning for our sins and making it possible for us to have life and have 
it more abundantly. Right; that's got to be it; that's a dandy explanation of the 
facts.’ What Christian would reason like that? Hardly any. Rather, the traditional 
Christian thinks she knows these things by way of faith and its correlate, divine 
revelation. (Plantinga 1996) 
It is a characteristic of religious disagreement that it is rooted in, to borrow Victor 
Stenger’s phrase, opposed epistemologies. Without the evidence provided by 
religious epistemic methods, religious belief is an empty husk. When the believer is 
asked what she would believe bracketing off the evidence provided by religious 
methods, the response is almost uniformly ‘I would not believe.’ Even the 
“evidentialist” Richard Swinburne argues that without the evidence of religious 
experiences, the probability that theism is true barely cracks the 50% mark (2004, 
341—2). In other words, with religious methods disqualified, believers either fail to 
believe, or have the justifications for their beliefs severely handicapped. It is 
therefore the case that in a typical religious disagreement, the application of religious 
epistemic methods generates disagreement, whereas once these methods are 




To conclude, Feldman asks what attitude one should take when one encounters 
religious disagreement. But this question can only be properly answered once we 
know why religious disagreement is so very pervasive and so very intractable. To 
answer this question, we must ask what methods were used by the disputants to 
arrive at the results that they did in the first place. We must ask how suitable those 
methods are for answering the question posed. We must ask whether agreement or 
disagreement is usually generated when those methods are used. We must ask 
whether the investigators are competent at using those methods. Until these 
methodological questions are answered, the brute fact of disagreement is no guide 
to action. We must ask: what kind of disagreement are we facing? Is this a 
disagreement about the deliverances of public methods? Are both parties using the 
same methods? Under what conditions do those methods generate agreement?  
If we encounter a disagreement, the existence of which is commonplace, familiar 
and known to be caused by one party’s persistent use of methods which regularly 
generate disagreement, then we are entitled to maintain our belief provided we are 
using methods that tend to generate agreement. Our own attitude should not shift in 
response to such a predictable disagreement caused by such an obvious culprit. Of 
course, if religious methods were public and usually generated agreement, but merely 
happened to fail on some particular occasion, then this particular disagreement 
would be cause for us to abandon our belief until we could figure out who had made 
the mistake (and in such a case, there would be an agreed procedure for figuring this 
out, since the conditions under which the method is reliable would be familiar). But 
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it is simply not the case that religious disputes are the result of someone having “gone 
wrong somewhere”. Religious disagreement is not the exception, but the norm.  
It seems to me that Feldman’s argument rests on an unstated assumption that is 
commonplace in much of the literature on disagreement: that all parties are in some 
sense “doing the same thing”, that everyone is using the same sets of public methods 
whose disorderly performance might be eventually explained to the satisfaction of all 
parties. Yet it is clear that religious folk are not doing the same thing as secular folk. 
Far from it; they are using methods that have an established track record of 
generating disagreement between independent investigators. To illustrate the point, 
it is remarkable that early in the Feldman’s article, he writes: 
The students in my class disagreed with one another about significant religious 
matters. Some—the atheists like me—believed that there is no God. The majority 
believed that God does exist. Among the theists there were notable differences 
about the nature of God and about God’s relation to the world. The details of those 
differences will not matter for the discussion that follows. (Feldman 2011, 141) 
If I may paraphrase the above quote, I would like to emphasise just how absurd 
Feldman’s omission seems to me: 
The students in my class disagreed with one another about significant religious 
matters. Some—the people not using religious methods, like me—agreed that 
there is no God. The people using religious methods believed that a god does exist. 
However, among the people using religious methods there were notable 
differences about the nature and number of gods, their capabilities, their 
corporeality and their causal relationship with the world. But the details of those 
differences will not matter for the discussion that follows. 
How could those details not matter for the discussion that follows? It is an incredible 
omission. Such massive discrepancies in the outputs of religious methods are 
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evidence of the utmost importance for the discussion that follows, for they are prima 
facie evidence of the unreliability of religious methods.  
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6. Religious Parallelism 
And I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the name of God 
Almighty, but by my name JEHOVAH was I not known to them. — Exodus 6:3 
6.1 Introduction 
Although the problem of religious diversity receives a lot of attention, the opposite 
problem of religious parallelism is relatively neglected. As we have seen, it is 
highlighted by defenders of perennialism, but it is largely neglected by philosophers 
of religion. The neglect this problem has received is quite surprising. Worldwide, 
there are notable parallel myths and common metaphysical commitments shared by 
distant and isolated religious communities. These similarities would appear, on first 
glance, to be strong evidence in support of religious epistemic methods. For if it is 
the case that there is some surprising independent agreement among the world’s 
religions, then the argument from religious diversity loses much of its force. It would 
appear not to be the case that religious methods generate widespread disagreement. 
Similarities between different and isolated religions, then, would be strong prima 
facie evidence speaking in favour of the reliability of religious epistemic methods. 
The puzzle of religious parallelism has only gained serious attention since the rise 
of comparative mythology as a distinct discipline in the mid-nineteenth century 
(Tylor 1929a, 275). It was then that the new field of anthropology placed man at the 
centre of scientific investigation. No longer was man looking only outwards on an 
external world that was both lawful and alien, but his attention was now shifted to 
his own nature, with its own quantities of lawfulness and strangeness. Religion, that 
uniquely human phenomenon, soon attracted the attention of the new science. 
Ground-breaking work by Durkheim, Tylor and Frazer sought to explain the 
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consistent and recurring patterns of religious thought. The extent and nature of 
religious diversity, which had unsettled men of earlier eras, was reappraised. 
Educated men and women grappled with the new and arguably more puzzling 
problem of religious parallelism. For some, religious parallelism provided a renewed 
sense of confidence in the supernatural: God had endowed all his created beings with 
some innate knowledge of his being and of his doctrines. For others, religious 
parallelism was further evidence of the human mind’s enslavement to natural forces. 
Religion was a natural result of our evolutionary histories. God had no dominion over 
the human mind, but instead, our neuroses, our material culture, or the inherited 
structures of human thought were our ultimate rulers. This Victorian pessimism is 
captured perfectly by Oscar Wilde: ‘The principle of Heredity,’ he wrote, is ‘the only 
one of the Gods whose real name we know.’ 
As well as the strides made in the nineteenth century, important contributions to 
the problem of religious parallelism have more recently been made in the burgeoning 
field of the cognitive science of religion. Notably, the theories of Pascal Boyer, Stewart 
Guthrie and Justin Barrett can account for the human disposition to consistently 
posit supernatural agency. While these approaches are major advances on the work 
of the Victorian anthropologists, I do not find these explanations on their own 
sufficient to account for religious parallelism. In the course of this chapter, I draw on 
theories from within the field of comparative mythology alongside the cognitive 
science of religion in an attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the causes of 
religious parallelism.  
What sorts of explanations are available that account for religious parallelism? 
How can we account for the puzzling and surprising overlap in contents? In very 
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many cases the similarities are easily explained by appeal to nothing more than a 
shared cultural history. One is able to give a diffusionist explanation: one can point 
to a common cultural source. Stories of a heroic demigod, Maui, stretch from the 
Western Pacific Ocean far into the East. Of course, this is no surprise. Polynesian 
navigators carried the story with them, just as they carried their linguistic and 
material culture. 
While diffusion can account for much of the observed parallelism, it cannot 
account for all of it. In many other cases, diffusion is extremely unlikely, with the 
religious cultures in question having been isolated from each other for tens of 
thousands of years, and so the similarities must be explained by some other means. 
These are the sorts of religious similarities that ‘history cannot unriddle’ (Brinton 
1876, 161). They are the similarities that concern this chapter. Given that the rates of 
recurrence of certain religious and mythological ideas are clearly above chance, we 
cannot assume that so many similarities in the contents of religious belief are merely 
coincidences either. It seems that either (a) the similarities are the result of 
independent thinkers applying public or reliable religious methods, or (b) the 
similarities are the result of independent thinkers applying other natural methods. 
In this chapter, I argue that the similarities are sufficiently accounted for on the latter 
hypothesis.  
6.2 Boyer’s Theory of Religion 
In attempting to provide a rigorous definition of ‘religion’, anthropologists have 
surveyed the world’s religions noting the most stable ideas found across different 
cultures. Although it is difficult to find any truly universal religious ideas, there are 
nevertheless commonalities that cross a wide range of vastly separate communities. 
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Tylor notes belief in ‘spiritual beings’ as a defining characteristic of religion (1929a, 
287). In a similar vein, Boyer points to ‘intentional agency that one does not 
physically encounter’ (2003, 120), and Scott Atran writes: ‘Supernatural agency is 
the most culturally recurrent … concept in religion’ (2002, 57). Related to these ideas 
of hidden or disembodied agency we find the idea of the personification of natural 
objects and artefacts, such as personified mountains, planets or statues. Durkheim 
famously argued that it is not hidden agency, but the twin concepts of the sacred and 
the profane that define religious thought. However, since the religious notions of 
sacredness and profanity are almost always applied according to some system of 
thought that draws on the authority of some supernatural beings, the sacred and the 
profane, in religious contexts, are more often consequences of the near universal 
belief in supernatural agency. 
The belief in supernatural agency is common enough and found across such a 
wide range of religions that we have reason to take seriously the claim that there is 
some overlap here that is not explained by diffusion or chance. The religious cultures 
in question are isolated from each other not only by thousands of kilometres but, in 
some cases, have been isolated from each other for tens of thousands of years.  
If we were to express the belief upon which religions almost universally agree in 
the form of a single proposition, it would consist in a rather vague existential 
statement of the form ‘some spirit-like things exist’. Note the exceeding generality of 
the preceding proposition. The closest we get to a truly universal religious belief, 
then, seems to concern the existence of a certain class of objects, described as causally 
efficacious disembodied minds or minds embodied in surprising places. The 
agreement is very coarse grained and the common overlap constitutes a proposition 
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that is descriptively impoverished. Moreover, there remains broad disagreement 
over what the spirits are like, what they do, where they live, how they feel about extra-
marital sex, when they interfere with the natural world, how they effect their will, 
whether they feel pain etc. As Boyer emphasises: ‘there do not seem to be any 
substantive universals in religious ideas, beyond the very vague notion of 
“supernatural” entities and agency’ (1994, 9). This is an important point. For while 
the world’s religions appear to agree on the existence of some things that we might 
call spirits, this very general agreement does not translate to a coherent picture about 
the nature of these spirits. For example, two religions from distant cultures may both 
attest to the existence of living mountains, yet will disagree over which mountain is 
living. If spirits themselves were doing the causal work in the formation of the 
common belief that spirits exist, then we should expect more surprising 
intersubjective agreement among investigators or religious specialists when they are 
asked particular questions about spirits.  
There are two promising accounts in the cognitive science of religion that I would 
like to discuss, which are jointly able to explain the pervasiveness of (and propensity 
for) belief in spirit-like entities. These explanations are superior to any explanation 
that appeals to reliable religious methods, since such explanations are able to account 
for both (1) the widespread agreement in the existence of spirit-like things and (2) 
the widespread disagreement in the actions or behaviours of those spirit-like things. 
The first explanation is Pascal Boyer’s broadly memetic approach which points to the 
minimal counterintuitiveness of religious ideas to explain their pervasiveness. The 
other is Justin Barrett’s theory of a Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device, or 
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HADD for short, which is a cognitive mechanism that routinely overpredicts 
intentional agency in the world. I begin, in this chapter, with the theory of Boyer. 
In The Naturalness of Religious Ideas, Boyer argues that the furniture of religious 
theories is counterintuitive enough to be interesting and memorable, and therefore 
easily transmissible from one generation to the next. Religious ideas violate some of 
our most basic intuitions about the way the world works, yet these counterintuitive 
ideas are nevertheless subject to certain cognitive constraints. It is this fine balance 
between counterintuitiveness and intuitive constraint that makes religious notions 
so easily transmitted from generation to generation. What is so special about this fine 
balance? Boyer argues that while the counterintuitiveness of religious ideas makes 
them particularly memorable and imagination-grabbing, the intuitive constraints by 
which such ideas are bound create a rich inferential framework. Religious ideas, then, 
are counterintuitive enough to command our attention, yet intuitive enough to be 
reasoned about in a systematic and explanatory way. This is all rather abstruse, but 
need not be. Some examples will help us to be clearer about what Boyer is getting at. 
With regards to the counterintuitiveness of religious entities, Boyer lists three 
typical ways in which that most common of religious entities, spirits, violate our 
intuitions: 
1. Spirits are typically either very strange physical objects, or they are non-
physical altogether.  
2. Spirits do not die, are not born, do not age etc. 
3. Spirits have unusual or heightened cognitive and communicative abilities. 
(1994, 117—8) 
So, in the first case, spirits violate our intuitions either that agents must be embodied, 
or that some objects cannot be agents. In the second case, spirits violate our intuition 
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that agents are living things that are biologically determined to mature, grow, age 
and die. And in the third case, spirits violate our intuition that there are natural limits 
to what may be known or communicated. These are violations of our deep intuitions 
about everyday objects. Intuition violation makes religious ideas memorable and 
easily transmissible from one generation to another. Counterintuitiveness thus plays 
an important part in accounting for the popularity of spirit beliefs in human beings. 
I can imagine that the reader may find Boyer’s account of counterintuitiveness 
difficult to swallow. An obvious objection is that religious people actually happen to 
accept claims like 1, 2 and 3. Therefore, it is quite obviously not the case that these 
claims violate their intuitions. The proof is in the pudding: these believers accept the 
claims as intuitively plausible. They wouldn’t believe them if they didn’t find them 
intuitively plausible. What Boyer must be getting at is that religious ideas are 
counterintuitive if you are an outsider.  He must mean something like ‘religious 
ideas are counterintuitive if you’re a non-believer, but of course, they’re intuitively 
plausible if you’re a believer.’ Right?  
Wrong. Boyer is clear that his notion of an ‘intuition’ does not describe the explicit 
commitments held by members of particular communities. For Boyer, intuitions 
about classes of objects are constrained by innate features of our cognitive make-ups. 
Specifically, there are domain specific ontological assumptions that humans grasp in 
an apparently innate way. These are fundamental ontological categories that make 
up a general framework of human thought. These can be seen as the seemingly 
spontaneous assumptions that shape our expectations about the behaviour of objects 
given their category membership, and these assumptions appear to develop in 
human beings from a very early age. Thus, for example, having learnt that some 
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individual is joint with the predicate ‘likes to eat meat’, we are likely to assume that 
such an individual can also be joint with the predicate ‘breathes’, but it would be 
counterintuitive if we were told that the predicate ‘is difficult to build’ could also be 
applied. Here we have an innate distinction between the ontological categories living 
creature and artifact. Once we learn that an object has some of the properties 
distinctive of one category, an intuitive classification scheme launches into action 
that warrants certain other predications, while forbidding others. Religious ideas 
violate our innate intuitions about category membership and predication. Of a ghost, 
we might predicate ‘watches over its relatives’, an activity usually associated with 
agency, while also predicating ‘travels through walls’, an activity associated with non-
agentive phenomena, such as sounds.  
So, religious ideas do violate basic intuitions, and they even violate the intuitions 
of religious believers themselves. Religious ideas are just plain weird to everyone. Yet 
it is this very weirdness, this counterintuitiveness, that makes the ideas so attractive 
to the human imagination. They are believed, to borrow a phrase from Tertullian, 
because they are absurd. Note that this is not to render the existence of the object 
believed an impossibility. Counterintuitiveness itself is no blight on the worthiness 
of a belief. A Venus flytrap is a counterintuitive object, yet this is no reason to reject 
any and all beliefs about Venus flytraps. All that Boyer’s theory says about 
counterintuitiveness is that counterintuitiveness is part of the explanation for the 
fidelity of transmission of religious ideas from one generation to the next.  
While absurdity may capture the imagination and make religious ideas good 
candidates for transmission, there are limits. Specifically, there are limits to the kind 
of absurdity that religious ideas typically embrace. Boyer gives an interesting 
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example of the negative effect that some of our cognitive constraints place on 
religious belief: ‘a religious system that includes more than a thousand different 
classes of supernatural beings, each class with its particular properties and 
associated rituals, would certainly overload human memory’ (1994, 17). So, a religion 
that postulated thousands of entities as diverse as ghosts, goblins, angels, gods, demi 
gods, sprites, demons, witches etc. would not get off the ground, since such a list 
would not make a promising object of transmission in the long term. It could always 
be the case that one lone religious enthusiast might develop such a list, but such a list 
would probably be a hopeless candidate for transmission to future generations. Boyer 
gives another example of a religion that would be absurd, but would probably fail to 
be transmitted: one which posited a god who is construed as ‘omnipotent but having 
no mind’ (1994, 121). Although this would be an absurd idea, which might be capable 
of attracting our attention momentarily, it would make a poor candidate for 
transmission in the long term, since a being that can do anything but has no reasons 
for doing any particular thing does not make for a very satisfying explanatory tool. 
Without an account of the psychology of the god in question, we could not make sense 
of the relationship between human affairs and the actions of the god (1994, 122). We 
could not give fruitful and interesting explanations for such diverse phenomena as 
floods, wars, a run of bad luck or an epidemic of a deadly virus. The success of 
religious ideas depends on the balance that they strike between the explanatory 
power of our intuitive ontologies and the attention-grabbing power of 
counterintuitive claims.  
Although I think Boyer’s account of religious ideas is attractive, it goes only part 
of the distance to account for the pervasiveness of spirit beliefs. His theory may 
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account for why these ideas are so readily transmissible, yet it does not entirely 
account for why the core element of religious agreement manifests as it does. Why 
spirits? Why agency? Surely there are other ideas that could strike just as fine a 
balance between our intuitive ontologies and absurdity that could be easily 
transmitted from one generation to the next. Here’s an idea. Why not posit invisible 
artefacts that have special causal powers? This idea seems to strike a particularly 
good balance between absurdity and explanatory power. Why do religions not so 
commonly contain this idea? Why is the persistent theme of religion the idea that 
some agents exist who don’t have the regular kind of body? What is it about the idea 
of hidden or mysterious agency that is so particularly attractive to human minds?  
Boyer’s theory may be able to explain the ease of transmission of religious beliefs 
about mysterious agency. However, his theory finds difficulty in accounting for the 
recurrent generation of similar religious ideas. Boyer’s theory, then, depends on the 
diffusionist assumption that the parallelism of different religions is the result of their 
transmissibility.  
If we were to accept a scenario according to which there existed a common 
prehistoric cultural source for all the world’s religions, then Boyer’s theory would be 
sufficient to explain the observed overlap in content. If all modern religions 
happened to share a common ancestor religion in the depths of human prehistory, 
and if this ancestor religion just happened to posit the minimally counterintuitive 
idea of a spirit-like thing, then we might rest content with Boyer’s theory. It would be 
reasonable to expect the minimally counterintuitive ideas of the common ancestor 
religion to feature in all extant religions. If the common ancestor hypothesis were 
true, then it would be nothing more than a historical accident that modern religions 
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share the minimally counterintuitive content that they do. Boyer could then account 
for the overlap in modern religions as the result of inheritance. I think it is clear, 
however, that such an account rests on a rather implausible pre-historical scenario. 
If we wish to account for the spirit motif common to the world’s religions as a 
recurrent rather than an inherited idea, then we require more than Boyer’s theory 
alone.  
6.3 Barrett’s Theory of Religion 
Justin Barrett’s theory of religion appears to be able to account for the spirit motif of 
religions as a recurrent idea rather than an inherited one. Barrett builds on the earlier 
theory of Stewart Guthrie (1993), who took religion to be caused by systematic 
anthropomorphism. Building on Guthrie’s foundations, Barrett posits a module in 
the brain responsible for the pervasiveness of the idea of hidden agency. He calls this 
module a Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD for short) (2004, 32). The 
gist of Barrett’s theory is that human beings are prone to overpredict agency in the 
world. This chronic overprediction of agency is evolutionarily adaptive, since the 
negative value of the occasional false positive is minor compared to the negative value 
of any false negatives. In other words, a person who overpredicts agency may be more 
likely to spot a lion where there isn’t one, but this is a small price to pay if he is also 
more likely to spot a lion where there is one. Failing to identify agency when it is 
present could result in missing an opportunity to capture dinner, or even worse, 
becoming someone else’s. Over-predictors of agency, despite their embarrassing 
skittishness, would have a clear evolutionary advantage over under-predictors. 
Barrett says that HADD is activated under certain conditions:  
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When HADD perceives an object violating the intuitive assumptions for the 
movement of ordinary physical objects (such as moving on non-inertial paths, 
changing direction, inexplicably, or launching itself from a standstill) and the 
object seems to be moving in a goal directed manner, HADD detects agency. 
(2004, 33) 
So, grass that spontaneously rustles or ponds that suddenly splash may activate 
HADD. Barrett adds to this list some other conditions in which HADD may be 
activated. HADD may be activated when some phenomenon is observed that 
apparently lacks any known natural cause, and which might be in the interests of 
some agent to carry out (2004, 34—5). When an unexpected storm sinks a vessel on 
its way to battle, HADD will activate, causing us to ask and then answer the question 
‘cui bono?’ Thus, there are three kinds of conditions that spark the activity of HADD:  
1. Any observation of objects that act with apparent volition.  
2. Any observation of a phenomenon that fails to be accounted for by the 
usual natural mechanisms.  
3. Any observation of an event that might be taken to be in the interests of 
some agent.  
Once HADD is activated and we ascribe an agent as the cause, our Theory of Mind 
(ToM) kicks into action, and the agent’s behaviour comes to be explained in the 
familiar belief-desire terms of our innate folk psychology. After HADD has been 
activated in cases such as these, the entities posited become a part of our working 
ontology. A splash or unexpected wake on the surface of the lake may cause us to 
posit an agent, or lake monster, or water sprite. And so, from the puzzling 
phenomena we develop a system of mythic entities with characteristic behaviours.  
Thus, while Boyer’s theory helps to account for the relative attractiveness and 
reliable transmissibility of religious ideas, Barrett’s theory sheds light on why the 
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ideas that are so often generated happen to concern mysterious or counterintuitive 
agency. So, with both theories in hand we are able to explain both (1) why religious 
belief so often concerns strange agents, and (2) why those agents are so commonly 
spectacular and counterintuitive.  
In addition, Barrett’s theory can explain why the agency ascribed as the cause of 
some phenomenon is so often mysterious. When some ambiguous or unfamiliar 
phenomenon is observed, an agent may be ascribed as the cause, yet being an 
unfamiliar phenomenon, the mind infers an unfamiliar or alien kind of agency. 
Naturally, our ancient ancestors were aware of the usual suspects that caused ripples 
in tall grass (lions, smilodons, baboons, snakes, etc.); less sure were they about the 
agents who might be causing tsunamis, disease epidemics and runs of bad luck. 
Ascribing a supernatural agent as the cause of such phenomena is the natural 
response for beings like us, equipped as we are with our HADDs and our Theories of 
Mind (ToMs).  
Barrett notes that the HADD+ToM account of religion predicts that those with 
more developed ToMs may find that religion affords a more fruitful inferential 
scheme than those with less developed ToMs (2004, 43). One might expect, then, 
that religious belief would be more prevalent in groups whose ToM is better 
developed generally, since the explanatory power of spirits is enhanced if more can 
be said about the probable emotional states, beliefs and desires of such beings.  
Barrett notes that there is evidence for just such a difference in the development 
of ToMs holding between men and women. It is for this reason that sufferers of 
disorders primarily affecting ToM, such as those with Asperger’s syndrome, have 
been characterised as exhibiting ‘extreme male brain’ traits. Women outperform men 
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on a range of so-called ‘mind-reading’ tests, and are better at decoding non-verbal 
communication at all age levels (for examples, see Baron-Cohen [2002]). As was 
noted in the previous chapter, women vastly outnumber men when it comes to the 
practice of spirit possession. Yet even with regards to more mainstream religious 
practices, Barrett notes that women tend to be more religiously involved and 
committed than men (2004, 42). Thus, the HADD+ToM theory, while not developed 
in order to explain this gender discrepancy, accounts for it quite elegantly. Moreover, 
there is evidence that those with developmentally abnormal ToMs, such as those with 
Asperger’s syndrome, are less inclined towards ascribing supernatural causes than 
the general population. Notably, when people with Asperger’s syndrome ascribe a 
supernatural cause to some phenomenon, they exhibit a tendency to describe this 
cause in relatively impersonal or deistic terms (Visuri 2012, 363). In one study, 
Asperger’s subjects were commonly found to describe spirits in the terms of modern 
physics, such as being composed of pure ‘energies’ and ‘electrical impulses’ (Visuri 
2012, 362). 
6.4 Approaches Within Comparative Mythology 
Boyer and Barrett can account for some of the agreement found between diverse 
religions, specifically with regards to their near universal metaphysical 
commitments. The theories of Boyer and Barrett are jointly able to explain why we 
find agreement in the existence of spirit-like things. But what about the agreement 
that we find between diverse religions with regards to the specific narrative contents 
of their cosmogonies, myths and folklore? Religious parallelism is not restricted to 
intersubjective agreement about the existence of spirit-like things. As noted earlier, 
we commonly find world eggs, flood myths, earth mothers, sky fathers, primordial 
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bodies of water from which the earth emerges, spirit as represented by breath, god 
as by wind, battles between man and dragon, reincarnation, heroic demigods etc. 
How are we to explain this kind of puzzling agreement? Often, this agreement has 
little to do with the existence of spirit-like things, and more to do with the mythical 
or historical relationship between the supernatural and natural realms.  
Certainly, much of the agreement can be explained as resulting from a common 
cultural source, and we may in such cases trace a probable history of diffusion, but 
what about those cases of convergence for which a common source is extremely 
unlikely? Without a common cultural source, what could possibly rein in and 
constrain the human imagination in such a way as to reliably generate the same sets 
of characters and scenarios again and again? Myth does not seem to be subject to any 
external constraints on its content. No authority prescribes which myths shall be 
passed down. Indeed, myths are a fantastical kind of imaginative expression, in 
which any event seems possible, so why is there such striking agreement between 
them? The comparative mythologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss, puts the problem like this:  
In the course of a myth anything is likely to happen. There is no logic, no 
continuity. Any characteristic can be applied to any subject; every conceivable 
relation can be met. With myth, everything becomes possible. But on the other 
hand, this apparent arbitrariness is belied by the astounding similarity between 
myths collected in widely different regions. Therefore the problem: if the content 
of a myth is contingent how are we going to explain that throughout the world 
myths do resemble one another so much? (1955, 429) 
Diffusionist explanations aside, existing solutions to the problem of mythological 
parallelism have tended to emphasise that human beings have universally shared 
cognitive makeups or universally shared primeval ideas that regulate or inform all 
our myth-making activity. The common motifs of isolated myths are determined by 
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features common to all human minds. Hence, I dub this position the ‘innatist theory 
of myth’. Its exponents include Lévi-Strauss, Sigmund Freud and his disciple, Carl 
Jung. In contrast to the innatist theory, I develop and endorse a natural analogy 
theory of myth, which points to similarities across natural environments, and 
analogical reasoning about those environments, as neglected factors in the 
convergence of mythologies across cultures. 
The structuralist theory of myth put forward by Claude Lévi-Strauss posits a 
common underlying structure of human thought that all myths share as a substrate. 
The particular elements of myths (heroes, ghosts, tricksters, etc.) are ultimately 
irrelevant to capturing the deeper meaning of the myth, since they act as mere 
placeholders. What is important is the relationship between the elements, as this 
relationship is identical cross-culturally. Myth is grounded in a pattern of thought 
according to which binary opposites find eventual mediation in some intermediary 
element. Thus, in answer to the question as to why Native American myths 
concerning trickster gods so often see the god taking the form of either a raven or a 
coyote, Lévi-Strauss points to the fact that these stories seek to mediate the binary 
opposites of life and death. In an attempt to find a likely mediator between the two, 
an empirical deduction is performed. This is an analogical induction that draws from 
regularly observed associations of relations in one’s environment (especially from the 
pool of available ethnozoological and ethnobotanical knowledge). Thus, since 
herbivores live peacefully without killing to survive, they come to be the animals most 
regularly associated with life. Their opposite, the predators, come to be regularly 
associated with death. The animal reconciling life and death, then, would be the 
scavenger or carrion-eater, who lives on the flesh of the dead, yet who does not 
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necessarily kill to survive e.g. the raven or the coyote (1955, 440). All human myth is 
arranged according to this pattern of mediation of opposites, and the study of myth 
is reduced to the search for this deeper structure hiding underneath any particular 
myth.  
As intriguing as his analysis might be, it is improbable that there is a universal 
mythological structure of the sort that Lévi-Strauss describes. The key innovation of 
his theory is the idea that myth is structured according to universal rules of human 
thought. However, myths simply could not be always so confined to such an 
internally imposed pattern, since myths are often born from external inspirations—
accidents of language for example. The nineteenth century ethnologist D.G. Brinton 
gives just such an example:  
There is a cave, near Chattanooga, which has the Cherokee name Nik-a-jak. This 
the white settlers have transformed into Nigger Jack, and are prepared with a 
narrative of some runaway slave to explain the cognomen. (1882, 22)  
Similarly, myths may be inspired by (while not being accurate descriptions of) true 
stories or historical episodes. If the narrative structure of the myth roughly maps the 
progress of the historical events, then it is unlikely that they will express Lévi-Strauss’ 
deep logic of myth. Myths may also be put forward as imagination-capturing 
explanations for why things are the way they are. They are not attempts to mediate 
opposites. They may be just so stories. All of these would be examples of myths 
lacking the logical structure of binary opposition and mediation that Lévi-Strauss 
says is essential to mythology.  
It is peculiar that Lévi-Strauss places such a low emphasis on the common 
elements of isolated mythologies. In contrast, the psychoanalyst Carl Jung argues 
that the common elements of isolated mythologies are due to the unconscious 
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expression of innate human ‘archetypes’, contained within the unconscious mind. 
Jung is best known as the rebellious pupil of Sigmund Freud. Freud’s own theory of 
religion is as fantastical as it is unlikely. The theory appeals to a deep and hidden 
memory of an ancient oedipal murder (Pals 2006, 79), and this troubling 
unconscious memory holds sway over all members of the human race. Since Jung’s 
theory is an advance on Freud’s wild speculation, I will omit the work of the master 
to focus on the pupil.  
Jung’s notion of archetype is central to his explanation of religious parallelism. 
However, he is painfully ambiguous in his definition of ‘archetype’. He says 
archetypes are ‘inexpressible’ (1960, 124), while at other times he says that 
archetypes are: ‘typical forms of behaviour which, once they become conscious, 
present themselves as ideas and images’ (1960, 137). Still elsewhere, Jung seems to 
present archetypes as unconscious ideas and categories that shape the typical mythic 
descriptions of human life, something akin to Platonic forms for mythic elements 
such as giants, dragons, evil stepmothers, heroic demigods etc. This latter 
interpretation seems closest to his general intention. However, given the fatal 
ambiguity in usage, it is probably best to avoid the term altogether.  
In his more concrete moments, Jung makes a comparison between animal and 
human instinct: birds instinctively build nests and flap their wings, human beings 
likewise raise their hands to the sun or ritually immerse their newborns in water 
(1960, 136—7). Yet human beings, unlike birds, also come to associate particular 
ideas with their own behaviours. The result is that human beings, acting instinctively 
and without understanding the meaning of their behaviour, attempt to explain why 
they behave as they do. Why do I prostrate myself before the sun? Why do I set up a 
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Christmas tree in December? The reason that the explanations are so similar across 
distant mythologies is that they are rooted in similar ritual behaviours, which appear 
to be expressions of reverence for the same objects and persons. The sun, pure water, 
tall trees, or human breath, for example, are objects that are instinctively treated with 
reverence. They have come to occupy a sacred status in mythic systems worldwide. 
Thus the common ritual behaviours give rise to the common ideas. The behaviours 
antedate the explanations.  
It is difficult to know how much weight to give to such an account. At least 
sometimes, conscious mythological ideas appear to antedate the resulting ritual 
behaviour. So, to explain similarities in mythologies as resulting from common ritual 
behaviours appears to be, at least sometimes, putting the cart before the horse. Jung’s 
own example of decorating the Christmas tree, for example, appears to be an example 
of a ritual activity whose mythic pagan origins has, for many Christians, become lost 
in the course of the cultural dislocation of pagan ideas. Certainly, one might be 
tempted to argue that the pagan tree worship from which the tradition was originally 
drawn was equally carried out in an unreflective way. But such accounts as this are 
in the same family as the Wittgensteinian account of religion outlined in the first 
chapter, and fall victim to the same objections.  
The accounts of Lévi-Strauss and Jung differ markedly, so what do these innatist 
accounts have in common? Both accept that the role of the environment in shaping 
myth is relatively minor. The human mind takes the primary causal role. Our 
cognitive makeups ensure that, no matter the environment, there will always be 
substantial similarity across isolated human mythologies. For Lévi-Strauss, 
mythological similarities are caused by a deep logic of human thought. For Jung, they 
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result from common unreflective or unconscious ideas. Both theories point to the 
causal priority of the mental. This priority claim is rejected on a natural analogy 
theory of myth. According to a natural analogy theory, structural similarities in 
external conditions play the causally prior role. 
A natural analogy theory retains part of Lévi-Strauss’ account of myth-making, 
specifically, his notion of empirical deduction or analogical reasoning, which can 
explain many of the similarities in isolated myths. The theory of natural analogy 
accepts as unproblematic the innatist claim that human beings are cognitively 
similar, yet the theory adds that many features of the environment are equally 
common to all human beings. These common environmental features do much of the 
legwork in explaining common and recurring mythological elements.  
Consider the pervasiveness of similar Earth mother and sky father myths. What 
common environmental features can be appealed to that explain this myth? Well, 
human beings share in common observations of a terrestrial and a celestial realm. It 
is common to observe liquid rain, that falls from the latter onto the former, which 
nourishes plants and makes fruitful the earth below. Without rain, the Earth is 
barren. There is an analogy that presents itself: liquid semen makes fruitful a womb. 
There is a structural relationship common to both cases, which is difficult for any 
intelligent person to overlook. It may be concluded, by analogy, that the mechanism 
of procreation observed in the one case applies in the other: that rain is a variety of 
semen. If rain is semen, and originates in the celestial realm, then the celestial realm 
is masculine. A myth (or hypothesis) emerges: a masculine presence in the sky 
inseminates the earth mother below, and therefore the fruits of the Earth have two 
supernatural parents. The analogy between the two cases can be traced to the 
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common structural relationship that holds between the two cases, and it is not 
mysterious that cognitively similar human beings placed in environments sharing 
many of the same structural features will be drawn to make similar analogies and so 
will produce similar myths. The probability that some given culture will produce a 
myth of sky father and Earth mother will be higher than the probability that it will 
produce a myth according to which the sky and the earth are associated with, 
respectively, a box and a spider. There is no easily imaginable structural relationship 
that holds between a box and a spider that maps that relationship between sky and 
Earth.  
Similar analogical reasoning can go some distance to explain the preponderance 
of egg or seed origin myths (generation of universes is analogous with generation of 
creatures), of myths that marry or identify women with a moon spirit (the rhythm of 
the female reproductive cycle maps the rhythm of the moon’s cycle), and of myths 
that recurrently associate the same animal spirits with the same behaviours and 
personalities (fearsome wolves, cheeky monkeys, cunning ravens etc.). 
Historical precursors to a natural analogy theory can be found in nineteenth 
century cultural anthropology in the United States and Britain. A good example is 
Tylor, who states: ‘Similar ideas… are found in different lands, but this similarity 
seems in large measure due to independent recurrence of thoughts so obvious’ 
(1929b, 73—74). Tylor also remarks that empirical observation informs myth by a 
process of ‘mere imaginative analogy’ (1929b, 48). Elsewhere, he states that 
mythology is informed by ‘that great doctrine of analogy, from which we have gained 
so much of our apprehension of the world around us’ (1929a, 297). And, perhaps 
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most clearly, he writes: ‘through all such endless varieties of mythic conception, there 
runs one main principle, the evident suggestion and analogy of nature’ (1929a, 298).  
While Tylor is emphatic that natural analogy is the most important method of the 
myth-maker, he gives relatively few examples of this analogical reasoning in action. 
For such examples, we must turn to the relatively under-appreciated American 
linguist and ethnologist, D. G. Brinton, who also takes analogy to be key to explaining 
parallel myths. Brinton agrees that the similarity of the world’s mythologies may be 
accounted for in part by the existence of common observations causing common 
analogical inferences. The similarities of the world’s myths are explained, he says, ‘by 
the identity of the laws of thought acting on similar impressions’ (1876, 161). Among 
other examples, Brinton accounts for the persistence of the religious significance of 
the number four as deriving from the four cardinal points. This explanation goes 
some distance, he argues, in accounting for the ‘four brothers’ or ‘four gods’ myths, 
found among a range of religious cultures in the Americas, the Near East and the 
Subcontinent. The four gods are often subservient to a primary god of light or fire, 
commonly associated or identified with the sun. Brinton further gives a detailed 
account of the way in which the daily motion of the sun maps the progress of the soul 
after death in Egyptian, Indian and Aztec religious belief (1876, 140—7).   
A natural analogy theory of myth predicts that cultures from radically different 
environments should produce radically different myths. While I cannot demonstrate 
this here, there is some evidence it is true. At least, I will give one example provided 
to us by Tylor. He observed that there is a relative scarcity of werewolf myths in 
Britain since the later middle ages, despite these myths having once been very 
popular and well distributed. In contrast, werewolf myths remained popular on the 
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European continent. ‘This has been,’ writes Tylor, ‘not so much for lack of 
superstition, as of wolves’ (1929a, 313). Indeed, the grey wolf has been extinct in 
England since the early 16th century (Matheson 1943, 15).   
6.5 Conclusion 
There is surprising agreement found among different religions, particularly with 
regards to their general metaphysics and mythological overlap. Naturalistic accounts 
of religious belief suffice to explain why there exists surprising religious agreement 
across a wide range of isolated cultures. The accounts of Boyer and Barrett happen 
to explain why religions agree on the existential claim that there are spirit-like things, 
while often finding disagreement about most predicative claims concerning spirits. 
Both Boyer’s and Barrett’s accounts of religion explain religious agreement in terms 
of cognitive faculties that have evolved for reasons that are fitness-enhancing yet not 
necessarily truth-tracking. It is therefore unsurprising that (1) belief in spirits is 
widespread, and that (2) beliefs about spirits often fail to converge independent of a 
common historical or cultural source. Yet Boyer’s and Barrett’s accounts do not on 
their own account for the widespread similarities found in the specific narrative 
contents of isolated mythologies. Boyer and Barrett can explain why the 
metaphysical commitments of religion often converge, but their accounts lack the 
machinery to explain why the characters and stories in so many isolated mythologies 
overlap. While many writers in comparative mythology have stressed either an 
innatist or diffusionist hypothesis for this overlap, I have instead presented a theory 
of natural analogy, which I believe is able to supplement the accounts of Boyer and 
Barrett in a way that better accommodates the existing data.  
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In short, religious parallelism is a problem that can be explained by appeal to 
natural cognitive mechanisms. Although I have not argued the point here, it can be 
easily seen that this parallelism cannot easily be explained by reliable religious 
epistemic methods. If there were such reliable religious methods, then we should 
expect not just agreement on the proposition that spirits exist, but agreement 
concerning where, when and how they operate. Moreover, the lack of convergence 
around some single mythological narrative is unlikely on the theory that such 
narratives are delivered by reliable religious methods, yet to be expected given a 
natural analogy theory of myth, according to which isolated cultures often inhabit 
different kinds of environments, and are wont to make conflicting analogical 
inferences.  
It is a striking fact that the often highly detailed, narrative agreement found in 
religious mythology is best explained by the exercise of a non-religious method, in 
this case analogy. When religions do agree, this is no work of magic or miracle; it is 





 7. Religion, Science and Epistemic Circularity 
By an attentive and repeated inspection, I found that my object was very well 
seen in red; better in orange and still better in yellow; full as well in green; but 
to less advantage in blue; indifferently well in indigo, and with more 
imperfection in violet. — William Herschel, Investigation of the Powers of the 
Prismatic Colours 
Or 
For now we see through a glass, darkly. — 1 Corinthians 13:12 
7.1 Introduction 
What work still needs to be done? To this point, we have arrived at the following three 
general conclusions about the relationship between religion and science:  
1. The knowledge claims of religion often conflict with science.  
2. Religions have distinctive ways of acquiring and justifying those claims 
that are unlike those used in science.  
3. Religious methods of investigation are excluded from science on the 
grounds that such methods are private. 
As they stand, these three facts do not indict religious methods as unreliable. Indeed, 
all that has been shown is that religious methods do not generate the same kind of 
intersubjective agreement that scientific methods regularly do. All that has been 
shown is that when religious folk make claims about the world, these claims are 
justified by methods that are private. To show that they are not simply private, but 
unreliable, some further argument is needed. Moreover, the above three conclusions 
tell us nothing about the reliability of scientific methods. All that has been shown is 
that scientific methods produce surprising intersubjective agreement. But it does not 
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follow that because scientific methods produce this kind of agreement, they are 
therefore reliable. To show that scientific methods are reliable, and that religious 
methods are not, some further argument is required. Is such an argument available? 
Some have argued that no such argument is available, on the grounds that it is 
impossible to independently establish the reliability of any epistemic method. 
William Alston, for example, has argued that it is impossible to establish the 
reliability of our most basic epistemic methods in any non-circular way. We are 
wedded to them, it seems, but unable to demonstrate their reliability without 
recourse to their use. The flipside of this argument is that it is impossible to show 
that any epistemic method is unreliable without appealing to other epistemic 
methods that have been accepted only on circular grounds. Alston’s argument, 
simply put, is that any justification of the reliability of an epistemic method will rely 
on premises that presuppose the reliability of that very method. Alston regards such 
circular justifications as inevitable for our most basic epistemic methods, yet he does 
not believe that this fact should lead us into scepticism. On the contrary, he argues 
that we are entitled to “sit tight” with the methods that we have competently 
mastered.  
I will argue against Alston that there exist non-circular justifications for the 
reliability of some epistemic methods. Before presenting that argument, I shall first 
outline Alston’s claim that, in attempting to demonstrate the reliability of our best 
methods of inquiry, we are all chasing our own tails.  
7.2 Epistemic Circularity 
Alston argues that epistemic circularity infects all of our most well-regarded 
epistemic methods. While Alston takes perception as his case study, he argues that it 
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is reasonable to think that his conclusion can be applied to other methods such as 
memory, deductive reasoning, intuition etc. As was made clear in §4.4, Alston’s 
defense of the reasonableness of using religious methods depended on his 
individuating distinct mystical practices with a very fine toothed comb. However, for 
the sake of this argument, says Alston, no such pedantic concern for individuation is 
necessary. The problem of circularity is a feature, not of this or that well-specified 
method, defined as such-and-such a process applied under such-and-such 
conditions, but rather of our fundamental epistemic methods understood in a very 
broad sense. As I will show later, this failure to individuate methods precisely is part 
of the problem with Alston’s argument for epistemic circularity. Once we individuate 
epistemic methods more precisely, the apparent circularity vanishes. 
Alston’s argument begins with the observation that most of us accept the 
following proposition to be both true and well justified: 
(A) Sense experience is a reliable source of perceptual beliefs. (1986, 4) 
So far so good. This seems about as unproblematic an assumption as they come, at 
least to a non-philosopher. It is worth noting that Alston takes ‘reliable’ to mean the 
tendency of the belief forming mechanism to yield true beliefs in normal 
circumstances of use, rather than the track-record of the belief-forming mechanism 
in generating true beliefs. I accept that definition in the rest of this chapter.  
We all unreflectively accept a principle like (A). Indeed, the philosopher who 
doubts that his senses are reliable ‘will be the first to join in the laugh against himself,’ 
as Hume put it, ‘all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other 
tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason 
and believe’ (1966, XII, ii). Whether or not human nature dictates that we are hard-
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wired to blindly accept the reliability of sense experience, we may still ask what 
reason any of us have for supposing a principle like (A) to be true. Perhaps we have 
no choice about believing (A), but this is irrelevant to whether there are any reasons 
for believing (A) 
Alston argues that our best reason to believe (A) is an argument from the track-
record of sense experience. We can point directly to a history of true beliefs generated 
by sense experience. He adds that there may be other indirect ways to justify (A). For 
example, there may be theoretical arguments, such as theological or evolutionary 
arguments to the effect that we have been so formed as to have reliable perceptual 
faculties. Still, says Alston, it seems that the simplest way to justify belief in (A) is to 
make a list of all the times that sense experience has produced true beliefs in the past. 
If the list is very long, then this would then be good evidence that sense experience is 
reliable. 
Alston proceeds to an example. Let us assume that you have seen what appears to 
you to be a goldfinch out the window, and so you come to believe that there is a 
goldfinch out the window. In fact, it is also true that there is a goldfinch out the 
window. How do we establish that, in this case, sense experience has produced in you 
a true belief? Alston suggests the following procedure, and goes on to explain why it 
is ultimately circular: 
The most obvious way is to take a look myself and see if there really is a goldfinch 
there. But then I am relying on the reliability of sense perception to amass my 
evidence. In supposing that I have ascertained in each case that the perceptual 
belief under examination in each case is correct, I have assumed that my sense 
experience is yielding true beliefs. Thus I am assuming (A) in adducing evidence 
for it, and so it would appear that my argument is circular. Of course, I could 
determine the accuracy of your report without taking a look myself. For one thing, 
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I could get someone else to take a look; but that hardly changes the logic of the 
situation. More relevantly, I could have arranged to have a continuous 
photographic record of the scene outside the window. But even in this case I, or 
someone, must look at the photographs to determine what they show. Or if we 
have the photograph read by still another instrument, and the output of this 
instrument recorded by still another… , at some point someone must use his/her 
senses to determine the reading of some instrument. No matter how much 
sophisticated technology we employ, we must rely in someone’s sense perception 
at one or more points. Any track record argument that depends on ascertaining 
the truth value of particular perceptual beliefs will involve a reliance of sense 
perception to obtain some of its premises. (1986, 6) 
On first sight, that seems like a very convincing argument. I must use perception to 
establish the track-record of perception. So, any argument appealing to the excellent 
track-record of perception is a circular argument.  
If track-record arguments are circular, then what about Alston’s suggestion that 
we may establish that our methods are reliable indirectly, by appeal to theological or 
evolutionary theories, for example? Such an argument might go like this: Perception 
must be reliable because if it were systematically unreliable, natural selection would 
have weeded it out long ago. Would this justification also be circular? Alston argues 
that indirect justifications are also circular. For how would we go about establishing 
that these indirect justifications are true or probably true? It seems that, if we can 
confirm them at all, we can only do so by way of inductively surveying the available 
facts, or by way of testing the theory against experience, and in either case we are 
taking the reliability of our perception of the available facts or test results for granted. 
You cannot justify a theory that justifies perception without using perception. Thus, 
indirect justifications fare no better. 
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Let us return, then, to the track-record argument. The track-record argument, 
although circular in some sense, is not circular in the traditional sense of containing 
the conclusion within its premises. Formally stated, the argument would run as 
follows (1986, 9): 
1. At t₁, S₁ formed the perceptual belief that p₁, and p₁.  
2. At t₂, S₂ formed the perceptual belief that p₂, and p₂. 
  . . . . . . 
Therefore, sense experience is a reliable source of belief. 
As can be seen, the conclusion is not strictly speaking contained in the premises. 
However, the argument is circular at one step removed. For even if the track-record 
argument shows that sense experience produces true beliefs 97% of the time, we only 
accept the second conjunct of each premise on the grounds that it has been delivered 
by sense experience, which is reliable 97% of the time.  
Alston predicts that circular justifications are the only ones likely to be available 
for a class of epistemic methods that Alston dubs ‘basic’. These include such methods 
as ‘memory, introspection and inductive and deductive reasoning’ (1986, 8). For such 
methods, there does not exist any justification for their reliability that does not make 
use of premises drawn from that method. The idea is that if we were to be confronted 
by the sceptic, who doubts that sense experience or memory or introspection is a 
reliable source of belief, then any appeal to the track-record of such basic methods 
will not successfully convince her. When she asks us for a good reason as to why we 
should accept any of the premises as true, our only resort is to beg the question, to 
tell her that each premise was delivered by the basic method and that the basic 
method is reliable. We have judged, using the basic method, that the basic method is 
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reliable, and back aboard the endless merry-go-round we go. The sceptic, of course, 
will hardly take this to be a good reason to buy a ticket to ride, and neither do I.  
Does epistemic circularity undermine our ability to justifiably believe the 
deliverances of our basic epistemic methods? I think that depends on how certain we 
are that the circular justification is the only available justification. How exhaustive 
has our search for justifications of the method been? At the very least it is clear that 
non-circular justifications are preferable to circular ones, since any method, whether 
reliable or unreliable, can be given a circular justification. Producing a circular 
justification, therefore, does not provide us with any further security in using the 
method.  
Alston argues that although we have only circular justifications available for our 
basic epistemic methods, we need not lose us any confidence in using those methods. 
Where perceptual experience is concerned, says Alston, we are reasonable to accept 
the following principle of perceptual justification (PJ):  
PJ: If one believes that p on the basis of its sensorily appearing to one that p, 
and one has no overriding reasons to the contrary, one is justified in 
believing that p. (1986, 12) 
Similar PJs could be provided for other basic sources of belief mutatis mutandis. 
These principles would warrant us in accepting the deliverances of basic methods 
even when we cannot show these deliverances to be reliable, so long as there exist no 
overriding reasons or defeaters. Our basic methods are innocent until proven guilty. 
I have little to say about Alston’s PJs, other than that they are unnecessary, since 
most of our most well-established epistemic methods have perfectly good non-
circular justifications. Perhaps there are some methods for which there are no other 
justifications available than circular ones. Perhaps these require something like 
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Alston’s PJs. But if it is the case that non-circular justifications are available, 
especially for methods as integral to our intellectual activity as perception, then we 
need not settle for overly permissive principles of justification of the sort that Alston 
is selling. 
7.3 The Justificatory Role of Agreement 
I would like to suggest that the kind of track-record argument that Alston presents 
seriously misconstrues the way in which we typically defend knowledge claims 
derived from perception, or indeed, from any sources whatsoever. Let us consider 
Alston’s example of the goldfinch once again. Imagine that you see a goldfinch out 
the kitchen window, and that I am sceptical of your claim that there is a goldfinch 
outside. What can I do? To be more specific, what can I do to bring more evidence to 
bear on the proposition that there is a goldfinch out the window? The first thing I 
would do, as Alston rightly suggests, is look out the window and check if the goldfinch 
is there for myself. After a quick inspection, I find that my eyes concur with yours. 
“Fancy that! There is a goldfinch there,” I would say. In most cases, that would be the 
end of it. The inspection greatly increases my confidence that your original assertion 
about the goldfinch was true. But why is my confidence so greatly increased? After 
all, as Alston says, this ‘hardly changes the logic of the situation.’ We are still relying 
on perception to justify perception. We have no independent reason to think there is 
a Goldfinch there. Right? Not quite. Let us think a little more clearly about ‘the logic 
of the situation’.  
You and I were in the kitchen. You applied your eyes in the usual way to answer 
the question ‘what’s out the window?’ You had a visual impression of a goldfinch. I 
then applied my eyes, not yours, to answer the question as to whether there was a 
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goldfinch outside. After a quick check, I also had a visual impression of a goldfinch. 
This intersubjective agreement between independent observers greatly raises the 
probability that there is a goldfinch outside. Why? Because two independent 
investigators have converged on the same answer to the same question using the 
same method. We are not, as Alston would have it, justifying perception by the lights 
of perception. That is a crude caricature of what is going on. Rather, we are justifying 
a particular deliverance of a perceptual faculty by appealing to intersubjective 
agreement. Thus, it is not brute perceptual experience that does the justifying work. 
Instead, the knowledge claim is justified by the independent convergence between 
investigators applying the same method. The best explanation for this convergence 
is the fact that they have a common cause: the goldfinch out the window. Once we 
bring in a second investigator to apply the same method, we are no longer justifying 
the proposition that there’s a goldfinch out the window by any appeal to “basic” 
perception, but by an appeal to a convergence of methods which would be 
extraordinary if it were not tracking the truth. 
Perhaps the reader is not satisfied that the agreement in the above case really is 
independent. After all, you told me that you could see a goldfinch. Once I learnt what 
you thought, my own judgment may very well have been affected. No matter. Let us 
bring in a third person. Let us ask her to look out the window and tell us what she 
sees on the branch, all the while withholding our own beliefs on the matter. Let us 
imagine that she also reports seeing a goldfinch. Our new agreement dramatically 
increases the probability that the original perception was reliable. Having clarified 
the nature of the justification of perception, it seems that if there is any track-record 
argument at all, it is closer to the following structure: 
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1. Under conditions c1, A had the visual perceptual impression that p₁, and 
so did B. 
2. Under conditions c2, A had the visual perceptual impression that p₂, and 
so did B. 
 . . . . 
Therefore, (probably) p₁ and p₂ …     
Therefore, under conditions c1, A and B had the visual perceptual impression 
that p₁ and p₁, and under conditions c2, A and B had the visual 
perceptual impression that p₂ and p₂ … 
Therefore, visual perception is reliable under conditions c1 and c2. 
Perception is not justified, as Alston thinks, by some argument that assumes that 
perception has produced true beliefs on several other occasions. That is patently 
circular. Instead, perception is taken to be reliable in certain conditions according to 
the degree of agreement generated by perception under the conditions specified. 
Giving a general specification of the conditions under which a method is reliable is a 
difficult task, but any specification is amenable to independent testing by the lights 
of other methods the reliability of which we have already established. Indeed, the 
task of testing the reliability of epistemic methods, such as vision, is quite rightly a 
part of cognitive science.  
The modified track-record argument concerns examples of intersubjective 
agreement; I will also discuss the role of intermodal agreement, or agreement 
between different methods, shortly. The fundamental point that I wish to stress, 
however, is that Alston’s argument gets things backwards. We cannot argue from the 
truth of some proposition to the reliability of the method which produced it. Indeed, 
if we already knew that the proposition were true, we wouldn’t require any method 
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to tell us. In practice, we discover that a certain method produces intersubjective 
agreement in several cases, and we argue from those cases of observed agreement to 
the reliability of the method. 
‘Gotcha!’ Says Alston. ‘You can only discover that perception produces 
intersubjective agreement by using perception! Your justification of perception is 
exactly as circular as I have claimed.’ At this point I may as well concede. Alston is 
right that you can’t perceive without perceiving. That is a trivial matter of fact. The 
trouble is that “perceiving” (in some unhelpfully broad sense) is not what was being 
appraised for its reliability. In Alston’s argument, our visual perception was all that 
we wanted to judge. You saw a goldfinch out the window. Then I looked, and I too 
saw a goldfinch out there. And if we then wish to know whether our visual perception 
produced intersubjective agreement, we are quite capable of closing our eyes or 
wearing blindfolds and describing to each other what we saw. Then I will hear 
whether you agree with me, and you will hear whether I agree with you. If we do 
agree, then the fact that my eyes are reliable has been justified, not by my eyes, but 
by my ears! It is easy to claim that a justification for some method is circular if one is 
as careless at individuating methods as to class eyes and ears as the very same thing. 
Let us assume that we have observed (using our ears) intersubjective agreement 
with regards to the deliverances of our eyes. This is a strong argument for the 
reliability of visual perception. But what makes it a good argument? What kind of 
argument is it? And how does it show that the deliverances of perception under 
suitable conditions are probably true? The argument, as presented above, is an 
inductive one, and lends the same kind of inductive support to its conclusion as 
Alston’s original track-record argument was intended to give to his conclusion. 
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Whereas Alston’s argument proceeds from the preponderance of true outputs of a 
method to the reliability of the method, I argue from the agreement generated by a 
method to the reliability of the method. In neither case is the conclusion deductively 
entailed by the premises. Alston’s argument is only supposed to give some kind of 
inductive support to its conclusion, yet it is possible that some method that has 
produced many true outputs is nevertheless actually unreliable. Consider a magic 
eight ball, which consistently gives the right answer when questioned. This previous 
success has been purely accidental, the run of true answers having been only a matter 
of chance. However, the magic eight ball does not have any tendency to produce true 
answers, and so it is not reliable. Examples such as these show that it could always 
be the case that the track-record of a method leads us to accept a false conclusion. Of 
course, it is very unlikely that we would encounter such a situation over a long enough 
run of trials, yet nevertheless it is possible.  
A similar shortcoming applies to my own argument. It is always possible that 
some method generates widespread intersubjective agreement, yet not be reliable. 
How likely is such a situation to come about? I am not sure. But any answer to such 
a question must appeal to the results of other methods whose reliability has been 
independently established. We could only establish the unreliability of a method 
which has hitherto produced intersubjective agreement by appeal to other methods 
which we have independent reason to think are reliable. This kind of independent 
agreement between a variety of different methods is what I term ‘intermodal 
agreement’. Intersubjective agreement is a mere marker of reliability. Intermodal 
agreement is the hallmark.   
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The crucial difference between Alston’s argument and my own argument is that 
Alston’s argument is circular and mine is not. If we want to check whether some 
method is reliable, this need not require that we use the very method under scrutiny. 
Since we can establish the reliability of some method without appeal to the method 
in question, the circularity is avoided. The reliability of our epistemic methods can 
be established by independent means, and in science, this is a matter of daily routine. 
More often, this reliability is determined by comparing the agreement found, not just 
between different people, but between various different methods, all of which are 
susceptible to independent justification. I will have more to say about this kind of 
cross-checking in the section below.  
To conclude, I have shown that Alston’s circularity thesis is the result of two 
mistakes: one, a misconstrual of the premises of the track-record argument in such 
a way as to beg the question, and two, a failure to individuate epistemic methods in 
an appropriately fine-grained way. Once these shortcomings are corrected, the 
circularity fails to rear its head. The upshot is that we can have independent evidence 
for the reliability of our most well-established epistemic methods.  
The trust that we place in our eyes is not founded on the assertion that eyes 
routinely tell the truth. Indeed, we all know that eyes routinely deceive. How do we 
judge when our eyes are deceiving us and when they are telling the truth? We judge 
by applying a range of distinct methods. We cross-check. Indeed, Alston’s argument 
leaves me wondering whether he believes that sticks truly bend when stuck in water, 
or whether the world disappears whenever the lights go out.  
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7.4 Intermodal Agreement 
So far, I have argued that intersubjective agreement is a clue that whatever we are 
agreeing about is probably true. Of course, it is very far from a guarantee. Agreement 
between two people is, on its own, pretty weak evidence. This is a fact learnt by 
experience. You and I agree that we feel lucky when we head out fishing in the 
morning. This does not raise the probability that we will catch any fish. However, if 
a method produces persistent independent intersubjective agreement in well-
specified conditions, given some domain of investigation, this is stronger evidence 
that the method producing the agreement is reliable. Again, this is stronger evidence, 
but hardly infallible. It could be the case that you and I both feel lucky about catching 
fish, but always and only on Tuesday mornings and only when there is no rain. It is 
reasonable to expect that some very unreliable methods will produce intersubjective 
agreement intermittently or even chronically. Moreover, reliable methods will fail to 
generate intersubjective agreement if they are dysfunctional or impaired. 
Intersubjective agreement is not, and cannot be, the whole story with respect to the 
justification of epistemic methods. 
Let us consider Alston’s goldfinch example again. This time, let’s say you look out 
the window and see what seems to you to be a goldfinch. You tell me that you see a 
goldfinch. I am sceptical since it’s the wrong time of year for goldfinches, and so I 
also take a look. But when I look out the window, I see no goldfinch; I see a possum. 
We agree that something’s there, but we disagree about what it is. How should we 
proceed? There is an immediate epistemic effect: we are no longer justified to 
continue to believe that what we see is the case. We are in a parallel situation to 
Richard Feldman’s ‘Dean in the Quad’ example. Someone has gone wrong 
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somewhere. Our disagreement is evidence that at least one of us is seeing things, but 
it is unclear which of us has the problem. We appear to be equally good at identifying 
animals in trees. We are epistemic peers. So who has gone wrong, and where? Of 
course, people who disagree about animals in trees don’t just sit there and do some 
philosophy, but tend to physically react. They squint their eyes. They move closer to 
the animal, quietly and without disturbing it, such that their observations of the 
creature are more discerning. They seek a better vantage point. 
What is a vantage point? And what makes one vantage point better than another? 
A vantage point is a place which affords a more reliable visual perception of some 
object. A good vantage point is one which, when observers use it, tends to generate 
more agreement about what is observed. As a general rule, a good vantage point for 
naked-eye viewing of a fist-sized animal in a tree would have to be concealed and 
reasonably elevated, within a distance of no more than about fifteen metres of the 
creature and without any obstructions in the visual field. For the purposes of viewing 
nesting birds, such as albatrosses and penguins, we have camouflaged hides which 
allow close proximity without disturbing the animals. How could we discover all this 
about vantage points if vision were justified only by the deliverances of vision? How 
could we sort reliable visual observations from unreliable ones? Should we not say, 
instead, that birds are blurry smudges when far away, but well-defined objects when 
close to an observer? If vision were justified only by appeals to vision, we would have 
no concept of a vantage point. The comedian Mitch Hedburg once quipped: ‘I think 
Bigfoot is blurry, that's the problem. It's not the photographer's fault.’ 
The fact that we know that some vantage points are better than others tells us two 
things about the reliability of vision. It tells us, firstly, that the reliability of vision is 
232 
 
not an all or nothing affair. Vision is reliable under certain conditions. It is unreliable 
under others. And secondly, the fact that we know what these favourable conditions 
are tells us that the bounds of the reliability of vision cannot be decided by appeal to 
vision, but must be decided by appeal to other methods. In total darkness, eyes are 
quite unreliable for predicting where obstacles will be, and we discover this only 
when we hit our shins on the coffee table. In contrast, under good lighting I can pick 
up a single poppy seed from the kitchen bench and roll it between my fingers. To 
determine the reliability of some method, we must consult other methods whose 
bounds of reliability have been independently established.  
‘Gotcha again!’ Cries Alston, ‘you cannot consult other methods to determine the 
reliability of vision without assuming that those other methods are reliable. Forced 
to provide a reason for thinking the other methods reliable, you can do no better than 
to point to the question-begging track-records of those other methods. This is all 
circular again.’ Yet it is unclear to me that this argument hits its target. There are two 
ways Alston sets up this objection, and neither argument is successful.  
The first rendition of the objection runs that any attempt to justify my sight by 
appeal to my hearing, for example, ultimately depends on hearing’s being justified 
by appeal to hearing. If that’s right, then all I have done is to move the problem back 
a step. I have swept the circularity under the rug for a fleeting moment, but it quickly 
reappears under examination. Alston gives the example of the visual perceptual belief 
that the object on the dinner table is a peach pie. Suppose, he says, that we are able 
to justify this visual perceptual belief by non-circular appeal to our modalities of taste 
and smell. Have we cleared the problem? Alston is doubtful. ‘Take taste,’ says Alston, 
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‘if its reliability is established by relying on taste, we are once more embroiled in 
epistemic circularity’ (2005, 206).  
I cannot tell whether Alston entertains this argument seriously, since it is patently 
false. Taste is as amenable to independent justification as any other perceptual 
faculty. Indeed, there is no reason to think that, so long as we push for further 
independent justifications that appeal to different methods, we will eventually 
"bottom out" at the single basic method (be it smell or testimony or whatever) which 
governs all others, and which may only be judged to be reliable by its own lights.  
Alston proceeds to present the argument slightly differently. Alston’s concern 
seems to be that even if we try to justify our methods in a piecemeal way, our chain 
of justifications will eventually circle around to the very method under examination: 
‘Narrowing the class of [perceptual beliefs] the reliability of whose formation we are 
concerned does not enable us to escape epistemic circularity in arguments designed 
to establish this, but only postpones the evil day’ (2005, 207). More specifically, he 
writes:  
Say the reliability of taste is established by reliance on vision and audition. We are 
still involved in epistemic circularity, but the circle is larger. Vision is validated by 
audition and touch, which are validated by smell and taste, which … are validated 
by vision and audition. (2005, 206) 
So, Alston concludes that when we attempt to defend the reliability of narrower sets 
of methods we will still encounter a circular justification, it will just take longer to 
rear its head. I am not convinced by Alston’s argument. For one thing, it is 
contradicted by the fact that people lacking certain sensory modalities (e.g. blind 
people) have perfectly convincing arguments for the claim that vision is a reliable 
epistemic method. Their justifications for the reliability of vision cannot make use of 
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the deliverances of the modality in question. They cannot see. Their justifications 
cannot be circular. 
Do the blind have good, non-circular justifications for the claim that vision is 
reliable? What sorts of reasons do they have for accepting such a claim? To begin 
with, blind people notice that those who claim to have the faculty of sight routinely 
agree on the finer details of their perceptual experience. Shapes, locations, colours 
and patterns are described consistently. Moreover, facts about the overrider system 
of vision command universal assent among the sighted community. Sighted people 
routinely claim the following underminers: the object moved too fast to see, it was 
too dark to identify the object, the object was too bright to look at directly, the object 
was too distant to make out etc. Additionally, blind people find the predictive abilities 
of those claiming to have the faculty of sight superior to their own. A sighted friend 
can, for instance, locate lost keys without needing to touch or hear them. Even a guide 
dog can predict that dangerous obstacles are approaching. If these rudimentary 
observations did not satisfy the skeptical blind person, she can even perform a test. 
She can, for example, privately write a short sentence on a word processor, print the 
document out from her computer and give a sighted person the printed page. The 
sighted person will read back text that exactly matches the sentence written on the 
computer. Yet so far as the blind person can tell, the printed text cannot be detected 
by touch or smell. Therefore, there must be information on the page that came out of 
the printer that the blind person cannot detect in the same way as the sighted person. 
Moreover, advanced technology such as Optical Character Recognition software can 
be used to establish the reliability of optical detection methods without having to rely 
on the testimony of anyone with the faculty of vision.  
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This blind investigator would have excellent non-circular evidence that vision is 
reliable. The evidence is drawn from the independent agreement generated between 
vision and a variety of other methods: the justification is delivered by intermodal 
agreement. Moreover, if we sighted folk wish to establish that vision is reliable in a 
non-circular fashion, then we are welcome to adopt a principle of methodological 
blindness, according to which any justification for the reliability of vision ought to 
bracket off or set aside the evidence proffered by vision itself.   
Therefore, circular arguments need not be our only recourse to justify perception, 
as independent evidence is available. Epistemic circularity is not as widespread as 
Alston claims. However, if his argument is set up another way, it may be a little more 
successful. If the argument is made that we cannot bring forward some further piece 
of evidence to independently show that all of our various methods are, as a 
comprehensive unit, reliable, then I would have to agree. Once we ask for a 
justification for the reliability of all our various methods, as a single unit, we will be 
forced to use some method from among that set to do the justifying work. But as far 
as I can tell, this fact is no blight on their individual reliability. We cannot possibly 
decide whether all our methods are reliable by collecting them together in a pile and 
demanding some further piece of evidence which can independently show the whole 
collection to be reliable. If we have an exhaustive list of all of our epistemic methods, 
then of course there will be no non-listed method to which we can appeal which 
shows the methods to be reliable. But this seems no serious problem to me. We 
already have evidence that shows that each of them is reliable.  
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7.5 From Agreement to Reliability 
Why suppose that independent agreement between different observers and different 
methods is a reliable indicator of truth at all? What does it matter that everyone 
agrees? So what if some collection of different methods always points at the same 
result? What is it about independent convergence that should lead us to infer the 
probable truth of the converged upon proposition? There is no logical connection 
between agreement and truth. Indeed, one might argue that drawing any connection 
between the two is fallacious, a kind of bandwagon argument or an argumentem ad 
populum. Yet there are very good, probabilistic reasons to think that intersubjective 
and intermodal agreement about some proposition radically increase the probability 
that the proposition is true.  
To begin with, it should be noted that publicity and reliability may sometimes 
come apart. To show how, I would like to begin with Alvin Goldman’s example of a 
method that is public yet unreliable. The method generates independent 
intersubjective agreement and yet does not track the truth. Goldman gives the 
details: ‘Suppose that a certain hallucinogenic drug produces vivid belief in any 
statement S if one takes the drug while asking oneself the question, "Is S true?" Then 
taking this drug qualifies as a public method’ (1997, 537). Goldman's example needs 
some tweaking, however, since the drug he describes may generate agreement 
concerning any S, and so would produce internally inconsistent belief outputs. It 
would, therefore, generate its own disagreement. Instead we ought to consider a drug 
that produces vivid belief in some particular set of internally consistent statements 
S. Taking this drug would qualify as a public method, since it would generate 
intersubjective agreement.  
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Clearly, since we know that the method does not track truth, we would not 
hesitate to call this method scientifically illicit. No scientist would publicly defend a 
ground-breaking new theory on the basis of having taken the “publicity drug”. So 
what's the moral of the story? Goldman takes the example of the publicity drug to 
show that publicity is not sufficient for a method to count as scientific. Some appeal 
to the reliability of the method is also required, he says. Reliability, not publicity, is 
the mark of the methods of science. But then, he ponders, perhaps publicity is not 
even necessary for a method to count as scientific. If reliability is the true mark of the 
scientific, then all this talk of the importance of the publicity of scientific methods is 
something of a post hoc ergo propter hoc. The publicity of scientific methods is only 
a by-product of their reliability. 
 Let us imagine that you and I take the publicity drug, and we soon find ourselves 
in agreement about some set of propositions; among them the belief that a pineapple 
is on the table, whenever an orange is placed on the table. Anyone taking the drug 
forms the same pineapple belief. The belief is apparently false and the method 
unreliable. But on what grounds should the belief be judged false, and the method 
therefore judged unreliable under such conditions?  
Of course, there would be reasonably straightforward ways to check whether the 
deliverances of the drug were getting things right. Separate investigators would 
presumably agree that there is an orange on the table by applying a variety of other 
perceptual tools (eyes, tongues, fingers etc.) and could in principle apply a variety of 
other techniques (ultrasound, photography, testimony etc.) all of which would 
converge on the result that there is an orange on the table, if there were in fact an 
orange on the table. The overwhelming body of corroborating evidence indicates that 
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an orange, not a pineapple, is on the table. Once these tests had been conducted, the 
publicity drug would be judged to be unreliable under those conditions. When we 
began our investigations, the drug generated intersubjective agreement, and this 
agreement was prima facie evidence for the claim that the drug was reliable. Yet the 
disagreement generated between the outputs of the publicity drug and the outputs 
of a variety of other methods is stronger evidence that the drug generates agreement 
in a proposition which is false.   
Let us imagine, on the other hand, that we take the publicity drug, and we soon 
find ourselves in agreement about some set of propositions, among them the belief 
that an orange is in on the table, whenever an orange is placed on the table, and 
importantly whenever this orange is observed in such as way as to exclude the 
possibility that the apparent reliability of the method has been caused by some other 
reliable method e.g. by vision or by the testimony of others. To this end, we might 
consider putting the orange in a sealed box on the table, or putting a blindfold, 
noseplugs and earplugs on the agent using the drug. If, under such controlled 
conditions, the agent reliably predicts that there is an orange on the table only when 
there is an orange on the table, then we would tentatively judge the publicity drug to 
be reliable under some conditions. Of course, we would have no explanation as to 
how this method is so reliable under these conditions. We would be astounded and 
puzzled, and we would investigate, at length and in astonishment, whether there was 
the possibility of trickery. But once any trickery was ruled out (by the application of 
a raft of critical tests appealing to a variety of independent methods) we would have 
to conjecture that something more is going on. Theories would be proposed to 
explain how this new faculty works. We would suggest several possible mechanisms, 
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and test these explanations (by the application of a raft of …). We would investigate 
whether there are any other conditions under which the method is reliable. Is the 
method’s success restricted to the identification of oranges? That would be a shame. 
Might we be able to ingest the drug when we need to answer other (slightly more 
pressing) questions? As our investigations progressed, and our theories changed, it 
would remain the case that the deliverances of the publicity drug agree with the 
deliverances of other methods under some specifiable conditions, in a way that is 
apparently independent of the use of any other methods. This agreement among the 
different methods that we use, must be either a miracle, a quirk of cosmic chance, or 
due to the fact that the methods individually give us epistemic access to the same 
objects.        
To return to the central question of this section, what makes it reasonable to think 
that a method is reliable when we can specify conditions under which it 
independently agrees with other methods? What argument can be made that draws 
a connection between agreement and reliability? Surprisingly, the best argument 
proceeds, not by assuming that our epistemic methods are generally reliable, but by 
assuming the very opposite. Let us put ourselves in the position of the sceptic: 
assume for a moment that each of our various epistemic methods, taken individually, 
has a high probability of giving the wrong answer to any particular question. Adopt, 
for a moment, a very pessimistic attitude to question of human knowledge. Assume 
that each of our epistemic methods is, as a matter of fact, very unreliable. Now ask: 
‘What is the probability that several very unreliable, but independent, methods 
would converge on the same answer to the same question?’ Of course, the answer to 
this question will depend on how many methods we have, how unreliable they are, 
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and how many possible answers there are to the question. Let’s consider a toy 
example.  
Let us assume that we have just three methods, A, B and C, all of which are 
believed to be as unreliable as each other. Each method is assumed to have a .o1 
chance of giving the right answer to some question q. Let us assume that there are 
exactly twelve possible answers to q. Perhaps we can let q be the question ‘which egg 
in the carton is rotten?’ Let us now imagine that methods A, B and C all indicate that 
the fifth egg on the right is the rotten one. This agreement is utterly improbable if the 
methods are causally independent and operate according to different causal 
principles. What is the epistemic probability that methods B and C would converge 
on the same answer as A by chance? Methods B and C are both taken to have a one 
in twelve chance of arriving at the same answer as A. Therefore, the probability that 
B and C would converge on the same answer as A is 1/12 x 1/12 or approximately 
.007. So, the probability that our methods have independently arrived at the same 
answer by pure chance is very low—lower than the initial probability (.01) that any 
single method might have got the right answer (and if one did, then they all did).   
This argument is a variety of Reichenbach’s common cause argument (1938, 118), 
more recently popularised by Wesley Salmon (1999). The basic idea is that the 
likelihood that multiple lines of evidence would converge on the same answer to the 
same question is low on the hypothesis that such an event is the result of chance, and 
high on the hypothesis that there exists a common cause for the agreement (which 
can in this case be reasonably inferred to be the fact that the fifth egg from the right 
is rotten). The third possible hypothesis, that the results of some of our methods 
cause the results of the others to agree, might have a likelihood equal to that of the 
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common cause hypothesis. However, this third hypothesis can be reasonably 
excluded on the grounds that epistemic methods have often been tested in isolation 
from each other, and no causal interference between methods has been identified. 
Elliot Sober makes the point by way of the following example.  
When I hold my ears and release them, my auditory impressions stop and start 
though I continue to have the same visual impressions. The visual (V) and 
auditory (A) impressions are probabilistically correlated, but manipulating the 
one does not change the probability of the other. (2011, 14)  
This does not necessarily entail that A does not cause V, but it is quite good evidence 
when no intervention on A appears to have any effect on the production of V.  
So, putting aside the hypothesis that some prior method causes the others to 
agree, we can make the following likelihood assessment of the two remaining 
hypotheses: The hypothesis that there is some common cause, a common object or 
objects of our disparate methods, and the hypothesis that the agreement is due to 
chance. 
1. P(e|Common Cause) > P(e|Chance) 
Note that the above is merely a likelihood assessment. From it, we cannot conclude 
anything about the probabilities of the competing hypotheses (Sober 2011, 9). If we 
want to know how e affects the probabilities of our competing hypotheses, we need 
to know the prior probabilities of Common Cause and Chance. For my own part, I 
see no (non-pragmatic) way to choose between the hypotheses. Assuming the 
(admittedly problematic) principle of indifference, we should split the difference and 
allocate equal prior probabilities to Common Cause and Chance. Having allocated 
equal probabilities, the evidence of independent agreement among different 
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epistemic methods supports the Common Cause hypothesis against the hypothesis 
of Chance. The Chance hypothesis is the claim that the agreement found between 
methods is nothing more than a coincidence of outputs. In such a universe, there may 
still be some reliable method(s), but there will not be any agreement between the 
outputs of any reliable methods. So, if the reader wishes to allocate a high prior 
probability to Chance, then if there happen to be any reliable methods in the universe 
of Chance, whether religious or natural, we would have no way to identify them as 
such. Note that depending on how we flesh out the likelihood assessment in 1., 
Common Cause could have a very low prior probability, and yet still be preferable to 
Chance after the discovery of e.  
7.6 The Specialisation of Scientific Observations 
One obvious rejoinder to arguments for the reliability of scientific methods is to say 
that science is not restricted to the application of relatively simple or "basic" methods 
like perception, or deduction. To use, say, Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) to 
amplify and study some piece of DNA, is a very different thing from using, say, one’s 
sense of touch to gauge the ripeness of an avocado, or one’s sense of smell to judge 
which egg is rotten. There is a relative lack of theory, a lack of explicit technical 
training, involved in the latter cases. I don’t need to know anything about olfactory 
organs to be able to sniff out a rotten egg. Yet in contrast, no person can just naively 
grab a pipette and, with no knowledge of PCR at all, amplify a piece of DNA. One has 
to learn how to use PCR, and this involves lengthy theoretical training by others who 
are already specialists. Part of the training consists in learning how to apply the 
method in such a way that its outputs tend to agree with outputs of other methods. 
Therefore, there is some sense in which scientific methods are not truly independent.  
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The case might then be made that some religious methods are very much like this. 
Certain religious methods require some kind of appropriate theoretical knowledge, 
and so are similar to the non-basic, highly technical methods of contemporary 
science. Indeed, many religious methods require years of specialist training before 
proficiency can be claimed. Moreover, divination or the interpretation of scripture, 
for example, can also be developed in such a way that the results of these methods 
agree with scientific methods. Thus, we find Hugh Ross, an astrophysicist and 
founder of the old Earth creationist organisation Reasons to Believe, arguing that 
when Genesis is interpreted correctly, it can be seen to stand in perfect agreement 
with the results of modern astronomy. However, to know what the Bible is really 
saying about astronomy, one needs to be trained in biblical hermeneutics, and this 
requires at least a passing knowledge of Hebrew and Greek, historical knowledge of 
the ancient world, literary genres, etc. To be proficient at applying religious methods, 
one also needs an understanding of modern science, since from such an 
understanding, one can spot recently discovered scientific facts in the Bible where 
they may otherwise have gone unnoticed. Ross himself finds biblical support for an 
expansionary universe in many passages from the book of Isaiah (Ross, 2000). Just 
as is the case with our other, sophisticated scientific methods, when biblical 
interpretation is carried on naively we are led into error, but this is no blight on 
biblical interpretation. Indeed, the case is no different from PCR. A layman can’t just 
grab a pipette and run PCR, and a layman can’t just grab the Bible and know how it 
interpret it. The Bible, just like PCR, only works, only generates agreement, if you 
know what you’re doing. 
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A problem with the above argument is that the kind of agreement generated by 
such a procedure is not arrived at independently. Of course Genesis can be 
interpreted in order to agree with the results of modern astronomy and geoscience 
after the fact, but if the agreement is manufactured like this, then it is obviously post 
hoc. This is not surprising agreement, and it is particularly difficult to generate 
surprising agreement by specifying a certain way of approaching biblical 
interpretation. There are at present no prescribed interpretive rules under which the 
supernatural testimony of God does generate surprising agreement. Hugh Ross’ 
reading of Isaiah as endorsing an expansionary universe is not a convincing example. 
This is an example of one method causing another to appear to be reliable. In this 
case, the agreement found between religion and science is caused by the results of 
science. When the results of science change, the biblical interpretation changes 
accordingly.   
Perhaps a more serious objection would run that some scientific methods are so 
unique in their detection capabilities that there can be no cross-checking for them. If 
some scientific methods are not amenable to cross-checking, they resemble religious 
methods, which have been argued to be autonomous, and subject to distinct methods 
of appraisal. It seems to be the case that some scientific methods detect phenomena 
that sit at the outer limits of our capability for detection. Thus, PCR, insofar as it 
amplifies microscopic bits of DNA, makes detectable a world that is otherwise 
undetectable to us by other means. How, then, are we to tell whether PCR is giving 
us accurate information about DNA, when the only means we have of “seeing” DNA 
is via PCR? If scientists rely on such uncorroborable methods, then there is ultimately 
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no difference between the methodology of the scientist and the methodology of the 
clergyman. 
Perhaps it is no surprise to the reader to discover that PCR is not the only means 
we have of getting information about DNA. Indeed, if a researcher is sceptical over 
whether the right bit of DNA has been amplified by PCR, she may visually check the 
resultant gel to examine the approximate size of the amplified output to check 
whether the size corresponds to the number of base pairs expected. If the size is as 
expected, corresponding as it would to a precise number of base pairs, then the result 
is already highly unlikely to have been an error. Even then, if this simple check did 
not satisfy the sceptical researcher, she could then sequence the sample by one (or 
several) independent DNA sequencing methods, to find out the exact order of the 
base pairs. If the order is as expected, then it is incredibly unlikely that the results of 
the PCR and the visual check are an error. But we need not stop there. If our sceptical 
researcher is still doubtful that the results of the sequencing might be erroneous, she 
can use restriction enzymes, which separate the DNA into smaller sequences, which 
can then also be inspected on a gel tray. Even when the objects of our investigation 
sit at the very limits of our methods of detection, we have a variety of ways to assess 
the results. 
Perhaps DNA amplification and sequencing is just a bad example. For although 
amplification and sequencing technology is in its infancy, having only been 
developed in the last forty years or so, it has nevertheless been a very busy infancy. 
The technological advances in this field can hardly be overstated, and a vast range of 
diverse sequencing methods is now available that rely on different chemical and 
physical processes. It is, therefore, simply not true to say that bits of DNA sit at the 
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outer limits of our detection capabilities. Perhaps, once upon a time, we had only a 
single method for detecting DNA, but that is certainly not the case today given the 
huge strides that have been made in the development of new detection technologies.  
What my critic requires, then, is an example of a scientific method which is widely 
taken to be reliable, despite not being cross-checkable with other methods. If such 
an autonomous method could be found, then it would lend weight to the argument 
that there exists some set of autonomous, but nevertheless reliable methods, among 
which we may have reason to count such religious methods as mystical experience, 
haruspicy or divine revelation.  
7.7 Autonomous Scientific Methods 
Let us consider the old, if overused, example of Galileo’s telescope. Galileo pointed a 
telescope at Jupiter, and over the course of one week in January 1610, he discovered 
that Jupiter had four satellites. Why was it that Galileo’s telescopic observations of 
the moons of Jupiter were taken to be reliable, when all other methods available at 
the time, and all competing theories, were silent on the existence of these moons, or 
flatly contradicted that any moons were there? After all, no-one else could see these 
alleged moons, and the telescope was the only detection tool that yielded the 
observation. In this case, it seems that scientists accepted a method that was totally 
illegitimate. Galileo’s contemporaries had only one method of collecting positive 
evidence for the existence of Jupiter's moons: looking through Galileo's telescope. If 
this single method could not be cross-checked, then we would seem to have a 
problem. Specifically, we would seem to have an autonomous method—a method 
that could not be cross-checked—the reliability of which would have to have been 
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affirmed in lieu of any intermodal agreement. Were Galileo's telescopic observations 
able to be cross-checked? If not, then why were his results taken so seriously?         
The answer to this last question is that, quite simply, they weren’t taken so 
seriously. When Galileo published Sidereus nuncius in 1610, many of his 
contemporaries were sceptical that Galileo's observations were reliable, since they 
were obtained by way of a mysterious “spyglass” which was regarded as error-prone 
with regards to celestial observations. Indeed, part of the reason for this scepticism 
was undoubtedly the fact that the deliverances of telescopic observation flatly 
contradicted the deliverances of other methods such as naked eye observation. 
Furthermore, the deliverances of telescopic observation were simply improbable 
given the prevailing background knowledge of the day. No other method indicated 
that Jupiter had moons, and the very idea that Jupiter did have moons was 
improbable on the theoretical backdrop of geocentrism. For these two reasons, the 
telescope was considered very likely to be giving misleading information, or as one 
of Galileo's contemporaries put it: ‘On Earth, it works miracles; in the heavens it 
deceives’ (Horky quoted in Van Helden 1994, 11). The earthly observations could be 
corroborated, while the heavenly ones could not be. While public access to the 
telescope remained minimal, and while the chances of any intermodal agreement 
were few, scepticism towards the observations of Galileo widely prevailed, and quite 
rightly. Galileo was apparently either deceived or a deceiver. 
This scepticism was almost entirely abandoned within a year or two of the 
publication of Sidereus nuncius, after the corroboration of Galileo's claims by 
independent observers. Kepler, for example, was enthused by Galileo's results and 
sought a telescope of better quality than his own by which to independently 
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corroborate Galileo’s observations. In August of 1610, Kepler was gifted one of 
Galileo’s telescopes by the Elector of Cologne, and on the first day of September he 
made observations of Jupiter’s moons in the presence of the younger astronomer, 
Benjamin Ursinus. Together, the pair attempted to show that the observations were 
reliable by abiding by the following procedure: ‘what one observed he secretly drew 
on the wall with chalk, without its being seen by the other. Afterwards, we passed 
together from one picture to the other to see if they agreed’ (Kepler quoted in Van 
Helden 1994, 12). This ingenious move by Kepler ensured that any intersubjective 
agreement generated between the two men was independent agreement. Indeed, 
Kepler and Ursinus found that they converged on the relative positions of three of 
Jupiter's moons, yet disagreed over a fourth. This surprising, all but miraculous, 
intersubjective agreement about the moons of Jupiter was one of the first 
scientifically scrupulous verifications of the reliability of the telescopic method. 
Kepler was concerned to demonstrate that the agreement between himself and others 
was not due to any suspicious interference, prior arrangement or trickery. To that 
end, Kepler went so far as to withhold all contact from Galileo until publishing his 
own observations, so that none could allege that Kepler was merely a Galilean stooge. 
In the spring of 1611, one year after his initial observations, Galileo's findings were 
given official verification by the mathematicians at the Collegio Romano, who had 
independently corroborated the observations of Galileo. The phenomena were shown 
to be intersubjectively observable, and access to better telescopes at the Collegio 
Romano ensured that the mathematicians' observations agreed with those of Galileo. 
This was the first step on a road leading from scepticism to belief. It was the first step, 
the first clue, that the observations were probably reliable.  
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Given the rapid pace of telescopic advance in the seventeenth century, it was in 
the 1630s, only twenty years or so after the initial observations, that Galileo's claims 
could be widely corroborated by telescopes that worked according to different 
physical principles. Astronomical telescopes, which make use of a convex rather than 
concave ocular lens, were first described by Kepler in 1611, and apparently first used 
by Christoph Scheiner in 1617, although without much fanfare (King 1955, 45). 
Astronomical telescopes became widespread around the middle part of the 
seventeenth century, and observations made with them corroborated the 
observations of Galileo, despite his using a concave ocular lens. Moreover, by using 
astronomical telescopes, new discoveries were made that were corroborated 
intersubjectively before coming to be intermodally tested in their turn. Certainly, 
there was still disagreement, but the route to resolve disputes about the evidence lay 
in the development of better observational tools that generated still more agreement. 
Huygens, for example, justified the superiority of his telescopic observations of 
Saturn’s rings, on the grounds that since his telescope had successfully observed 
Saturn’s moon Titan, while all others had failed to spot this satellite despite observing 
Saturn every day, it followed that, in Huygens’ own words: ‘the results of our 
observations concerning the shape of the planet are also to be considered true in each 
case when we and they saw different figures simultaneously’ (Huygens quoted in Van 
Helden 1994, 20).  
Huygens’ argument depends on a general principle of reliable observation: in 
cases of disagreement, the method with the better track-record of generating 
surprising agreement in a particular domain of inquiry is to be preferred. Once a 
general theory of the mechanism of some epistemic method has been developed (in 
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the course of repeated testing by other methods), the conditions under which the 
method will be reliable can be specified, and the method can be applied 
‘autonomously’, in the sense that its deliverances are presumed trustworthy in lieu 
of any corroboration whenever the stated conditions hold.  
The seventeenth century witnessed still further advances in technology that 
greatly expanded our astronomical observations. Although the Jesuit astronomer 
Nicolas Zucchi experimented with replacing the objective lens with a mirror in his 
telescope of 1616 (Schreiber 1904, 19), it was not until 1668 that Newton developed 
a functioning example of a telescope that worked on the principle of reflection rather 
than refraction. Reflecting, or ‘Newtonian’, telescopes corroborated all that Galileo 
had said, and, once again, generated new discoveries. Since reflecting telescopes 
work on quite different optical principles to refracting telescopes, this agreement 
between the outputs of reflecting and refracting telescopes is miraculous unless there 
exists a common cause for their agreement. These new telescopes corrected for the 
problem of chromatic aberration that their predecessors suffered from, and made 
more discerning observations of celestial bodies, in the sense of generating 
agreement on a greater number of more precise propositions. Newtonian telescopes 
were welcomed for yet other reasons too: they were far shorter than the best 
refracting telescopes, some of which had grown to inconvenient lengths of 10 metres 
or more. 
One might wonder how it was known that the chromatic aberration produced by 
refractive telescopes was indeed an aberration. Why assume the effect is an artifact, 
and not an accurate chromatic detail of the heavenly bodies? There are at least two 
reasons. First, the chromatic aberration varies in proportion to the size of the 
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telescope. This is a very good clue that the effect is an artifact of the telescope, unless 
we accept that the heavens change depending on which telescope we use.  Secondly, 
the chromatic aberration of Galileo’s early telescopic observations was so severe as 
to prohibit meaningful and distinct observations of any celestial bodies other than 
the moon. Only subsequent modifications to the telescope minimised the chromatic 
dispersal such that observations of other heavenly bodies were informative. This 
greatly enhanced the precision of the agreement between observations made with 
differently powered telescopes and between different observers.  
The fact that what was observed with a refracting telescope was corroborated by 
reflecting telescopes lowers the probability that the initial observations were an 
error. Indeed, it would be all but miraculous if both the refracting and reflecting 
telescopes produced such similar errors, since they work on entirely different 
physical principles. The scope of this intermodal agreement has only increased since 
the time of Galileo. Nowadays, the results of refracting and reflecting telescopes have 
been corroborated by radio telescopes and x-ray telescopes to name just two others.      
7.8 The Autonomy of Mathematics  
If perceptual methods are unlikely candidates for autonomous scientific methods, 
then perhaps we must turn our attention to a method whose security does not seem 
to depend on the promiscuity of the senses. Mathematics, for example, may make a 
better candidate for a properly autonomous method. Science makes extensive use of 
mathematics, and yet it seems that the results of mathematical enquiry cannot be 
tested against, or corroborated by, other methods. Mathematics is an oddity in the 
world of rational investigation. The objects with which mathematicians concern 
themselves cannot be touched or seen. The whole system of mathematical thought is, 
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to quote Reuben Hersh, ‘created by fanatics sitting at their desks or scribbling on 
their blackboards. These wild men go where they please, led only by some notion of 
“beauty”, “elegance”, or “depth”, which nobody can really explain’ (2006, 320). 
For these reasons, Penelope Maddy has argued that mathematics is autonomous 
in the way described. Indeed, she argues that the Quinean project of naturalizing 
philosophy demands that we accept mathematics as a field to be justified on its own 
terms. Mathematics is not proven or justified by appeal to some higher science. She 
writes:  
Where Quine holds that science is ‘not answerable to any supra‐ scientific 
tribunal, and not in need of any justification beyond observation and the 
hypothetico‐ deductive method’, the mathematical naturalist adds that 
Mathematics is not answerable to any extra‐ mathematical tribunal and not 
in need of any justification beyond proof and the axiomatic method. (1997, 
184)  
If Maddy’s stripe of mathematical naturalism is correct, then it might be argued that 
science makes use of a method, mathematics, for which no independent support can 
be summoned. And if mathematics, which is so integral to science, is autonomous, 
then this leaves the door open to other autonomous methods, such as religious 
epistemic methods, to make their own contributions to science.  
Before proceeding to discuss the notion of reliability in mathematics, let us briefly 
reflect on the historical origins and development of mathematics. Sophisticated 
systems of mathematics were formed at independent locations across the globe, 
interwoven into the very cultural fabric of the great civilizations of human history. 
The independent emergence of a range of mathematical systems is not only 
incredible, but also a convenient fact for us, given that intersubjective agreement is 
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evidentially relevant only if independent. Written systems of arithmetic and 
geometry developed independently, notably in the great civilizations of the 
Mediterranean and Near East, North Africa, China, India, and Central and South 
America. Strikingly, these isolated mathematical systems were often developed for 
the purposes of solving the same problems related to the rise of agricultural and 
urban life, among which the most universal problems were related to astronomy and 
the related problem of establishing the calendar. The growth of trade naturally 
necessitated better techniques in book-keeping. Furthermore, the construction of 
major public works required solutions to recurrent problems in the fields of 
surveying and engineering, which saw strides made especially in geometry. Thus, the 
development of mathematics at all these locations was undertaken in order to solve 
common practical problems within the very same domains of inquiry. Now, the fact 
that mathematics was the tool developed by all these communities to solve the same 
set of relatively specific problems is itself suggestive of the reliability of mathematics; 
suggestive, but hardly conclusive. 
Indeed, note that elsewhere in human history we also find independent 
investigators coming to agree that some method is reliable within some particular 
domain, even when the method in question is unreliable in that domain. For 
example, many societies independently adopted astrological methods, and 
specifically, took up the supposition that the position of the celestial bodies at one’s 
time of birth is a reliable guide to one’s future personality. The mere fact that 
independent parties agree to use the same particular method in the same particular 
domain is a very fallible indicator of the reliability of the method chosen.  
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What is more interesting with regards to the case of mathematics, however, is the 
independent, intersubjective agreement generated with regards to the (often 
obscure) solutions to the problems. The solutions are often difficult and 
impenetrable, yet they are unmistakeably identical in many cases across cultures. To 
take one notable example, ancient Chinese scholars independently arrived at 
Pythagoras’ Theorem, known in China as the Gougu Theorem. It was proved in the 
Chou Pei Suan Ching produced between 100 BC and 100 AD (Gustafson 2012, 207). 
This independent agreement about such an obscure mathematical fact is a 
remarkable result in the history of human thought. The common result suggests that 
the method is reliable. Moreover, there are interesting and enlightening differences 
between the Greek and Chinese justifications of the theorem. Most notably, while 
Pythagoras’ Theorem was proved in Euclid’s elements by a deductive argument, the 
theorem was given a visual proof in the Chou Pei Suan Ching. These are two different 
methods for demonstrating the truth of the theorem. 
Let us return to high school, for just a second, and remember what it is that the 
Pythagorean Theorem states: the square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle 
is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides. Reflect on the improbability 
of this proposition, if conceived of unreflectively. Imagine being told that this 
proposition is true without being exposed to the proof. There is no reason to suppose 
that it probably holds for all right-triangles. There is no reason to suppose that it 
holds for any right-triangle. Yet once one traces a line through the reasoning, 
witnesses the proof, and comes to understand the ultimate simplicity of the claim, 
the original feeling of improbability collapses to a near certainty. Compare 
Pythagoras’ Theorem (so remote as it is from our immediate, unreflective grasp) to 
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the claim of the mystic that everything is one. In the first case, the independent 
agreement we find between the Greeks and the Chinese is nearly miraculous. In the 
second case, the agreement we find between mystics of different traditions and eras 
is banal. It is an incredible fact that mathematicians, isolated by language, culture 
and numeric systems, independently arrived at the belief that the sum of the square 
of two sides of a right-angled triangle is equal to the square of the hypotenuse. Such 
a claim is so extraordinary, so improbable, that the independent discovery of the 
theorem in both Greece and China lends strong support to the claim that 
mathematics is reliable. In contrast, the claim that everything is one pales.  
One might argue against the value of this intersubjective agreement. After all, the 
Gougu/Pythagorean theorem of the Greeks and the Chinese is similar only because 
the preliminary assumptions were identical and the pattern of reasoning was 
common in both the Chinese and Greek cases. Therefore, it follows that the 
conclusion is bound to be identical in each case, but the fact that the conclusion is 
common to the Greeks and the Chinese hardly shows that the mathematics is 
reliable. To reach that conclusion, we had better be sure that the assumptions of 
mathematics, the axioms, are correct, and there is no reason to believe that they are. 
Moreover, the axioms of mathematics are almost as banal as the mystic’s claim of 
cosmic unity itself. 
It must be admitted that judgments regarding the truth of the assumptions, 
postulates and axioms of arithmetic and geometry have historically been shaped by 
intuition or by appeal to some similar sort of claim of “self-evidence”. Nevertheless, 
we have ways of cross-checking these methods. I will not provide a complete defence 
of the publicity of intuition, since this section is a defence of the publicity of 
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mathematics. Therefore, I will instead give an example from within the history of 
mathematics that indicates the extent to which our intuitive decisions about the truth 
of geometrical first principles is susceptible to the sort of cross-checking I have 
argued is integral to scientific practice. Specifically, I would like to consider the 
infamous example of Euclid’s fifth postulate.  
The postulate states that if some line segment falls across two straight lines in 
such a way that the interior angles on one side is less than two right angles, then the 
two straight lines, if projected on indefinitely, meet at some point on the same side 
on which the angles are less than the two right angles. When the lines are drawn in 
the mind’s eye, the conclusion that the lines will meet is intuitively very appealing, if 
not inescapable. The postulate captures, roundaboutly, the idea that parallel lines, 
projected indefinitely far, never meet. Nevertheless, there are geometries that do not 
accept this postulate, and these are collectively labelled ‘Non-Euclidean Geometry’. 
Now, there is an empirical matter of fact about whether the concrete space of our 
universe is Euclidean or Non-Euclidean. In this sense, we can speak of our 
observations of physical space being in a state of agreement or disagreement with 
either Euclidean or Non-Euclidean geometry, and so, in this respect, we are able to 
speak about these opposed geometries in terms of their relative intermodal support. 
So, any defence of the reliability of intuition in geometry must take geometry as a 
model of real space, and not as a description of abstract space. 
Now, as it happens, despite the intuitive obviousness of the proposition that the 
intersected lines will meet at some point, this evidence was taken to be inadequate 
for the purposes of establishing the axiom within geometry. Euclid himself indicates 
his own timidity, classing the principle among the postulates rather than the axioms. 
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The reason that the intuition is weak evidence is that the parallel postulate concerns 
lines drawn out indefinitely, and we have little reason to think that our intuitions are 
reliable with respect to indefinitely long lines. Who knows what happens if you carry 
two parallel lines out for an eternity? Our intuition is some evidence, but there is 
much room for reasonable doubt. In sharp contrast, Schopenhauer regarded the 
postulate to be 1. as certainly grasped as the principle of noncontradiction itself and 
2. as certainly true as all our synthetic a priori knowledge. What is interesting about 
Schopenhauer’s intuitions here is that they were wrong on both points: the postulate 
was considered far from obvious by many later mathematicians, and the postulate 
simply isn’t true of space in this universe. Indeed, by the eighteenth century, sceptical 
mathematicians such as Giovanni Saccheri and Johann Lambert sought to derive the 
fifth postulate as a consequence of the other four postulates, to no avail. In their 
attempts, and the attempts of others, to prove the parallel postulate, Non-Euclidean 
geometries were developed after repeated attempts to show that a reductio ad 
absurdum resulted from Non-Euclidean assumptions failed. The development of 
Non-Euclidean geometry can thus be seen as something of an accident, resulting 
from (1) the relative intuitive unobviousness of the postulate itself and (2) the 
repeated failure to demonstrate the fifth postulate as a deductive consequence of 
other, more certain, Euclidean assumptions.  
Now, it is a consequence of general relativity that space curves in the presence of 
massive objects. In curved space, the parallel postulate does not hold. The shortest 
distance between two points is not a Euclidean straight line, but a Riemannian 
geodesic. Therefore, Euclidean geometry is not accurate in this universe, in which 
space is Riemannian. So, by a somewhat surprising set of circumstances, Non-
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Euclidean geometry received intermodal support in the form of empirical 
confirmations of general relativity. Put another way, the anomalous perihelion shift 
of Mercury was not only good news for Einstein, but good news for Riemann too. 
What all this shows is that the relative intuitive unobviousness of the parallel 
postulate was well founded. 
7.9  The Failure of Religious Epistemic Methods 
Within most religious communities, there is no requirement that the epistemic 
methods used should generate independent intersubjective agreement, and nor is 
there any expectation that the results of some one method should be independently 
corroborated by means of other methods. Indeed, William Alston has argued that 
religious experience is (and must be) autonomous. He says: ‘Claims to have perceived 
God cannot be confirmed by the kinds of checks and tests that are available for claims 
to have perceived physical objects’ (1992, 70). Alston is aware that this places 
religious experience in a rather sticky situation. For if there are no checks or tests for 
religious experience, then how might we check whether any particular experience is 
veridical rather than illusory? Alston himself is open that this is a serious concern: 
Our conviction that sense perception puts us in effective cognitive contact with a 
surrounding world is intimately tied up with the fact that when we compare our 
perceptual beliefs with those of relevant others, they exhibit a massive 
commonality. And if we could have no such interpersonal confirmation how could 
we distinguish veridical perception from dreams and fancies? (1992, 72) 
Yet Alston’s solution is that since religious methods are not amenable to the same 
kinds of checks as scientific methods, we must take up a different standard of 
appraisal for religious claims. We must employ criteria of appraisal that are 
appropriate to the religious domain. We must recognize that religion is a distinct and 
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autonomous domain, with standards that differ significantly from those appropriate 
to sense perception (1992, 70). Specifically, for the example of Christian epistemic 
methods, we are to appraise their resulting outputs according to the following two 
criteria:  
a. Whether the content of the report is in consonance with the picture of the 
nature, purposes, and doings of God that has been built up in that 
community.  
b. Whether the subject exhibits over time a progress in becoming the kind of 
person that, according to the tradition of that community, God wants us to 
be (1992, 74).  
To broaden these criteria to cover a range of religions, I will modify a. and b. in the 
following way:  
a.* Whether the content of the report is in consonance with the picture of the 
nature, purposes, and doings of the relevant supernatural beings that has 
been built up in that community.  
b.* Whether the subject exhibits over time a progress in becoming the kind of 
person that, according to the tradition of that community, we ought to be.  
These are supposedly appropriate criteria for appraising religious methods. We 
ought to avoid applying to religious methods the very same criteria that we would 
apply to our perceptual methods since the domain of experience given to us by 
religious methods is apart from the domain of sense experience. Alston argues that 
to apply the standards of sense perception to the religious case is to indulge in a kind 
of chauvinism. Alas, I am both white and male, so I may as well be a chauvinist too.  
Alston’s two criteria for appraising religious methods are worthless. Neither is a 
criterion that we can apply independently of the use of the methods we are 
attempting to appraise, a fact that Alston readily admits. The first criterion, that the 
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report coheres with whatever the epistemic community at large supports, essentially 
prohibits the possibility of a surprising refutation of the claim that the method is 
reliable. If a method is incapable of contradicting the beliefs of the majority, but only 
supporting them, then I fail to see what use such a method can be for correcting 
errors in our thought, an essential desideratum of any epistemic method. The second 
criterion, that the religious practices should cause one to become the way the 
religious community prefers, is similarly circular since one draws one’s knowledge 
about ideal personhood, or saintliness, from the religious practices that are being 
judged. This was a problem, as the reader may remember, for Hick’s appeal to the 
fruits of religious methods, which suffered from the very same circularity.   
To illustrate the worthlessness of Alston’s criteria, consider the following 
hypothetical example: a group of Satanists take up some method in order to hasten 
their moral corruption. If the method is effective at achieving the Satanists’ goal, then 
it has passed Alston’s second criterion. If the method also leads the Satanists to 
accept the core tenets of Satanism, then it has passed Alston’s first criterion. Let us 
imagine that the method in question involves torturing virgins, before sacrificing 
them to Satan while reciting some terrifying and evil mantra. This would be a terrible 
method to use, and I have independent reason to think so (the method generates no 
intersubjective or intermodal agreement and is also harmful to virgins). Alston, on 
the other hand, is forced to say that the Satanic method has the same degree of self-
support as his own Christian Mysticism.  
Alston is left with the (frankly ineffective) argument that since this brand of 
Satanism is not a socially established religion, it fails to clear the first important 
hurdle. The example of the Satanists, Alston must say, is a contrived example, of little 
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relevance to the religious situation as we find it. Yet this is simply not true. Sure, the 
example of the Satanists is contrived, but the method described is not far-fetched. 
Atrocities such as human sacrifice and the torture or execution of apostates are not 
especially hard to find in the history of religious traditions which were once, or which 
still are, socially established. The belief that apostates ought to be put to death, for 
example, remains the majority opinion in some countries in the Islamic world. I 
would have to remind Alston that far from being typical, the Sunday morning 
Christian is an anomalous character in the history of socially established religious 
practice.  
We may now safely put arguments for the autonomy of religious methods to the 
side, and we may instead ask which religious method is most successful according to 
the standards that we routinely apply to other methods, such as perception. It seems 
that the best candidate for a reliable religious method is mysticism. As was noted in 
§2.3.3, what is noteworthy about mysticism is the agreement generated between 
independent practitioners. Yet as I have also noted elsewhere, this independent 
agreement is not especially compelling for two reasons. Firstly, the claims of the 
mystic have a high prior probability. For this reason, the convergence around the 
propositions in question is weaker evidence for mysticism than it might otherwise 
be. If the agreed upon propositions were not so obvious, we might have some cause 
for suspicion. As it happens, the agreement is not particularly puzzling, and it does 
not seem to demand that we posit some reliable method as the cause. More troubling 
for the mystic, however, is the fact that mystical experience is not independently 
corroborated by any other methods.  
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Of course, there are alleged cases of veridical mystical experiences, in which the 
deliverances of mysticism are apparently corroborated by other methods. Since 1967, 
the Division of Perceptual Studies at the University of Virginia School of Medicine 
has investigated mystical experiences, particularly near death experiences (NDEs). 
In the fifty years since its inception, the Division of Perceptual Studies has amassed 
thousands of reports of NDEs in an attempt to identify reports of extrasensory 
experiences that bear on the question as to whether near death experiences are 
reliable. The overwhelming majority of such reports do not generate intermodal 
agreement. However, a minority of the reports gathered are genuinely puzzling. 
There are cases in which patients, who were clinically dead at the time, have been 
apparently able to recall events witnessed from a perspective outside of their own 
bodies. Details are provided of the appearance of the operating theatre, the 
discussions had between hospital staff, objects in separate rooms, medical 
procedures performed etc. Subsequent investigations were then alleged to have 
supported the patient’s testimony.  
Cases such as these are prima facie evidence for the reliability of NDEs, yet there 
is no shortage of naturalistic hypotheses that might well explain these cases better. If 
the patient maintains some residual degree of consciousness throughout treatment, 
then we need not posit an entirely new cognitive faculty to explain the reliability of 
any information gathered during the NDE. Moreover, the majority of cases are 
anecdotal reports which are only formally recorded long after the NDE has taken 
place. For obvious reasons, NDEs are difficult to study in controlled conditions; 
difficult, but not impossible.   
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In 2014, initial results of the AWARE study (AWAreness during REsuscitation) 
were published. AWARE is the most comprehensive study to date to test the 
reliability of cognition during NDEs. To assess the accuracy of claims of visual 
awareness during NDEs, participating hospitals installed shelves in their emergency 
rooms. Each shelf was fitted with an image only visible from above. These shelves 
allowed researchers to test the claim often made by NDEers that they are able to 
observe their own resuscitation from a perspective outside their own bodies and 
usually high above. Over four years, the study observed 2,060 cardiac arrests. Of 
those, 140 survived. Of the survivors interviewed, nine reported having an NDE. Of 
the nine reports, two involved detailed descriptions of their surrounds. Of these two 
descriptions, one was described as ‘accurate’ (Parnia et al. 2014, 1799—1805). 
Unfortunately, this lone patient was also resuscitated in a room lacking a shelf.   
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Closing Thoughts on Science, Religion and Methods 
They profess to be possessed of superior knowledge. – Hippocrates, On the 
Sacred Disease 
Scientific methods routinely generate surprising intersubjective and intermodal 
agreement under specified conditions. Religious methods do not. Instead, 
disagreement usually results. There are, at present, no specified conditions under 
which this persistent disagreement can be cured in any way that is not post hoc. This 
persistent disagreement is evidence that the methods are unreliable. Therefore, the 
ongoing conflict between science and religion can be settled on the side of science, 
for the time being. Its methods are surprisingly successful. 
Can there be any room for religious epistemic methods? Or are believers 
irresponsible when they take up religious methods? My attitude to these questions is 
permissive. I have argued that religious methods cannot presently be shown to be 
reliable, and that, therefore, they should not be used in the justification of scientific 
theories. Religious methods should not be brought to bear on questions of theory 
choice in science. This in no way excludes religious methods from contributing to 
human knowledge in the most general sense. Outside of science, religious epistemic 
methods may help their practitioners to understand the depth and breadth of their 
own personal emotional, experiential, and ethical potential. They may expand the 
imagination and bring narrative structure to human life. No intelligent (or perhaps, 
no interesting) person is a mere conglomerate of reliable methods. To argue that such 
methods are best done away entirely with is to commit, as Reichenbach puts it, ‘a 
naïve intellectualism,’ to which he adds: ‘Music too has an effect of the highest order 
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on men and may be one of the best means of spiritual and moral education. But we 
do not speak of the meaning of music’ (1938, 58—9).   
Even within science, religious methods have a place, and their place is within the 
context of discovery. These unreliable methods may legitimately contribute to the 
development of, or the inspiration behind, new theories. Indeed, the history of 
science is replete with examples of religious methods being used in just such a way. 
Modern geology, for example, flourished as a research program many of the 
assumptions of which were shaped by biblical histories, including the story of the 
Noachian deluge. Subsequent appeals to fossil evidence, stratigraphy and erosion 
corrected the theory where it fell short. From religion, the theory was received; from 
science, the tools were received with which we might put the theory to test. 
At present, there is no single board or committee whose role it is to accredit all 
the scientific methods. The acceptance of a method as scientific is often an organic 
process, largely achieved through the building of peer consensus, lengthy 
investigation, argument, and teamwork. Perhaps above all else, criticism of the 
methods used to justify some claim is the centrally important path to methodological 
progress. Criticism leads to progress by the discerning exclusion of certain methods 
from certain domains of investigation, and an increase in confidence of a method’s 
accuracy when successive attempts to invalidate the method fail. The methods we 
accept as reliable today are always open to further testing, and may, in principle, be 
rejected tomorrow. The conditions under which we take some method to be reliable 
are constantly threatened by new discoveries. 
Consider, for example, the early development and subsequent testing of the 
carbon-14 dating method. The prospects for using radiocarbon as a proxy for dating 
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organic materials were realized by Willard Libby in the late 1940s (Libby et al. 1949, 
Arnold and Libby 1949). To establish that radiocarbon might be a reliable proxy, 
Libby analysed the carbon-14 content of wood samples from the ancient Egyptian 
tombs of Sneferu and Zoser, whose estimated age was independently established by 
Egyptologists on the basis of historical Egyptian chronologies and calendars. With 
gratifying success, Libby found that the carbon-14 content of the wood samples was 
the same as the estimated content. The content estimate was made according to a 
theory stating that the half-life of carbon-14 is approximately 5568 years. Libby was 
slightly wrong about this, and most contemporary researchers presume a half-life of 
5730 years. The important point, however, is that Libby’s initial results were highly 
promising. His method agreed with what Egyptologists had already said was the case, 
within an estimated margin of error of 450 years (Arnold and Libby 1949, 228).  
Despite Libby’s initial success, some of the assumptions of radiometric dating 
were criticized in the light of other evidence. Indeed, some early discrepancies 
between dates derived by carbon-14 and well-established historical records led Libby 
himself to consider the possibility that the concentration of carbon-14 in the 
biosphere had not remained constant through time. Libby’s original experiments 
assumed a constant concentration of carbon across all eras. This assumption was in 
line with a local inductive principle: the future resembles the past with respect to the 
concentration of carbon-14. However, other researchers were sceptical that the 
concentration of carbon-14 should have any reason to have remained constant over 
time. More likely, given that the sources of carbon-14 vary in their rates of emission, 
the concentration of carbon-14 should vary accordingly. Thus, the deviation between 
the historical and radiometric records was traced to the variation in the 
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concentration of carbon-14. Carbon-14 content is now calibrated against other 
benchmarks such as tree ring data and the results of uranium-thorium dating on cave 
and coral samples (Reimer et al. 2013). To put the example in Alstonian terms, the 
overrider system of radiometric dating, the set of acceptable underminers and 
rebutters, has changed considerably between 1949 and the present day.  
Now, just as there is no board or committee to accredit all the scientific methods, 
there is similarly no committee tasked with accrediting the methods by which new 
methods are offered up. Libby’s idea to use carbon-14 to measure the age of organic 
samples came to him upon consideration of the worldwide distribution and mixing 
of radiocarbon. When asked, in an interview, why he had been the first to even think 
of the possibility of radiocarbon dating, he answered:  
Carbon dating requires you to think of the world as being one system. Consider 
the propositions, simple as they are, but they involve this assumption of 
worldwide mixing. That was quite a block. Here I was talking about the ocean, I 
mean the entire ocean mass, the entire biosphere, the entire atmosphere, as 
though it were in my test tube. (Marlowe 1979) 
Had this picture of worldwide mixing been false, there would be little value in 
radiometric dating, and Libby would have been drawn down a blind alley. Yet Libby’s 
method was successful, and his reasoning was inspired by his unique perspective. 
Galileo also had a unique perspective, suffering as he did from a degenerative eye 
disease. That is not just a bad joke. Galileo’s worsening vision may have inspired his 
decision to affix a diaphragm to his telescope, probably after having found that 
squinting aided his own worsening vision. The reasons that investigators have for 
devising new methods cannot be accounted for. And of course, as for the common 
methods of visual or auditory perception, no person devised them or willingly 
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decided to use them at all. Most of us were just born with eyes and ears attached. This 
needn’t mean we are compelled to use them, or that we must be hardwired to accept 
their testimony. That some organ is “strapped to us” for life need not imply that we 
must use it to investigate the world. There are good reasons that we use our eyes, 
rather than our genitals, to detect distant objects, yet we are born quite unwillingly, 
but thankfully, equipped with both.  
The emphasis that I have placed on cross-checking as central to the task of 
justification stands opposed to the foundationalist claim that some methods are basic 
and deliver non-inferential knowledge to believers. In arguing that some methods 
require no rational justification, foundationalists attempt to turn the justified 
application of perception into an irrational faith. In so doing, the door is left open by 
the foundationalist to accept other irrational faiths. The notion that sense experience 
is given, or typically unproblematic, is distasteful for reasons that are perhaps more 
personal than public. I will openly share these personal reasons, if only to illustrate 
the very practical nature of the problem of justifying perception. As a sufferer of 
hypnogogic hallucinations, I am often awoken at night by all manner of strange 
creatures who either crawl along the walls, or who mischievously pull the bedsheets 
from the bed. Sometimes, large spiders crawl all over the duvet. Other times, giant 
snails and slugs refuse to leave the room no matter how hard I work to corral them. 
They are awful little beasts. Most times, I leap from the bed and begin to shoo the 
apparitions from my room, but quickly I notice that I cannot grab the creatures with 
my hands, and that I cannot hear them. Try as I might to convince others, no-one 
else in the house can see them. It occurs to me that a three-foot long snail is not a 
creature that I have ever encountered before. And although I can see the creatures, 
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in all their grotesque visual detail, I return to bed, assured not by sight, but by other 
considerations. Naturally, my initial terror is caused by the strange sight that my eyes 
behold. But can the terror be justified? On the most rudimentary sort of inspection, 
it cannot be. 
Of course, I could decide to trust the evidence of my vision and throw out all of 
the evidence from other sources, but this would be to commit a kind of vision 
chauvinism. One must be fair in one’s dealings with the various sources that one has 
available for justification. No method is welcome which, after investigation, 
persistently refuses to agree with the others, and which demands acceptance, 
obedience, or endless attention at the expense of all others. Yet this kind of 
chauvinism is regularly taken up by religious believers as a matter of religious 
practice. Consider the example of Kurt Wise, a young Earth creationist who struggled 
in the course of his PhD research in geology to reconcile the results of science with 
the word of the Bible:  
Science said the sun came before the earth—or at least at the same time—and the 
Bible said that the earth came three days before the sun. Whereas science said 
that the sea creatures came before plants and the land creatures came before 
flying creatures, the Bible indicated that plants preceded sea creatures and flying 
creatures preceded land creatures. (Wise 2000, 352) 
The persistent disagreement between science and scripture nagged at Wise for 
months. Finally, he decided to take to the Bible with a pair of scissors, excising any 
verse that went against the results of science. He sliced and chopped and hacked. By 
the time he had completed the task, there was very little of his holy book left intact. 
If science were right, then the Bible was mostly wrong. And if the Bible were right, 
then science was mostly wrong. He made a decision: ‘It was there that night that I 
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accepted the Word of God and rejected all that would ever counter it’ (Wise 2000, 
354). This is Bible chauvinism. The agreement generated by a variety of natural 
epistemic methods could not conquer one single, contradictory, uncorroborated 
method.  
Perhaps, like Galileo with his telescope, religious practitioners are pioneers of 
methods which will soon become commonplace in every laboratory in every 
university. Yet whereas Galileo’s results were corroborated within only a couple of 
years from the date of his first observations, the results of religious methods have 
struggled for tens of thousands of years to find reliable external corroboration. 
Religious methods have been well studied, both formally and informally. Associated 
supernatural claims of paranormal, prophetic, and extrasensory abilities have been 
investigated in a variety of scientific contexts without much success at all. The 
subsequent decline of formal research in these fields is mostly due to a lack of 
funding, which has been, in turn, mostly due to a lack of success. If there are reliable 
religious methods, they are unique in their ability to remain hidden. In this case, the 
absence of evidence should be considered evidence of absence.  
Yet still, religious epistemic methods are argued to provide special knowledge of 
the world, of a kind that utterly transcends the meagre scraps of belief that reason 
and sense experience can provide. Religious methods have failed, to this point, to 
prove their mettle. Practitioners fail to agree with each other, and their results fail to 
agree with the results of science and common sense. The conflict between religion 
and science resides at this very point of tension. Religious believers claim 
authoritative knowledge is delivered to them by methods that cannot be 
corroborated. This failure to find corroboration is just what we should expect if the 
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methods are not, in fact, reliable. One who accepts the deliverances of self-supporting 
religious methods, and thereby believes a proposition that stands in conflict with 
other results that have been independently established by a variety of alternative 
sources, is making the worst kind of trade. This is to trade good sense for falsehoods, 
to exchange justified knowledge for a sense of certainty. Such a trade is akin to selling 
all of one’s worldly possessions, only to gamble away the money on a single hand. But 
the way to make money, as any investor will tell you, is to diversify investments and 
manage risk. And so, if I may conclude with a dose of irony by quoting the book of 
Proverbs: ‘Buy the truth, and do not sell it, also wisdom and instruction and 
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